



The diffusion of the Internet in China

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**THE DIFFUSION OF THE
INTERNET IN CHINA**

by

William Abbott Foster

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A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the
COMMITTEE ON BUSINESS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

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
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ABSTRACT

The number of Internet users in China has grown from 8.9 million users in 1999 to 22 million in 2001. However, estimates of users alone do not give an adequate picture of the Internet in China. The Global Diffusion of the Internet (GDI) Project has developed a framework for looking at Internet diffusion at a country level across six dimensions: pervasiveness, geographical dispersion, sectoral absorption, connectivity infrastructure, organizational infrastructure, and sophistication of use.

China's Interconnecting Network regime has shaped the pattern of Internet diffusion in the country. The Chinese government made the decision in 1996 to allow two organizations to run interconnecting networks that provide commercial global Internet connectivity. Under a strategy known as "letting the sons compete", it has authorized more and more state owned organizations to run competing interconnecting networks.

Under this state-coordinated competition, China has diffused rapidly along all the dimensions of the global diffusion of the Internet framework. A world class backbone infrastructure is being built by multiple carriers. Almost all government agencies and most major businesses have a Web presence. 22 million Chinese are using the Internet at least once a month. However, though the infrastructure is being built and the cost of access is dropping rapidly, most organizations have not yet significantly redesigned their business processes to take advantage of the Internet.

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

If one wants to understand how the Internet is changing the world, a valuable place to start is with the world's most populous country—China—and how it is absorbing the Internet. The Internet is diffusing rapidly and extensively throughout China. Five thousand users in 1994 grew to over eight million by the end of 1999. During 2000 that number grew from 8.9 million to 22 million.¹ Although it is unlikely that the number of users will continue to increase by 30% every six months, if growth can be sustained at anywhere near half that level – a big “if” – in several years China will have more Internet users than any other country on earth. However, the number of users alone does not give an adequate representation of the impact of the Internet on a country.

Table 1: China Statistics (1998)²	
Population	1.27 billion
Literacy (over 15)	81.5%
GDP	\$4.42 trillion
GDP per capita	\$700
Telephones	105 million
Television	300 million
Administrative	23 provinces, 5 autonomous regions, 4 municipalities.

China is no stranger to information technology. The technology of writing has been an integral part of the Chinese civilization and the empires that have governed it for millennia. During the Qing dynasty, three copies of every tax receipt were made: one for

¹ China Network Information Center (CNNIC), Semi-Annual Survey Report on Internet Development in China (2000.1 and 2001.1) Available at <http://www.cnnic.cn/develst/e-cnnic200007.shtml> (Current January 16, 2001).

² “China,” *The World Factbook 1999*, see <http://www.odci.gov> (Current 19 May 2000).

the taxpayer, one for the magistrate, and one for the Department of Revenues in Beijing.³ Writing strengthened and supported the hierarchy. The Internet, however, represents a new and untamed information technology. It is possible now to exchange information much more rapidly and in ways that potentially bypass traditional hierarchies, promoting informational flow that breaks down boundaries. China has chosen to embrace the Internet despite the potential dangers. What the ultimate impact will be has yet to be seen, but it is clear that China's pattern of Internet diffusion is unique.

This thesis is part of a larger study of the Global Diffusion of the Internet, a project that has included case studies of over 25 countries and utilizes a framework of Internet diffusion (outlined in Chapter II) that makes possible longitudinal and cross-country comparisons. This thesis applies a case study methodology to one country—the People's Republic of China (PRC)—instead of just to an organization. It is one in a long line of country case studies done over the past 25 years by the MOSAIC Group under the leadership of Dr. Seymour Goodman. The author actively participated in the development of the Global Diffusion of the Internet Framework and has applied it to China between the years 1997 and 2000.

The Internet is instantiated in a country in a manner that reflects the interaction of cultural, political, and exogenous forces. Though it is part of the global Internet and utilizes the same TCP/IP protocol, the Internet in China is diffusing according to its own unique pattern. Because the diffusion of the Internet involves a cluster of technologies,

³ Pao Chao Hsieh, *The Government of China (1644-1911)* Frank Cass & Co., 1966.

the study of Internet diffusion requires a method of analysis that conceptualizes the relationships involved. At the least, a framework must take into account the roles of users, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), telecommunication providers, and the government. The framework that we have developed allows us to graphically represent the unique pattern of Internet diffusion on a country-wide basis.

The Global Diffusion of the Internet Project has illustrated again and again that the role of the former PTT or telephone monopoly in the Internet has a major impact on the pattern of Internet diffusion in a country. Instead of allowing China Telecom, the former PTT, to have a monopoly on backbone and international interconnect services, the Chinese State Council made a decision in 1996 to allow four backbone networks to connect to the global Internet and to provide service to Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and end users. This “Interconnecting Network” regime was gradually expanded to include more “favored sons”, all state majority-owned corporations.⁴ Although the regime created competition, the State still is able to actively coordinate the roles of each of the competing networks. Lovelock has called this general approach of the Chinese government to telecommunications “state-coordinated competition” and has emphasized the role of bargaining in this coordination process.⁵ Even as China prepares for WTO accession and begins to lay in place the regulatory rules to govern the telecommunications sector in general and the Internet in particular, the legacy of the

Interconnecting Regime and the bargaining approach is being embodied in these new rules and reflected in the country's pattern of Internet diffusion.

The Internet in China is worth studying because of its potential impact on culture and society. Unlike the past where information was mediated by the State, the mass media, and the work unit, Chinese citizens with Internet connections and a command of English have unprecedented direct and immediate access to information and people around the world. Because of an abundance of Chinese language content, those who can only read Chinese still have access to a wealth of information.

Chinese President Jiang Zemin in a March 2000 speech urged Communist Party cadres to embrace the Net. Pointing to the Internet as the site of the Party's next struggle, Jiang urged Party members to keep up with the technology. "Internet technology is going to change the international situation, military combat, production, culture, and economic aspects of our daily life significantly," Jiang reportedly said.⁶

For US policymakers, the Chinese Internet represents a new and rapidly expanding border. It is a border that neither China nor the US fully understands. The possibility for misunderstanding is great because the Internet is not only transforming the relationship between the two countries, it is also transforming the countries themselves. The Chinese government has imposed its own unique regime on the networks in China

⁴ The term "Interconnecting Network" or *hulian wangluo* is used in the 1996 regulations. There is no widespread agreement on how to refer to these Chinese networks that have permission to connect to the global Internet. Sometimes the term is translated "InterLinked Networks." Other times the term "backbone networks" is used. Others use the term "network service provider" (NSP) as differentiated from an "Internet service provider" (ISP). A glossary of acronyms is at the end of this manuscript.

⁵ P. Lovelock, *The Evolution of China's National Information Infrastructure (NII) Initiative: A Policy-Making Analysis*, Unpublished Dissertation, University of Hong Kong, 1999.

⁶ P. Lovelock, "MFC Internet Update – March 13, 2000," *Made for China* available at

that connect to the Internet. Although the United States and China both participate in the Internet, the regimes that they use to govern their networks are very different.

For foreign businesses seeking to invest either directly in the telecommunications sector or who have supply or value chains that are influenced by the Internet, it is essential to understand these differences. By placing Internet diffusion in a historical perspective and by providing a framework for making sense of the Internet in China, I hope to contribute to a dialogue that is useful to foreign businessmen making investments in China.

Finally, the Internet is playing a significant role in the globalization of our planet. The Internet is a tool for creating the world that we want. A theory of global Internet diffusion should help us to understand this distributed tool and how policy-makers can guide it. This case study of China, as part of the larger Global Diffusion of the Internet Project, is a contribution to the development of such a theory of Internet diffusion. Some of the data incorporated in the country analysis are derived from three additional studies. One looks at Internet and e-commerce adoption in 18 Chinese electronics companies. Another explores the interactivity and transparency of selected government web sites. Finally, the third applies the same framework that is being used at national to Guangdong province. These separate studies provide much needed insight into the dimensions and determinants of the Chinese Internet diffusion.

The Global Diffusion of the Internet Framework is introduced in *Chapter II: Methodology*. Though the Global Diffusion of the Internet Framework provides the

overarching methodology for studying Internet diffusion on a country level, it is very helpful to also gather data at an organizational level.

Chapter III: Government Policy on the Internet provides a historical introduction to the Internet in China by focusing on the questions of governance and security. Many Westerners are surprised that the Chinese government has allowed the Internet to develop in China, given Western perceptions of the Communist Party's needs to control the flow of information. Lovelock argues that most foreign observers are missing the mark when they question why the Chinese government is taking the risk in allowing its citizens access to the Internet.⁷ He points out that the Internet is an essential component of the Chinese government's efforts to use information technology to decentralize decision-making while continuing to control it centrally—a process known in China as “informatization.” The Chinese government has always seen the adoption of the Internet as part of this larger process.

During the heyday of the Soviet Union there was much talk about the potential of information technology to make central planning work. It was hoped that by providing decision-makers with faster and more accurate information, they could better manage the economy. As documented by the University of Arizona's MOSAIC Group, the attempts by the Soviets to actually put this concept into practice failed.⁸ The failure was in part due to both the inefficiencies of centralized control, combined with the limitations of the

⁷ P. Lovelock, “E-China: Why the Internet is unstoppable,” *China Economic Quarterly*, Vol. 3, No. 1 first quarter 1999, pp. 19-35.

⁸ W. K. McHenry and S.E. Goodman, “MIS in USSR Industrial Enterprises: The Limits of Reform from Above,” *Communications of the ACM*, 29, 11 (Nov., 1986), pp. 1034-1043. See also S. E. Goodman, “The Information Technologies and Soviet Society: Problems and Prospects,” *IEEE Transactions on Systems*,

technology. Will the Chinese Communists be able to implement what eluded their Soviet counterparts? By decentralizing decision-making and by taking advantage of the newly available power of distributed computing, can the Chinese central government maintain “control” over the economy without having to manage decisions on a day-to-day, hands-on basis? Or will companies and local authorities choose to under-invest in automation, so as to not make their operations too transparent to higher authorities?

In order to understand the dynamics of China’s informatization efforts, it is helpful to examine the process by which the Chinese government has sought to manage their portion of the Internet. This process has been complicated by the fact that multiple Ministries have seen the Internet as encroaching on their domain (see Appendix A). To compound the problem, many of these government organizations hope to economically leverage their role in the Internet.

Chapter IV: Internet Security examines the role security issues play in the Chinese government’s attitudes towards the Internet. Chinese authorities have a number of intertwined concerns. The problem of protecting government and commercial networks from hacking, computer crime, and even information warfare is intermixed with a concern that the Internet will threaten state security by enabling dissent and offering a means for organizing resistance.

The Chinese leadership recognizes the potential of the Internet to coordinate dissidence. Up to this point, it has chosen to block a limited number of Web sites dealing with controversial issues including Taiwan, Tibet, and Falun Gong, as well as sites of

leading media outlets such as the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*.⁹ The Ministry of Public Security (MPS) prosecuted a number of individuals associated with dissident e-magazines, which have pestered Chinese leaders. The aggressive prosecution of Falun Gong members may, in part, be attributed to Falun Gong's ability to use the Internet to rapidly mobilize.

Although the threat of dissidence may be an issue for some, there is a larger concern on the part of many about how the Internet will contribute to the massive restructuring that China is undergoing. The overarching question becomes will government decision makers, their organizations, their nation, and their culture be winners or losers in the new economy brought about by a globally distributed technology.

Chapter V: Commercial Use of the Internet explores how quickly the Chinese government is realizing economic benefits from the Internet. Economic activity is not only driven from the top down, it is also driven from the bottom up. The potential benefit of the Internet to the Chinese is far greater than just the amount of e-commerce transactions. Users are establishing relationships, visiting Web sites, building their own Web sites, and exploring new technologies as they strive to profit from this new universe. In order to understand the extent and sophistication of e-commerce in China, I did a survey of 18 electronics manufacturers in China. This study explores the level of e-commerce sophistication and factors associated with e-commerce adoption. The survey showed that firms using e-commerce are more likely to have Chief Information Officers who have visited the West. It also showed that firms that were most sophisticated in

⁹ It is important to recognize that it is relatively easy to use a proxy server located outside of China to

terms of e-commerce had embraced decentralized decision making and were using modern management strategies such as having a technology plan. The adoption of e-commerce in China can not be separated from other aspects of the globalization of China.

Chapter VI: Government Use of the Internet looks at the Chinese Government Online Project by analyzing a number of specific government websites at the national and provincial level for their levels of transparency and interactivity. Almost all government agencies now have websites at the national, provincial, and even city level although in most cases the information flow is unidirectional. National sites and sites located on the East coast in cities like Shenzhen and Shanghai tend to have the highest degree of interactivity and transparency. As you go further West, less information is provided at the sites and they are less transparent and interactive.

Chapter VII: Dimensions of Internet Diffusion in China explores the dimensions of Internet diffusion using the framework that is laid out in *Chapter II: Methodology* and the background information described in chapters three through six. By looking longitudinally at Internet diffusion across six dimensions, this chapter illustrates China's unique pattern of Internet diffusion. China is different from many developing economies in that there were competing national Internet backbones as early as 1996. Both these backbones extended to every province in the country. Thus in 1996 China had a high level of Geographic Dispersion relative to its per capita Internet users. China's Connectivity Infrastructure has been rapidly expanding as China has invested in multiple multigigabyte backbones. Many Chinese organizations both public and private are

access any of the "blocked" sites.

primarily using the Internet for e-mail and information gathering. The Web is primarily being used for brochureware although some government and commercial organizations now have interactive websites. It is not clear how long it will take for Chinese organizations to re-engineer their business processes to take advantage of the Internet.

Chapter VIII: Determinants of Internet Diffusion in China looks at the determinants of China's unique pattern of Internet diffusion. The determinants are those factors that are critical for Internet diffusion that we have inductively arrived at after looking at many countries. It is not surprising that in China the influence of most of the determinants has been positive. Clearly, the government has played the major role in the pattern of diffusion of the Internet in China.

It is very easy for an outside observer to become fixated on the machinations at the center of government and forget that a significant part of the decision-making regarding the Internet is happening at the provincial and local levels. Different enterprises, cities, and provinces will, in their efforts to expand economically, take different paths in carving out their niches in the global economy. Chinese decision-making takes place in a matrix of vertical (between higher and lower territorial levels) and horizontal (at the same territorial level) ties.¹⁰ One organization will often not be able to issue binding orders to another. Instead, a great deal gets done through consensus building, personal ties, and compromise. China's government is both hierarchical and networked. Distributed technology both threatens the complex interaction of organizations within the network and offers the promise of making the process of

¹⁰ K. Lieberthal, *Governing China: from Revolution Through Reform*, W. W. Norton, 1995.

governing more effective.

Chapter IX: Provincial Case Study of the Internet in Guangdong examines the dimensions of Internet diffusion for Guangdong and looks at some of the factors that may be responsible for making Guangdong one of the most wired provinces in China. Unfortunately, we have not been able to update our study of Internet diffusion in Guangdong, which was done in 1998. By the year 2000, the dimensions of Internet diffusion for China as a whole approached the dimensions of Internet diffusion in 1998 in Guangdong.

Chapter X: Prospects analyzes each of the dimensions of Internet diffusion according to the determinants, and examines the potential future for the Internet in China. In all of the dimensions of our framework, China has yet to reach the top level. This is the level achieved by the United States and other leading Internet economies as early as 1998. The Chinese government is striving to become an information economy. It is building a world class infrastructure with fiber to most major buildings and villages. It is approaching informatization and electronic commerce as phenomena that can be implemented from the top down. How well these top down efforts will succeed will depend on their interaction with the impact of globalization, Chinese culture, and the decentralized nature of the Internet.

CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY FOR STUDYING INTERNET DIFFUSION

In order to do a case study of Internet diffusion at a national level it is helpful to have a framework for interpreting Internet diffusion. I present here a framework that can be used to evaluate both the dimensions and determinant of Internet diffusion.

In this chapter, I present the Global Diffusion of the Internet Framework for describing the diffusion and absorption of the Internet.¹¹ The unit of analysis is the nation-state. The fact that the nation-state still makes a difference in the era of globalization is illustrated by the fact that there are distinct differences in the pattern of Internet diffusion between different countries. These differences are shaped by cultural and governmental factors, factors that can best be studied by comparing the dimensions and determinants of Internet diffusion of individual nations. This framework is based on an on-going inductive study of the Internet in a wide representation of countries around the world. In developing country studies of Internet diffusion based on this framework, we hope to accomplish a number of goals:¹²

¹¹ The author participated actively as part of a team in the development of this framework for the Global Diffusion of the Internet Project. Other members of the team included Seymour Goodman, Grey Burkhardt, Larry Press, Jonathan Woodward, Bill McHenry and Peter Wolcott. The groundwork for the framework was laid out in P. Wolcott, S. Goodman, and G. Burkhardt, "The Information Technology Capability of Nations: A Framework for Analysis", 1996, http://mosaic.unomaha.edu/ITC_1996.pdf (Current January 4, 2001). The Global Diffusion of the Internet framework was first documented in S.E. Goodman, G. E. Burkhardt, W. A. Foster, L. I. Press, Z. Tan, and J. Woodard, *The Global Diffusion of the Internet Project: An Initial Inductive Study*, (Fairfax, VA: The MOSAIC Group, March 1998 (a)). Executive summaries available at <http://www.agsd.com/gdi97/gdi97.html> (Current July 19, 2000). This chapter draws on a draft by the author of paper on the Global Diffusion of the Internet Project methodology. That draft built on an earlier version by Peter Wolcott. Bill McHenry later coordinated the revision and extension of that document as P. Wolcott, L. Press, W. McHenry, S. Goodman, W. Foster, "A Framework for the Assessing the Global Diffusion of the Internet" Mosaic Group: Working Draft, August 14, 2000. This document is referred to in the above text as Wolcott et. al. (2000) and it has been accepted for publication by JAIS.

¹² These goals were first articulated by Seymour Goodman in a series of presentations he gave regarding the Global Diffusion of the Internet Project.

- To provide a useful, detailed framework of analysis for describing the diffusion and absorption of the Internet in a country.
- To provide some explanation of how a nation's present capacity came into being and how it is evolving.
- To give particular attention to policy issues and governmental roles with regard to the spread and control of the Internet in any country.
- To apply this analysis to a wide variety of countries with the intent of trying to find a few basic patterns for the absorption of the Internet around the world.

E-Readiness Indicators

During the past three years there have been multiple attempts to develop systems for assessing the E-Readiness of a country. These studies are based on the premise that there are stages to the integration of information technology into a society and that it is useful to be able to assign values to where a country is. The Global Diffusion of the Internet Project falls broadly within this category though it is focused specifically on the Internet and not the general informatization of a country.

The Center for International Development at Harvard University has developed the Readiness for the Networked World, A Guide for Developing Countries.¹³ This assessment tool evaluates 19 different indicators at four stages of development. The 19 indicators are grouped into five groups. This tool is primarily designed as a self-learning exercise for leaders at the national, state, or municipal level to think through where their

community is in terms of information and communication technologies and where it should be going.

The “Readiness for the Networked World” tool builds on an earlier one by Computer Systems Policy Project.¹⁴ This tool provides a list of 23 questions for community leaders to ask about the community itself. This assessment tool also produces a rating that indicates which of four progressive ‘stages’ of development the country is in. There are also other e-commerce assessment tools such as the one developed by the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Electronic Commerce Steering Group.¹⁵

The Global Diffusion of the Internet Framework is more than just an assessment tool; it provides a framework for analyzing the impact of different determinants on patterns of Internet diffusion. The pattern of diffusion is more important than the value of any one dimension and the relationship between the determinants. A Global Diffusion of the Internet case study is exploratory. Robinson and Crenshaw have tested the statistical interaction between numerous social, political, and cultural factors using Network Wizards domain names surveys as a proxy for Internet diffusion and World Bank World Development Indicators.¹⁶ They have shown that “Internet capacity is not in

¹³ Center for International Development at Harvard University, “Readiness for the Networked World,” available at <http://www.readiness.guide.org> (Current January 15, 2001).

¹⁴ Computers Systems Policy Project, “Readiness Guide for Living in the Networked World,” available at www.cspp.org.

¹⁵ APEC, “E-commerce Readiness Assessment,” available at http://www.ecommerce.gov/apec/docs/readiness_guide_files/readiness_guide_5.pdf, (Current January 30, 2001).

¹⁶ K. K. Robinson and E. M. Crenshaw, “Cyber-Space and Post-Industrial Transformations: A Cross-National Analysis of Internet Development,” Ohio State University Department of Sociology (December 1999, paper under review).

fact a simple linear function of economic and political development, but rather has been driven by complex interactions.”¹⁷

These interactions are indeed complex. The Global Diffusion of the Internet Framework provides a way of both organizing data and exploring the relationships that are driving diffusion. The purpose is not to supplant statistical analysis but rather to begin to pave the way for it.

A Framework for Analyzing the Internet within a Country

Wolcott, Goodman, and Burkhart argue that a useful analytic framework for analyzing information technology in a country has a number of characteristics.¹⁸ The framework should be rich enough to capture the diversity of experiences that countries have with technology. At the same time, the number of variables should not overwhelm the mind’s ability to keep track of them. In the case of the Internet, each variable should describe something that is both intuitively obvious and, to some extent, measurable. You do not want variables that overlap, just as you do not want a collection of variables that only partially covers the phenomena of the Internet or leaves important aspects out.

Values for the variables should proceed in an ordered way from less developed to more developed. The values or levels should be defined in such a way that insures that people looking at the same raw data will assign the same values. Much of the data about the Internet is “messy” and incomplete. The values need to be structured in such a way as to minimize ambiguity. Wolcott, Goodman, and Burkhart also made a strong case for

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Wolcott, Goodman, Burkhart, 1996, op. cit.

having a graphical representation for displaying all of the variables together for a single country, and to be able to show a time series using the same representation.¹⁹

The Global Diffusion of the Internet Project in 1997, building on the work laid out in Wolcott, Goodman, and Burkhart, settled on six dimensions for its framework for capturing Internet diffusion at any given year. The dimensions were developed by a team of six people, including the author, with expertise in studying the Internet in a wide variety of countries including the US, China, Finland, Chile, Cuba, the Gulf States, and India, among others. The dimensions were chosen based on how well they “covered” each of the countries studied. We have since applied the framework to Internet diffusion in over 30 countries. Though we have made a few corrections in the framework, we have found the framework itself to be an excellent tool for analyzing the Internet in each of these countries.

Research Methods

Like many MIS researchers, we are investigating the instantiation of technology in an organization, only instead of looking only at one particular business we are looking at a nation state--in this case China--as an organization. The methodology of the Global Diffusion of the Internet Project is aligned with interpretation rather than positivism. It is only through interpretation that we have been able to get at the “rich organizational and political processes whereby a given set of information technology is instantiated.”²⁰ It has long been recognized that interpretive methods, along with surveys, field experiments

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Allen Lee “Researching MIS,” *Rethinking Management Information Systems*, New York: Oxford, 1999.

and case studies are most appropriate for studying information systems phenomena at the level of an entire society.²¹ This is not to discount the value of quantitative information, but only to emphasize that qualitative methods are valuable, particularly in the early stages of country research. These qualitative studies may give rise to more and more quantitative methods.

The framework is valuable because it calls attention to multiple dimensions rather than relying solely on a single indicator such as users per country. Those who use it as an interpretive tool are pushed into exploring the dynamics of the Internet to a greater extent than if they just viewed the Internet through a single indicator.

We use a spiral process where each interview allows us to gather more data on the determinants of Internet diffusion for the country, refining our theory. We then can present our theories to new interviewees to see if they have a different perspective or anything to add. As each additional interviewee begins to add less and less new information, we begin to have confidence in our evaluation of the dimensions and determinants for that particular country. In this sense, we are applying the concept of the hermeneutic circle as expounded by Lee.²² Our interviewing methodology has parallels to qualitative interviewing²³ and grounded theory.²⁴

This particular case study of China draws on interviews, news stories, translations of regulations, web pages of Chinese organizations, conference presentations,

²¹ R. D. Galliers and F. F. Land, "Choosing Appropriate Information Systems Research Methodologies," *Communications of the ACM*, 30 (11), 1987, pp. 900-902.

²² A. Lee, *op. cit.*

²³ H.J. Rubin and I.S. Rubin, *Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data*, Sage Publications, 1995.

²⁴ B.G. Glasser and A.L. Strauss, *The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research*,

and a survey of 18 electronics companies. The author has visited China three times and has conducted multiple interviews with a cross section of decision-makers drawn from government, academia, and the Internet business community. These interviews are invaluable in getting a handle on not only the dimensions, but particularly the determinants of Internet diffusion.

Diffusion of Innovations

The Global Diffusion of the Internet Framework can be seen within the context of Everett Rogers' studies of Internet diffusion.²⁵ Rogers identified the Internet as involving not just the diffusion of a single technology, but rather involving a "technology cluster". The Internet involves many different innovations such as the TCP/IP protocol, the PC, SMTP (email), the Web, and Napster. Rogers points out that few studies of technology clusters have been undertaken.²⁶ To compound matters, the Internet involves adoption decisions by individuals, organizations, and governments.

The Global Diffusion of the Internet Framework is an attempt to come up with a way of dealing with the fact that the Internet is a technology cluster and involves decision-making at multiple levels of society. The Global Diffusion of the Internet Project specifies six dimensions of Internet Diffusion: Pervasiveness, Geographic Dispersion, Sectoral Absorption, Connectivity Infrastructure, Organizational Infrastructure, and Sophistication of Use.

Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1967.

²⁵ E. Rogers, *Diffusion of Innovations*, 4th ed., New York: The Free Press, 1995.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 235.

Pervasiveness

Pervasiveness is designed to capture the number of users per capita and is measured in five levels. Each level represents a range of one order of magnitude. Thus, a country is described as having more than one user in a thousand people but less than one in a hundred. There has been a great deal of debate as to what constitutes a user. Though different studies use different measures, there is some standardization in the past couple years around the concept that a user is defined as using the Internet at least once a month. Given the fact that in many countries users share accounts, extrapolating the number of users from the number of subscribers is a tricky process at best. Given the fuzziness associated with most estimates of users, we believe that making estimates in ranges of an order of magnitude is wiser than the false precision of an absolute number.

Table 2: The Pervasiveness of the Internet

Level 0	<i>Non-existent:</i> The Internet does not exist in a viable form in this country. No computers with international IP connections are located within the country. There may be some Internet users in the country; however, they obtain a connection via an international telephone call to a foreign ISP.
Level 1	<i>Embryonic:</i> The ratio of users per capita is on the order of magnitude of less than one in a thousand (less than 0.1%).
Level 2	<i>Established:</i> The ratio of Internet users per capita is on the order of magnitude of at least one in a thousand (0.1% or greater).
Level 3	<i>Common:</i> The ratio of Internet users per capita is on the order of magnitude of at least one in a hundred (1% or greater).
Level 4	<i>Pervasive:</i> The Internet is pervasive. The ratio of Internet users per capita is on the order of magnitude of at least one in 10 (10% or greater).

Geographic Dispersion

In many developing countries, the Internet is first available only in the capital city

or only in a subset of provincial capitals. Geographic Dispersion describes the physical dispersion of the Internet within a country according to the levels described in Table 3.

Table 3: The Geographic Dispersion of the Internet

Level 0	<i>Non-existent.</i> The Internet does not exist in a viable form in this country. No computers with international IP connections are located within the country. A country may be using UUCP connections for email and USEnet.
Level 1	<i>Single location:</i> Internet points-of-presence are confined to one major population center.
Level 2	<i>Moderately dispersed:</i> Internet points-of-presence are located in at least half of the first-tier political subdivisions of the country.
Level 3	<i>Highly dispersed:</i> Internet points-of-presence are located in at least three-quarters of the first-tier political subdivisions of the country.
Level 4	<i>Nationwide:</i> Internet points-of-presence are located in all first-tier political sub-divisions of the country. Rural dial-up access is publicly and commonly available and leased line connectivity is available.

Sectoral Absorption

Sectoral Absorption focuses on four major Internet-using sectors of society: academic, commercial, health, and public (government) sectors . The impact of the Internet on each sector is charted in Table 4. Personal use is not considered in this metric.

Table 4: Internet-using Sectors of the Economy

Sector	Subsectors	
Academic	Primary and Secondary education	University education
Commercial	Distribution, Finance Manufacturing	Retail Service
Health	Hospitals Clinics	Research Centers Physicians/Practitioners
Public	Central Government Regional and Local governments	Public companies Military

Internet use within each sector is rated as rare, moderate or common, as listed in Table 5. To rate the country as a whole, each sector with a "rare" rating is assigned one point, each "moderate" sector two points, and each "common" rating three points. These points are added together and then reduced to a single number using Table 6.

Table 5: Sectoral Use of the Internet

Sector	Rare	Moderate	Common
Academic - primary and secondary schools, universities	>0-10% have leased-line Internet connectivity	10-90% have leased-line Internet connectivity	>90% have leased-line Internet connectivity
Commercial-businesses with more than 100 employees	>0-10% have Internet servers	10-90% have Internet servers	>90% have Internet servers
Health-hospitals and clinics	>0-10% have leased-line Internet connectivity	10-90% have leased-line Internet connectivity	>90% have leased-line Internet connectivity
Public-top and second tier government entities	>0-10% have Internet servers	10-90% have Internet servers	>90% have Internet servers

Table 6: The Sectoral Absorption of the Internet

Sectoral point total	Absorption dimension rating	
0	Level 0	<i>Non-existent</i>
1-4	Level 1	<i>Rare</i>
5-7	Level 2	<i>Moderate</i>
8-9	Level 3	<i>Common</i>
10-12	Level 4	<i>Widely used</i>

The cut offs between rare and moderate and between moderate and common have been

established to carve out a large middle ground that is identifiable by different observers.

Connectivity Infrastructure

Connectivity infrastructure is comprised of four components: the aggregate bandwidth of the domestic backbone(s), the aggregate bandwidth of the international IP links, the number and type of inter-connection exchanges, and the type and sophistication of local access methods being used (Table 7).

Table 7: The Connectivity Infrastructure of the Internet

		Domestic backbone	International Links	Internet Exchanges	Access Methods
Level 0	<i>Non-existent</i>	None	None	None	None
Level 1	<i>Thin</i>	≤ 2 Mbps	< 128 Kbps	None	Modem
Level 2	<i>Expanded</i>	> 2 -- 200 Mbps	> 128 Mbps - - 45 Mbps	1	Modem 64 Kbps leased lines
Level 3	<i>Broad</i>	> 200 Mbps - - 100 Gbps	> 45 Mbps -- 10 Gbps	More than 1; Bilateral or Open	Modem > 64 Kbps leased lines
Level 4	<i>Immense</i>	> 100 Gbps	> 10 Gbps	Many; Both Bilateral and Open	$< 90\%$ modem > 64 Kbps leased lines

In our experience, the aspects of a country's Connectivity Infrastructure tend to cluster around two levels. Choosing the particular level depends on there being three out of four aspects of that level. When a country is clearly in between levels, we have often evaluated them as halfway between. Thus, a country halfway between Level 2 and Level 3 would be at Level 2.5

Organizational Infrastructure

Just as Connectivity Infrastructure assesses the extent and robustness of the

physical structure of the network, Organizational Infrastructure, derived from the number of ISPs and the competitive environment, assesses the robustness of the market and services themselves (see Table 8).

Table 8: The Organizational Infrastructure of the Internet

Level 0	<i>None:</i> The Internet is not present in this country.
Level 1	<i>Single:</i> A single ISP has a monopoly in the Internet service provision market. This ISP is generally owned or significantly controlled by the government.
Level 2	<i>Controlled:</i> There are only a few ISPs because the market is closely controlled through high barriers to entry. All ISPs connect to the international Internet through a monopoly telecommunications service provider. The provision of domestic infrastructure is also a monopoly.
Level 3	<i>Competitive:</i> The Internet market is competitive and there are many ISPs due to low barriers to market entry. The provision of international links is a monopoly, but the provision of domestic infrastructure is open to competition, or vice versa.
Level 4	<i>Robust:</i> There is a rich service provision infrastructure. There are many ISPs and low barriers to market entry. International links and domestic infrastructure are open to competition. There are collaborative organizations and arrangements such as public exchanges, industry associations, and emergency response teams.

Sophistication of Use

Because the Internet is a cluster of technologies, it is important to assess the Sophistication of Use of these technologies (see Table 9). At the conventional level, the Internet is mainly a substitute for earlier technologies. Web pages, for example, are often little more than “brochureware” that provide much the same information in similar format as has previously been done through print media. At the next level of sophistication, organizations within a country are reworking their business processes to take advantage

of the Internet. In the final stage, a country is not only utilizing the Internet but is developing new applications for it.

Table 9: The Sophistication of Use of the Internet

Level 0	<i>None:</i> The Internet is not used, except by a very small fraction of the population that logs into foreign services.
Level 1	<i>Minimal:</i> The small user community struggles to employ the Internet in conventional, mainstream applications.
Level 2	<i>Conventional:</i> The user community changes established practices somewhat in response to or in order to accommodate the technology, but few established processes are changed dramatically. The Internet is used as a substitute or straight-forward enhancement for an existing process (e.g. e-mail vs. post). This is the first level at which we can say that the Internet has "taken hold" in a country.
Level 3	<i>Transforming:</i> The user community's use of the Internet results in new applications, or significant changes in existing processes and practices, although these innovations may not necessarily stretch the boundaries of the technology's capabilities. One strong indicator of business process re-engineering to take advantage of the Internet, is that a significant number (over 5%) of Web sites, both government and business, are interactive.
Level 4	<i>Innovating:</i> The user community is discriminating and highly demanding. The user community is regularly applying, or seeking to apply the Internet in innovative ways that push the capabilities of the technology. The user community plays a significant role in driving the state-of-the-art and has a mutually beneficial and synergistic relationship with developers.

Framework Determinants

At the time the framework was first developed in 1997, it seemed important to explain what factors had led a country to a particular pattern of Internet diffusion. The original determinants for the Global Diffusion of the Internet Project Framework were developed using Porter's distinctions regarding the determinants of national advantage.²⁷

²⁷ M.E. Porter, *The Competitive Advantage of Nations: With a New Introduction*. New York: The Free

- *Factor conditions* refer to the factors of production, the inputs of any industry or enterprise.
- *Demand Conditions* describe the nature of the market with respect to the demands of sophisticated users, the breadth and variety of demands, and the size and pattern of demand growth.
- *Related and Supporting Industries* are the industries required for the development of other industries.
- The *Strategy, Structure, and Rivalry* determinant refers to the ease of formation of new companies, barriers to market entry, and the competitive environment.

The Global Diffusion of the Internet team, again using our country case studies as examples, isolated factors and groups across countries that could impact how the Internet was diffusing in a country. These determinants were then categorized according to Porter's four categories with his demand conditions being renamed as Constituents. It was decided that government should be treated on its own, separate from the other determinants.

Determinants and Dimensions

Wolcott (1999a), during his study of Turkey, made the decision to look at the determinants in terms of their relationship to whether they had an impact on various dimensions. At the same time, he rethought which determinants could be collapsed and where new determinants were needed.²⁸ After a number of iterations with the Global

Press, 1998.

²⁸ P. Wolcott, *The Diffusion of the Internet in the Republic of Turkey*, (University of Nebraska at Omaha, 1999 (a)) available at http://mosaic.unomaha.edu/TURK_PUB.pdf (Current January 30, 2001).

Diffusion of the Internet Project, the list of determinants continues to be refined and grouped. Table 10 includes a current list of the determinants in relation to the dimensions in which they have influence. We have found that though certain determinants have an impact on all dimensions others only influence certain dimensions.

Probing for the determinants of Internet diffusion results in a much richer case study. In addition, determinants may prove helpful to policy makers in understanding where the bottlenecks to diffusion are and provide guidance on what can be done to enhance diffusion or a particular pattern of it. It is important to note that there is no quantitative data to back up any claims of “causality” between the dimensions and the determinants. Certain researchers such as Hargittai have begun to do such research particularly in countries where there is the requisite data to start analysis such as in the OECD countries.²⁹ Many countries do not have the data that Hargittai’s model requires. In addition, the indicators that are available may not capture the complexity that is at work in a particular country.

We believe such interpretive work has merit and usefulness as part of an exploratory study. Though we make no claims of causality, our work with determinants does point to directionality in some cases. An X in the Perceived Value determinant in the Pervasiveness column of Table 10 would indicate not only a fairly direct influence, but an increase in Perceived Value would have a positive influence on Pervasiveness.

By including determinants in our framework, we make it less likely that certain factors will be overlooked in a country case study. The framework thus guides the

²⁹ E. Hargittai, “Weaving the Western Web: Explaining Differences In Internet Connectivity Among

questions we ask during our field research.

Table 10: Dimensions and Determinants

Determinants	Pervasiveness	Geographical Dispersion	Sectoral Absorption	Connectivity Infrastructure	Organizational Infrastructure	Sophistication use Use
TECHNOLOGY ITSELF						
Perceived Value	X	X	X	X	X	X
Ease of Use of the Internet	X		X			X
Cost of Internet Access	X		X	X	X	
INTERRELATIONSHIPS WITHIN TECHNOLOGY CLUSTER						
Access to Constituent Technologies	X	X	X	X	X	X
Demand for Capacity, Multiplicity of ISPs, Services Provided				X		
EXTERNAL/SURROUNDING FORCES						
Geography		X				
Adequacy and Fluidity of Resources	X	X	X	X	X	X
Ability to Execute		X		X		
Culture of Entrepreneurship					X	X
Regulatory and Legal Framework	X	X	X	X	X	X
Forces for Change	X	X	X	X	X	X
Enablers of Change	X		X		X	X

Perceived Value

For the Internet to diffuse in a country it is logical that it be perceived positively or at least more positively than negatively. Unlike some of the other determinants,

Perceived Value has an impact on each of the six dimensions. Woltcott et. al. (2000) points out how Perceived Value takes on a different meaning depending on which of the six dimensions you are analyzing it from.³⁰

Ease of Use

The Internet must be sufficiently easy to use. One of the developments that sparked the explosion of the Internet in the United States was the development of the graphic Browser, which offered a single, integrated, point-and-click interface to a wide variety of information sources.

Users must have the literacy necessary to boot up a computer, start an application, and then get something from it. The Internet may not be perceived as easy to use in countries where there is a dearth of web pages in one's native language or where computer input using one's native character set is either laborious or impossible. Even the requirement to use ASCII uniform resource locators (URLs), can be a significant deterrent to a significant portion of the world.

The Ease of Use determinant, by impacting individual and organizational decisions, influences the Pervasiveness and Sectoral Dispersion dimensions. Ease of Use also impacts whether the Internet is used simply as a substitute for written and phone communications or whether a country is able to redesign its business processes to leverage the power of the Internet.

³⁰ Peter Wolcott, Larry Press, William McHenry, Sy Goodman, William Foster, "A Framework for the Assessing the Global Diffusion of the Internet" Mosaic Group: Working Draft, August 14, 2000.

Cost of Internet Access

The Internet must be accessible at an acceptable cost. Wolcott et. al. (2000) postulates that the cost to the end user is a function of a number of upstream costs, including the rates and terms charged by ISPs to end users, long-distance charges for non-local access, the cost to the ISP of domestic lines, and the costs of international lines to get to global Internet access points.³¹

In many countries, the Internet is available but not at the speed that is taken for granted in the US. Thus, what is available for Internet access must be taken into account when considering how much an Internet account costs.

For many users it is not possible or practical to have your own PC. In many such countries, Internet Cafes, which lease time on an Internet-connected computer, have become very popular.

Like Ease of Use, Cost of Internet Access directly influences the Pervasiveness, Sectoral Dispersion, and Sophistication of Use dimensions.

Access to Constituent Technologies

Internet diffusion depends on the availability of technology including PCs, modems, routers, leased lines, etc. This determinant impacts all six dimensions. For the Internet to become pervasive, potential users must have access to PCs. Lack of basic telecommunications can limit geographic dispersion. The level of Organizational and Connectivity infrastructure are in part determined on the basic infrastructure that is

available to ISPs. Sophistication of Use depends on the availability of the requisite technology.

Demand for Capacity and Connectivity

A country's connectivity infrastructure is a function of the actual and projected demand for international and domestic connectivity. The number of ISPs in a country and the services they provide ends up driving the Connectivity Infrastructure.

Geography

Geography influences Internet diffusion. Clearly it is easier to establish a higher level of dispersion in a city state like Singapore than it is in a mountainous or geographically dispersed country. Geography predominately influences Geographic Dispersion and Connectivity Infrastructure.

Adequacy and Fluidity of Resources

Wolcott et. al. (2000) divides the resources necessary to support the Internet into five broad categories: financial, informational, human, technological or capital, and

³¹ Ibid.

material.³² Material resources such as raw materials, or energy are usually not a major issue in the development of the Internet, although there are countries with rather unstable and inconsistent power grids. Fluidity of resources refers to the ease with which resources can flow from where they are to where they are needed. Countries with well-developed venture capital markets have much greater fluidity of financial resources than those without such markets.

The availability of these resources influences all six dimensions and has a specific impact on Geographic Dispersion, Connectivity Infrastructure and Pervasiveness.

Ability to Execute

Wolcott et. al. (2000) believes that different countries have different abilities to execute and this impacts the pattern of Internet diffusion.³³ The Ability to Execute reflects an ability to develop a sound strategy and a suitable design given the opportunities and constraints, and the ability to manage the plans through to completion. It operates at both the organizational and national level.

Ability to Execute most directly impacts Connectivity Infrastructure and Geographic Dispersion.

Culture of Entrepreneurship

The creation of ISPs and new firms that provide e-commerce services is influenced by the overall culture of entrepreneurship and business creation that exists

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

within a country. In addition to impacting Organizational Infrastructure, a Culture of Entrepreneurship will also impact the Sophistication of Use dimension.

It should be noted that in many countries, the people starting ISPs and Internet Content Providers (ICPs) often have gone to school or have worked in the West. Thus, even if the culture is resistant to risk taking, individuals in it may have been exposed to entrepreneurship through travel abroad.

Regulatory and Legal Framework

Because the Internet is dependent on basic telecommunication services, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and Internet Content Providers (ICPs) are very much affected by whether and how a government ensures that they have access to the basic telecommunications infrastructure of the current or former monopoly telecommunications provider. The regulatory and Legal Framework of any country most specifically impacts the Connectivity Infrastructure and Organizational Infrastructure dimensions. In as much as they provide content or services on the Internet, ISPs and ICPs must contend with content control, tax, and liability regimes of the government. These policies can impact all of the dimensions.

Forces for Change

Wolcott et. al. (2000) postulates a Forces for Change determinant that refers to the force that is most responsible for Internet diffusion.³⁴

Dimensions can have different forces for change based on their own inherent

characteristics. Competitive environment has often been described as the prime determinant of technological capability. Wolcott et. al. (2000) points to a number of scholars have identified a competitive environment as a particularly strong determinant of technological capability.³⁵

Enablers of Change

Wolcott et. al. (2000) identifies enablers of change as those elements that help a change take hold in a community. Educational institutions play a major role in disseminating innovations. Rogers points to the importance of communication channels, anywhere from word of mouth, institutional, or mass media as influential in the diffusion of innovation.³⁶

Government

Government influences so many of the other determinant that we decided to keep it separate from the other determinants in a category by itself. It is, however, useful to analyze how government, through its various policies and regulations shapes the determinants and dimensions. Government can have a major influence on the determinant Access to the Internet. It can promote development of Internet infrastructure and fund access to the educational sector. The roles that the government provides to ISPs


³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ See D. C. Mowery and J. E. Oxley, "Inward Technology Transfer and Competitiveness: The Role of National Innovation Systems," *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 19(1), pp. 67-93. Also M. A. Cusumano and D. Elenkov "Linking international technology transfer with strategy and management: A literature commentary," *Research Policy*, 23(2), pp. 195-215. Also S. Lall (1993) "Policies For Building Technological Capabilities: Lessons From Asian Experience," *Asian Development Review*, 11(2), pp. 72-103. Also R. R. Nelson (ed.) (1993) *National Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis*, New York: Oxford University Press.

³⁶ Rogers, op. cit.

and the former monopoly PTT with regard to the Internet has a major influence over Cost of Internet Access. The government's policies regarding foreign investment and investment in general have significant influence on the Fluidity and Adequacy of Resources. The government has direct impact on a country's Regulatory and Legal Framework. It also has a major impact on the country's Ability to Execute. It is important to note that government can have either a positive or a negative impact on any one of the determinants. The relationship between government, the determinants, and the dimensions is pictured in Figure 1.

Figure 1: The Global Diffusion of the Internet Framework



Chapter III: Government Policy on the Internet

The Chinese government views the diffusion of the Internet within its borders as part of the larger process of informatization. It is hoped that information technology will facilitate the decentralization of decision-making while providing mechanisms for the central government to maintain control over the direction of the economy and society.

The Chinese government through its Interconnecting Network regime has instituted a hierarchical order on what could be a distributed network of networks. At the top of the hierarchy are certain chosen state-owned enterprises. China Telecom, once the monopoly telecommunications provider, now faces coordinated competition.³⁷

Ten years before China's first Internet connection, technocrats in academia and government were building support for the idea that information technology in general, and networks in particular, were essential to China's growth. Mueller and Tan point to the attention that Alvin Toffler's book, *The Third Wave*, received in China during the mid-eighties.³⁸ Chinese intellectuals were fascinated with the concept that the world was entering a postindustrial state where value was created through flows of information. Some saw the possibility of China leapfrogging or at least catching up with the West by making investments in information technology (IT). The term "informatization" has been widely used in China to refer to the process. It has been widely assumed that informatization was not only the next wave, but would bring prosperity with it. In fact numerous Chinese government studies have pointed to the robustness of the U.S. economy as evidence that investments in IT pay off.

³⁷ The phrase "coordinated competition" is from Peter Lovelock's dissertation, *The Evolution of China's National Information Infrastructure (NII) Initiative: A Policy-Making Analysis*, op. cit.

³⁸ M. Mueller and Z. Tan, China in the Information Age: Telecommunications and the Dilemmas of

China, as part of its commitment to economic growth since the late seventies, has rapidly rolled out the telephony infrastructure needed to support business. In the late eighties and early nineties, China made the development of a national data infrastructure a priority. It was based on the X.25 protocol. Information technology, it was believed, was essential for economic growth, but it was also believed to provide a way for the central government to manage that growth. As Lovelock has pointed out, many Chinese policy-makers believe that IT will allow the central government to decentralize decision-making to the provinces and the market while continuing to be able to control it centrally.³⁹ Decisions that in the past had been made through organizational hierarchies could now be made more efficiently through distributed organizations supported by information technology networks.

In 1993, the Chinese central government embarked on a series of Golden Projects to give the central government information on and control over the rapid decentralization of decision-making that was taking place as a result of the move to a market economy. The backbone for the projects, the Golden Bridge, connected ministries and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) through an Internet protocol (IP) network and provided support for the other Golden Projects. Although the Golden Projects ultimately were dwarfed by the blossoming of the Internet in China, some MII officials today still point back to them.

As the Golden Projects were exploring the impact of networking technologies on government, China's academic community started participating in global networking. The

Reform, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997.

³⁹ The phrase "coordinated competition" is from Peter Lovelock's dissertation, *The Evolution of China's National Information Infrastructure (NII) Initiative: A Policy-Making Analysis*, *op. cit.*

CAnet (China Academic Network), established in 1987, is generally recognized as the first computer network in China. CAnet used an X.25 link to exchange information with the European Research Network. Two other early and entirely independent sources of Internet development were the China Research Network (CRnet) and the Institute for High-Energy Physics (IHEP). In March 1993, IHEP set up a TCP/IP leased line to the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center that allowed it full access to the Internet.

As global interest in the Internet exploded in 1995 with the development of the World Wide Web, a wide variety of Internet projects began to bubble out of the Chinese academic, government, and commercial communities. Some of the academic networks began to sell “shell accounts” to commercial users and provide email and Usenet connectivity to bulletin board operators. Many of these bulletin board operators were quickly evolving into full-fledged Internet service providers (ISPs). At the same time, many government organizations created their own proposals to build national computer networks for internal use. Although there would continue to be debates about the possibility and advisability of building networks in China that were cut off from the global Internet, China’s technocrats had embraced the Internet as an essential component of informatization.

State Council

In 1995, with the Chinese Internet rapidly expanding in a decentralized manner, China’s leaders started discussing the Internet in earnest. They had to choose a range of options running anywhere from cutting China completely off from the Internet to allowing unrestricted growth. The Chinese State Council allowed the growth of the

Internet but imposed hierarchical controls on all the organizations involved with it. On February 1, 1996, the State Council issued Order No. 195, "Interim Regulations on International Interconnection of Computer Information Networks in the PRC," later modified on May 20, 1997.⁴⁰

While China is slowly moving toward a market economy, most of the significant economic decisions are still made by government agencies. The history of the Internet in China must be explained mainly through the role these government ministries played and continue to play. In China, real political power is held by the Standing Committee of the Politburo (SCPb), usually consisting of the top five to seven leaders in China. The party Politburo often decides strategic directions on political, economic, and social issues such as economic reform plans, policies toward foreigners, and even high-tech development plans. It can be assumed that the Politburo was either formally or informally involved in the decision to actively embrace the Internet.

Although the national strategy is made by the Politburo, the tactical decisions and daily operations are left to China's State Council and its ministries. The State Council usually relies on the industrial ministries to formulate and carry out policies that the council will then rubber stamp. In the event of conflict between ministries, the State Council will arbitrate. As the government decentralizes, individual provincial governments are beginning to have more and more influence over decisions. In the telecommunication field, almost all the provincial governments are seeking to expand

⁴⁰ PRC State Council, "Interim Regulation on International Interconnection of Computer Networks in PRC," Order No. 195 (February 1, 1996), as modified by PRC State Council's Order No. 218 (May 20, 1997).

their infrastructure. Local provincial telecommunication authorities are aligning with the provincial governments to attract foreign investment capital and technology. In so doing, they often circumvent the directives of the central government regarding foreign investment and architecture.

History of Conflict between MPT and MEI

Any attempt to understand the history of the Internet in China needs to take into account the competition between the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (MPT) and the Ministry of Electronics Industries (MEI). These were the two most powerful ministries in the information industry. The pivotal question was, Who would control China's information superhighway of which the Internet was just the precursor?⁴¹ MPT, as the telecommunications monopoly, wanted to maintain control of the fast-growing and lucrative service market. MEI, a manufacturer of IT products, was a new player in providing services. Suffering from the onslaught of foreign and domestic competition, MEI was fighting to find a new revenue source in service provision. Traditionally, MPT had been slow and less motivated to respond to the demand for advanced services, delaying deployment of state-of-the-art technologies. By the nineties, MPT had begun to adjust its strategy. Solid profits and growing demand enabled MPT to continue to upgrade the quality and expand the reach of its network. Up-to-date technologies such as fiber cable and satellite systems were integrated into its backbone networks.

MEI was a national base for research and development (R&D) and manufacturing of electronic components, computers and associated software, digital telecommunications

⁴¹ Zixiang Tan, "China's Information Superhighway: What Is It and Who Controls It," *Telecommunications*

systems, and broadcasting equipment. MEI strongly supported deploying advanced technology and introducing competition into the service market in the interest of boosting demand for its products.

MPT's service sector was a regulated monopoly market, giving it protection from both domestic and foreign competition. This resulted in lucrative, guaranteed profits for its service operation. MEI, on the other hand, had to compete with both domestic and foreign players for MPT's business. Foreign equipment was preferred because of its higher quality, reliability, and better after-sale service. MPT took advantage of its huge procurement budget to convince foreign suppliers to set up joint ventures with its equipment manufacturers, a key strategy to compete with MEI. MPT's manufacturers replaced MEI, becoming the dominant suppliers of most of China's telecommunications equipment markets. MPT gradually established itself as a solidly organized, cash-rich ministry, giving it the political and economic power to protect its interests while expanding its infrastructure.

MEI fought desperately to change its market position by relying on the solid political power gained through its broad IT base, personal ties with many top-level leaders, and alliances with other ministries. MEI's ties to the leadership included President Jiang Zemin, who was MEI minister in the early eighties.

As a result of the placement of former MEI executives, serious consideration was assured by China's inner circle of new MEI initiatives. In addition, the current MEI minister, Hu Qili, had been a member of the party Politburo in the late eighties.

MEI and its allies launched a campaign to enter the basic telecommunications service sector. Led by Hu, MEI formed a consortium with the Ministry of Railways and the Ministry of Electric Power. By accusing the MPT of inefficiency, as evidenced by huge unmet demand and slow development of new services, MEI's consortium successfully convinced the State Council to introduce competition and liberalization. A second carrier, China Unicom, was formed on July 19, 1994. China Unicom provided both local and long-distance services. Although this carrier had a long way to go to compete with MPT's national operation, Unicom had opened the door to providing telecommunications services.

The introduction of Unicom should not obscure the fact that China Telecom was by far the dominant telecommunications player and that the MPT was the dominant ministry in telecommunications.

State Council's Steering Committee on National Information Infrastructure

The State Council set up a Steering Committee on National Information Infrastructure (NII) to coordinate Internet policy. According to the State Council's Notice on April 16, 1996, the Steering Committee was fully responsible for every major issue relevant to informatization in China. Its major responsibilities included:⁴²

- Formulation of the policies, regulations, and laws;
- Development of strategic plans of China's NII and monitoring of the implementation;

⁴² PRC State Council, "The Notice on the Founding of the State Council's Steering Committee on National Information Infrastructure," Order No. 15 (April 16, 1996).

- Coordination of the large and cross-ministry projects;
- Coordination of and power over major issues regarding China's Internet;
- Coordination of the technology R&D and developing standards related to China's NII; and
- Performance of other functions assigned by the State Council.

The Steering Committee was chaired by Vice-Premier Zou Jiahua. The first deputy-chair was MEI's minister, Hu Qili. Other deputy-chairs were:

- Wu Jichuan, minister of the MPT
- Liu Qibao, deputy general secretary of the State Council
- Zen Peiyan, deputy commissioner of the State Planning Commission
- Xu Penghang, deputy commissioner of the State Economic and Trade Commission
- Zhu Lilan, deputy commissioner of the State Science and Technology Commission
- Chen Yuan, deputy director of the People's Bank of China

Members of the Steering Committee consisted of high-ranking officers from all the ministries and agencies who had a stake in China's Internet. They were:

- Wei Yu, deputy commissioner of the State Education Commission
- Lu Xinkui, deputy minister of the MEI
- Liu Shengzai, deputy minister of foreign trade

- He Dongcai, deputy minister of broadcasting
- Liu Wenjie, deputy director of customs
- Xiang Huachen, deputy director of taxation
- Li Bin, deputy director of the State Council's News Office
- Lu Yongxang, deputy director of the Chinese Academy of Sciences
- Li Zhuanshen, assistant minister of the Ministry of Public Security
- Li Rui, deputy director of China's Technology Bureau
- Yun Banggen, director of the telecommunications division of the People's Liberation Army

The Steering Committee and Key Internet-Related Issues

In keeping with the view that the Internet is a value-added service, the government freely chose to allow any domestic organization to run an ISP. Any interested domestic organization or firm could get a license to provide Internet services if it met the minimum requirements. However, by granting a limited number of government organizations the right to run Interconnecting Networks, the State Council kept tight control over international connectivity and established a hierarchy of responsibility.

The most challenging decision for the State Council was choosing who should run the limited number of Interconnecting Networks. As in many other nations, the research and educational community initially developed the Internet in China. The leadership saw the use of the Internet by these communities as enhancing China's future. In addition, research and educational communities tended to limit their services within their own community, therefore not posing a threat to the commercial interests of other ministries.

Granting Interconnecting Network status to the education community's Chinese Education and Research Network (CERNET) and research community's China Science and Technology Network (CSTNet) was a logical decision few would debate, although there were some at the time who argued that the two networks should be consolidated into one.

Decisions on the commercial Interconnecting Networks were more complicated. MPT saw the Internet as a natural extension of its telecommunications services. Having been unsuccessful at becoming the only commercial Interconnecting Network, MPT had to settle for being one of two commercial Interconnecting Networks. As a powerful player within the Steering Committee, MEI was in the position to have its affiliate be selected by arguing that information technology fell in MEI's domain. MEI was the only organization that launched Internet services after the State Council presented the Interim Regulations.

Other ministries at the time tried to obtain the right to operate an Interconnecting Network and failed. They fall into two categories. One group had done some regional development of networks for their internal purposes as represented by the Ministry of Railways, the Ministry of Aerospace Industry, and the People's Liberation Army (PLA). However, these organizations were turned down apparently because Internet provision is outside their traditional business operations. In the case of the PLA, there were additional concerns about the potential power of the PLA in relation to the ministries if it were to develop a successful national commercial Internet backbone.

The other group of government bodies, such as the Ministry of Broadcasting

(MBMT) and Xinhua News Agency, had not been able to obtain Interconnecting Network status. They both lacked the resources to run a national network at that time. Furthermore, these ministries did not have enough political power to influence the decisions of the Steering Committee.

By establishing a hierarchy, the State Council prevented a multitude of government ministries from getting their own global Internet connectivity and becoming major players in their own right.

The Ministry of Information Industry

In March of 1998, the struggle between MPT and MEI ended. The National People's Congress (NPC) made a decision to create a new Ministry of Information Industry (MII) by merging the MPT, MEI, and parts of MBMT, China Aerospace Industry Corporation (satellite communications), and China Aviation Industry Corporation (air traffic control frequencies).

Wu Jichuan, former minister of MPT, was appointed as head of the new ministry. Vice-ministers and staff were chosen from both MPT and MEI.⁴³ According to its August 1998 mission statement, the State Council gave MII broad responsibility for planning and overseeing the development of China's electronics, telecommunications, and electronic information industries (see Appendix C). MII is responsible for setting up laws and regulations for each sector and for coordinating the informatization of the country. In regards to the Internet, MII was given specific control over domain names and IP addresses. MII was made responsible for the planning, construction, and administration of

⁴³ "PRC Government Restructuring Continues," *China Business Review* (September 1, 1998).

private networks for the Communist Party and other government ministries. The intention was to have one organization ultimately in charge of all networks. The Steering Committee was abolished and its functions absorbed by MII.

China Telecom and the National Backbone

During 1997–1998, there was a great deal of discussion within China over whether multiple government organizations should be allowed to invest in building national physical layer data backbones to compete with China Telecom. Many believed that the government could not afford to invest in redundant architecture on a national scale. Competition should be encouraged at the periphery of the network, but long-distance data traffic, it was argued, should utilize China Telecom's network, such as its new Frame Relay service. There was a concern that too much competition would undermine China Telecom's ability to compete when foreign companies entered the market. There were others who argued that national security could best be assured if one company, China Telecom, was in control of the backbone. Of course, it was those in China Telecom and their allies in MII who most fervently raised the "security" issue.

Supporters of competition pointed to the example of ChinaGBN, which was affiliated with the old MEI. ChinaGBN uses VSAT (very small aperture terminal) for its national backbone but was still required to buy its international circuits through China Telecom. ChinaGBN carved out a niche serving government companies but also was an alternative for Internet service providers. Although it was difficult to assess the impact of ChinaGBN on China Telecom's ChinaNet service, most observers believed that competition and the threat of it has had its impact on China Telecom's investment,

deployment, and service decisions. China Telecom might not have rolled out service as quickly and effectively if there had not been the threat that ChinaGBN would lock in new customers. ChinaGBN was seen as a highly effective tool for controlling China Telecom.

ChinaGBN had planned on developing its own fiber backbone. However, after the merger of MPT and MEI, there was some discussion among policy-makers about ChinaGBN utilizing the fiber-optic backbone of China Telecom and not building its own.

At the same time there developed an effort, both inside and outside of MII, to increase competition in IP backbone services. These efforts picked up momentum and were debated in a number of telecommunications journals and discussed in political and legislative circles.⁴⁴ The concept of having competing backbones began to gain more currency in the State Council.

Let the Sons Compete

Unicom

By the spring of 1998, the State Council had approved Unicom, the second telecommunications network, as a national IP backbone with the ability to interconnect with the global Internet backbone.

Up to that point, Unicom had been primarily competing in the mobile telephony market. Its provincial arms attracted U.S. \$1.5 billion in foreign capital using the Chinese-Chinese-Foreign (CCF) mechanism. Under this arrangement, a foreign company would invest in a joint venture with a Chinese company with the joint venture then

⁴⁴ Zhou Qiren was one of the people who made public suggestions for increased competition.

investing in Unicom. The MII ruled in 1998 that these arrangements were illegal, thus cutting off one source of funds for Unicom.

Some thought that with the absorption of MEI into MII, Unicom was losing its sponsor and its political clout. However, MII reinvigorated Unicom by appointing MII's vice-minister, Yang Xianzhu, to be Unicom's president and MII's director general for planning, Wang Zianzhou, to be Unicom's general manager. This changed the power position between China Telecom and China Unicom.

MII authorized Unicom to participate in the Voice Over IP trials and to deploy IP telephony service in over 100 cities. Unicom has built an IP over ATM (asynchronous transfer mode) backbone—Uninet—to support both its Voice Over Internet offering and other IP services such as virtual private networks (VPNs). Unicom is deploying metropolitan fiber rings in over 240 cities that will be used to connect businesses and users directly to Uninet. According to MII, "China Telecom and China Unicom, the two telecom enterprises, will compete with each other according to new market regulations and rules of the game."⁴⁵

Unicom is definitely under MII's control, and as such is a trusted son. In that capacity, it has the privilege of building a national IP network with global connectivity and can also be counted on to help control the volatile Internet. Unicom is also part of the government's strategy for controlling China Telecom. By creating an entity for China Telecom to chase after, many government leaders believe that they will see better, faster, and more efficient service from the former monopoly.

⁴⁵ "Minister Wu Jichuan's New Initiative," *Telecom World* (May 1998): 4.

China Netcom

China Netcom (CNC) started out as the IP Network Model Project and was sponsored by the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), the Shanghai government, the Ministry of Railways, and the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT). Each invested 300 million RMB in the project that links 15 cities on the east coast, including Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou.

The backbone takes a different technological strategy than that used by China Telecom. By running the Internet protocol directly on fiber (IP/DWDM) it saves the costs associated with running ATM equipment. Though IP/DWDM cannot provide the quality of service (QOS) guarantees associated with ATM, its advocates argue that they can provide enough bandwidth to make QOS less relevant. The 15-city backbone being built by China Netcom will be operating at 40 gigabytes per second.⁴⁶

In the spring of 1999, Netcom received approval from the State Council through the State Development Planning Commission to build the network and connect it to the global Internet.⁴⁷ It was also authorized to participate in the Voice Over IP trials.

China Netcom has been set up from its managerial contracts on down to be the ideal “state-owned” vehicle for foreign investment. China Netcom has already reported a profitable quarter and is set to go public on NASDAQ during the fall of 2000. China Netcom’s board of directors includes a number of well-connected technocrats, including

⁴⁶ L. Gesteland, “China Netcom Corp Enters the Ring,” *ChinaOnline* (October 25, 1999) <<http://www.chinaonline.com/industry/infotech/newsarchive/secure/1999/october/c9102551.asp>> (Current October 26, 1999).

⁴⁷ “Press Review: May 3, 1999,” *Virtual China* (May 3, 1999), <<http://www.virtualchina.com/reviews/review-050399.html>> (Current December 28, 1999).

Jiang Mianheng, who in addition to being the president's son is a former czar of the information industry in Shanghai. Jiang Mianheng is now in a leadership position in the Chinese Academy of Sciences.

China Mobile Telecommunications Network

During 1999 China Telecom was divided into mobile and fixed-network companies. China Mobile Telecommunications, on May 17, 2000, commenced operation of a backbone network linking Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Tianjin, Nanjing, and Hangzhou that is capable of supporting IP telephone and Internet services in addition to traffic generated by mobile phones. The backbone supposedly has 465 Mbps of international bandwidth.

MII and SARFT and the Convergence of Cable with the Internet

Probably the greatest threat to China Telecom's bottleneck over the local loop comes from the possibility that China's 13,000 cable operators will start offering Internet service through their cable networks and will band together to form a national IP backbone and Interconnecting Network. Though this requires a significant upgrade of the cable infrastructure (perhaps only 10 percent of it will currently support two-way traffic), a number of cities have started trials. There is also a significant conflict between the MII and the State Administration for Radio, Film and Television. The State Council in the fall of 1999 issued a directive that the cable networks could not be used to provide Internet and phone service. Shanghai, a leader in interactive cable, was exempted from the directive. There is much speculation as to how this pronouncement will be interpreted and how convergence will evolve in China. Though there are turf battles between SARFT and

MII, there is also a concern on the part of China leaders of the impact of letting cable operators into the Internet before they are fully corporatized. In many cities, the cable operators are still part of the local government. These enterprises must first be spun off as state-owned enterprises and consolidated into a state-owned corporation under SARFT before they can be allowed into the Internet business. If these cable operators are let into the Internet and phone business before they are separated from the government, some people at MII believe they will never be controlled.⁴⁸

Internet Content Providers

Given the dominance of China Telecom and the freedom offered to consumers by the Internet, many Internet providers have forgone providing connectivity in favor of becoming a portal site or some other form of Internet content provider (ICP). Some of these portals, such as Sina.com and Sohu.com, have attracted significant foreign capital, thereby allowing them to grow their businesses.

In accepting foreign investment, these companies were choosing to operate in a gray area where the rules are ambiguous. The Chinese government had not spelled out what actually constituted an ICP and whether an ICP was a telecommunications provider. If ICPs were telecommunications providers, then the restrictions on foreign ownership applied.

Minister Wu of MII caused a flurry of controversy in September 1999 when he pointed out to a *Financial Times* reporter that “China’s government still needs to strengthen its management over the information content business. So, whether or not it is

⁴⁸ Kan Kali, Beijing Institute for Post and Telecommunications, phone call (June 15, 2000).

an ICP or an ISP, it is about value-added services. In China, the service area is not open.” Asked what level of foreign investment was suitable in the local market, Wu told the *Financial Times*, “The current policy does not allow that. We will correct these irregularities.”⁴⁹

Some observers at the time saw Wu’s comments as posturing around China’s possible World Trade Organization (WTO) accession. Others believed that it reflected Wu’s deep distrust of foreign investment. What it did point to was that a significant portion of the Internet business community in China was in a bind. On one hand, the U.S. investment community, in hopes of securing access to China’s market, was willing to take significant risks and invest money in these Chinese startups. On the other hand, no one knew the legal status of the startups.

Negotiating with the WTO

Telecommunications figured very prominently during the WTO talks of 1999. In the words of President Jiang Zemin, “China is a developing country, and its social productive forces have yet to be developed, so it can join the WTO only on terms for a developing country.”⁵⁰ During negotiations, the U.S. government pressed hard for China to open up both basic and value-added telecommunication services. The United States was willing to accept “developing country” types of delays in implementing access to basic and value-added services.

In April of 1999, Premier Zhu Rongji came to Washington with a deal that

⁴⁹ M. Williams, “China Says Foreign Internet Investment Unwelcome” *CNET* (September 14, 1999), <<http://hongkong1.cnet.com/briefs/news/asia/19990914bf.html>> (Current December 28, 1999).

⁵⁰ “Press Review: October 22, 1999,” *Virtual China* (October 22, 1999),

included opening up the telecommunications sector. At that time, there was speculation that Zhu had outmaneuvered Wu and his allies. There were even rumors at the time that Wu was going to resign. When President Clinton did not accept the offer and U.S.–Chinese relations deteriorated in the wake of the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia, Wu's position was strengthened and he remained minister of MII.

Finally, on November 15, 1999, the United States and China agreed to China's WTO accession. The United States gave up its demand for majority (51 percent) ownership. Table 11 shows the schedules for foreign equity in telecommunications services.

Table 11. Schedules for Foreign Equity in Telecommunications Services

WHEN	%	WHERE
Value-Added and Paging		
Upon accession	39%	Beijing, Guangzhou, and Shanghai
1 year	49%	Chengdu, Chongqing, Dalian, Fuzhou, Hangzhou, Nanjing, Ningbo, Qingdao, Shenyang, Shenzhen, Xiamen, Xi'an, Taiyuan, and Wuhan including Beijing, Guangzhou, and Shanghai
2 years	50%	Nationwide
Domestic and International Packet and Circuit Switching		
3 years	25%	Beijing, Guangzhou, and Shanghai
5 years	35%	Chengdu, Chongqing, Dalian, Fuzhou, Hangzhou, Nanjing, Ningbo, Qingdao, Shenyang, Shenzhen, Xiamen, Xi'an, Taiyuan, and Wuhan
6 years	49%	Nationwide

The agreement left it somewhat ambiguous as to which categories ISPs, Interconnecting Networks, ICPs, and IBPs fell into. China only orally committed that

ICPs would fall under the first category and ISPs under the last. U.S. negotiators did not want a separate section on Internet services as they did not want to undermine the position embodied in the WTO telecommunication agreements that Internet service is a value-added service. Minister Wu has continued to voice his position that the International Telecommunications Union definitions of basic and value-added services will have to be “perfected.”

Minister Wu has made it clear that all companies receiving foreign investment will still have to go through the Chinese government’s licensing regime. “The government will strengthen its supervisory function over an opened telecom service industry and provide orderly competition in line with relevant rules.”⁵¹ As mentioned earlier, there are different licensing regimes for Interconnecting Networks and for regular ISPs. Interconnecting Networks require the approval of the State Council. ISPs need to be licensed by MII. What is not clear is whether, under the WTO accession agreement, China committed to dismantling the Interconnecting Network regime and when. The U.S. trade representative’s office believes that the Chinese did make such a commitment. According to sources in the trade representative’s office, the provisions for domestic and international packet and circuit switching allow anyone to get global Internet connectivity without going through an Interconnecting Network. The big question is whether Minister Wu believes that the Chinese made such a commitment. The U.S. trade representative acknowledges that they are going to have to push the Chinese every step of the way in terms of opening up the Internet to foreign investment.

⁵¹ “Press Review: November 22, 1999,” *Virtual China* (November 22, 1999),

For the Chinese government it is not just a matter of “ownership,” it is a matter of control. Any organization in China that angers or threatens the Chinese government could lose its Internet connectivity. Firms that host their servers outside of China run the risk of having their IP addresses blocked by the government. In this new world of technology, having Internet connectivity completely cut off may be a death sentence for a business. The Chinese government is determined to have a say over who has a website in China and which websites are seen in China. Clearly, if ISPs are able to bypass the Interconnecting Network regime, there is a potential that the Chinese government will lose its ability to monitor Internet traffic and block certain websites.

It is rumored that the Chinese did make an oral commitment to a provision that telecommunications services can be provided through satellite transmission. Again, there is a question as to whether IP traffic will have to run through a government-controlled router before it is broadcast over an international satellite link.

Minister Wu announced in February of 2000 that the MII is currently formulating “Regulations for the Management of Foreign Investment in Telecommunication Services” and “Regulations for Internet and Information Security Management.”⁵² These regulations will provide important new guides on how the Chinese government plans to open up the telecommunications sector to foreign investment while still maintaining order and some degree of control over the Internet.

The U.S. trade representative fought very hard for including ICPs under the WTO

<<http://www.virtualchina.com/reviews/review-112299.html>> (Current December 28, 1999).

⁵² *Zhongguo Xinwen She (China Overseas News Agency)*, (February 22, 2000). See <<http://www.chinaonline.com/refer/legal/currentnews/secure/c00022207.asp>>.

accession agreement. On one hand, from the Chinese perspective, ICPs as value-added services would not be as important to protect from foreign control as the basic telecommunications sector. On the other hand, the Chinese government had come to realize the power of ICPs as a new form of media. Since media have traditionally been under government ownership, this greatly complicated WTO negotiations. The fact that more than \$200 million had already been invested in ICPs by foreign firms made the stakes even higher.

Minister Wu made it clear that firms that had illegally accepted foreign investments, such as Unicom or even ICPs, would have to rectify the situation as a precursor to the implementation of any new deals under the WTO agreement. He also said that China would require foreign investors to seek governmental approval before making any investments in the telecom sector. He believes that such a requirement is in keeping with the WTO agreement and is customary in many countries.

It is clear that the WTO agreement is only a framework that will have to be negotiated through each step of its implementation. There will inevitably be conflict between MII's vision of "controlling" the telecommunications sectors and the WTO goals of opening it. There are a thousand ways to frustrate an agreement, as a Beijing-based lawyer warned: "China will find itself in perpetual litigation in WTO dispute panels."⁵³

It is important to emphasize the importance that China's leaders place on developing a legal and regulatory system before fully opening the telecommunications market to foreign investors. They are opening the market in stages starting with paging

⁵³ Ibid.

and some domestic VSAT. China is working out how to harness market forces and foreign capital and still ensure that telecommunications are kept in order.

Voice Over IP: Can the Bureaucracy Keep Up with Convergence?

Once the Internet was available in China, it did not take long for some individuals to start using Voice Over IP to dramatically cut back the costs of phone service to foreign countries. Enterprising individuals even set up shop and allowed customers to use their Internet phone service. Two brothers in Fujian were arrested for running a flourishing Voice Over IP business. However, much to MII's consternation, the Fuzhou Intermediate People's Court issued a decision in January 1999 that found the two brothers had broken no law in operating their own Voice Over IP business.⁵⁴

The MII responded that it was illegal to operate an IP phone company without its approval. Zhang Chunjiang, director of MII Telecommunications Advisory Bureau, announced that the ministry would crack down harshly on IP phone companies that are "tantamount to information smuggling by bypassing government supervisors in our country."⁵⁵

During the spring of 1999, MII worked with China Telecom, Unicom, and later China Netcom to roll out a trial of Voice Over IP services. MII managed the selection of equipment and partners to support the rollout. China Telecom, Unicom, and Netcom were all instructed to pick different vendors. In addition, MII required that the each vendor

⁵⁴ "Press Review: May 31, 1999," *Virtual China* (May 31, 1999), <<http://www.virtualchina.com/reviews/review-033199.html>> (Current December 28, 1999).

⁵⁵ "Press Review: February 10, 1999," *Virtual China* (February 10, 1999)

prove that their equipment operated with that of other vendors. In doing so, MII is positioning itself as a major player in the Voice Over IP standards game. At the same time, it has used its position of power to ensure that Voice Over IP gateway products are going to be manufactured in China and rapidly integrated into its networks.

Class One and Class Two: The New Telecommunications Regulations

The State Council is expected to approve telecommunications regulations issued by MII that divide telecommunication services into Class One and Class Two services. Class One services are provided using networks that are owned by the provider. Class Two services are provided by organizations that utilize someone else's network to provide the service.

Internet and multimedia services are designated as Class One services, though information services and other relevant services provided via the Internet are Class Two services.

A major difference between Class One and Class Two licenses is that a Class One licensee must have the state as a controlling shareholder. Organizations holding either license must be legally established and have the capital and staff to offer long-term service.

Class Two licenses can be authorized by the local telecommunications office in the area where the service is being offered. The number and business scope of Class One telecom service providers are determined by the State Council's telecom authority. This authority is also responsible for approving and licensing all Class One telecom services.

The draft regulations refer to the decision-maker as the “State Council’s telecom authority.” Though MII is the designated authority, the State Council has given itself the leeway of changing bodies if it needs to.

The draft regulations do not mention whether the Class One license supersedes the need for an Interconnecting Network license or whether Internet service providers with a Class One license need separate permission to interconnect with the global Internet.

What is important here is that the Chinese government is implementing a hierarchical order on its telecommunications infrastructure. Class Two networks are dependent on Class One networks for physical connectivity. There will be competition between Class One networks, but enterprises running Class One networks must be controlled by the state and must have approval from the State Council’s telecommunication authority. It is a hierarchy, but it is a hierarchy with competition built into it. No one enterprise has a choke hold on the hierarchy. MII, as the State Council’s telecommunication authority, has responsibility for keeping the telecommunication sector orderly.

Also under circulation are regulations for foreign ownership of telecommunications companies. The regulations make clear that foreigners seeking to operate infrastructure, value-added services, and new telecommunications businesses must do so through a sino-foreign joint venture. The joint venture would have to have registered capital of RMB 200 million for a Category One service and RMB 5 million for a Category Two service. The Chinese investor has sole right to appoint the

Chairman of the Joint Venture and to nominate the general manager.

These regulations make clear that for a Category One license, the Chinese investor must be a state-owned or majority controlled enterprise with an operating license. In order to keep out enterprises that are not already in the telecom business, there is a requirement that the Chinese investor have an average income greater than RMB3 billion solely from telecom business. The Category One foreign investor must have a telecom licence holder in country of incorporation and have average income greater than US\$10 billion from its telecom business. Thus foreign investment will be allowed into basic telecommunication services but through joint ventures with S.O.E.s where the SOE is the majority partner.

CHAPTER IV: INTERNET SECURITY

A number of different concerns embody the Chinese concept of security. There is the deeply held belief that state security requires the party and the state to control certain information and that government and commercial networks must be protected from hacking, computer crime, and foreign espionage. In addition, many governmental bodies are worried about how the Internet will impact their political and economic power, and want to ensure that organizations associated with them get their share of any economic benefits that come with the Internet.

Encryption

Perhaps the encryption issue best illustrates the interaction of the many different concerns that the Chinese government has over security issues. Encryption is essential to effective electronic commerce. If encryption is to enable international electronic commerce, then encryption used in China must interoperate with software used outside of China. For the past couple of years, China has had rules on the importation of encryption software, but most of the rules were confidential. Companies implementing various e-commerce solutions embodying encryption once again were often operating in a gray area where there were no public regulations to protect them. This is not to say they did not have tacit support from government officials in at least certain ministries.

There has been significant debate between the MII, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), and the Ministry of State Security (MSS) over what China's official security policy should be. In October of 1999, a State Council directive was published giving power over encryption to the National Commission on Encryption Code Regulations (NCECR). The NCECR is thought to report to the Ministry of State Security and the State Bureau of Secrecy.

Under the original regulations only NCECR-approved encryption products could

be used by work units and individuals. This generated a great deal of concern. Many software and communications products, including Windows 2000, have encryption embedded in them. It was feared that foreign software and hardware manufacturers would be required to use encryption software developed in China under the guidance of NCECR. While MII has been concerned that these regulations could stifle e-commerce in China, the regulations were driven by a number of security issues. Certain encryption schemes could be vulnerable to attack by foreign intelligence operations. Also, MSS and MPS may have requirements to break encryption schemes in their effort to keep track of criminal and anti-state behavior.

There is general agreement, however, that the regulations are also an attempt by the MSS to not only expand its bureaucracy and mission but to help the organizations in China that can develop encryption software and commercially exploit it. Many of these organizations are either owned by the MSS or have ties to it. This is not to say that MSS does not have legitimate security concerns, but it is important to see how they are intertwined with both bureaucratic power and economic interests. While the regulations could be interpreted in multiple ways, some observers speculate that they are not aimed at browser software but at cashing in on the lucrative B2B (business-to-business e-commerce) market.

These regulations are also the result of the interplay of organizations as they seek to establish how certification of public keys should be accomplished and what organization will ultimately control it. The People's Bank has taken the lead on certificate authorities. These certificate authorities involve encryption. Because encryption is under

the control of the NCECR and the MSS, it means that the MSS will have a chokehold on one of the few hierarchies that is being imposed on the Internet.

Foreign companies lobbied heavily against the parts of the regulations that could be interpreted as requiring the use of Chinese-authored encryption in all foreign products, including Microsoft Windows, Cisco Routers, and GSM mobile telephones. In a four-point circular dated March 2000, the NCECR said that only a certain type of highly specialized encryption product, known as a “black box,” must be designed in China. “Other things, including wireless telephones, Windows software, browser software, and so on are not included in the scope,” according to the circular.⁵⁶ The circular also confirmed that China will not introduce a “key escrow” system in which encryption keys must be stored by a government-approved third party. “Foreign businesses do not need to be worried about this point.”⁵⁷

Some sources have told the *Wall Street Journal* that MII did not receive advance warning of the October 1999 encryption regulations.⁵⁸ The controversy that resulted is seen by some as an indication that Chinese leaders need to better coordinate their Internet policies. This incident encouraged the revival of the Leading Group on Informatization. The *Wall Street Journal* speculates that “it is possible that the Ministry of State Security, working with other secretive government and Communist Party groups, issued the regulations to ensure that more high-profile parts of the government will consult with

⁵⁶ “China Relaxes Strong Rules on Net Encryption Programs,” *Wall Street Journal* (March 13, 2000).

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

them on Internet security.”⁵⁹

The Leading Group on Informatization has been revitalized in the wake of the encryption regulation debacle in an attempt to improve intergovernmental coordination. Vice Premier Wu Bangguo is the group leader and Minister Wu of MII is the executive vice group leader.

Information Control

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has traditionally seen the mass media as its mouthpiece and a tool for communicating with the people. A whole network of control mechanisms has developed over the past half century in both the CCP and the government in an effort to ensure that the media support the state and party. Policies regarding control of the media ultimately come from the Politburo of the CCP. Ding Guangen, the head of the CCP’s Publicity (Propaganda) Department, directly oversees the operation of all CCP and government organizations involved in the production and control of the media. Once a policy is made at a regular Politburo meeting, the CCP’s Publicity Department issues a document with guidelines on how to handle sensitive issues such as the Tiananmen Square incident or the Falun Gong movement. In recent years, the general guideline states that “stability is the topmost priority.”

The CCP’s Propaganda Department is connected with a number of organizations in the government. The State Council’s Information Office has played a prominent role in issuing guidelines on the use of the Internet. The Ministry of State Security, in its goal of protecting the nation’s security, is closely aligned with the Propaganda Department. The

⁵⁹ Ibid.

Ministry of Public Security and its Bureau of Public Security have been responsible for enforcing the laws about the use of the Internet. Together, these forces of conservatism have struggled against those in the government who have a vested interest in seeing the Internet expand as rapidly as possible.

There are several think tanks that provide information and advice for the CCP and government leaders regarding the control of information issues associated with the Internet. These include the Chinese Academy of Social Science, the Chinese Strategy Research Institute, the Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Relations, the Information Institute, and the Institute of International Studies as well as elite universities such as Peking, Tsinghua, and Fudan. The National People's Congress has also taken an active role in discussing the need for laws dealing with media control in general and the Internet in particular.

The national media are a very powerful vested interest in China, and they were not unaware of the potential competition from the Internet. Very few guessed how rapidly it would spread and how much money the Western investment community would be willing to throw at China. Few realized how the Internet provided ways of circumventing the normal mechanisms that the Chinese government has put up to prevent foreign ownership and control of telecommunications and media.

The Internet has the advantage of speed, content, and accessibility over newspaper, radio, and television. But more importantly, instead of selectively feeding the user information, it allows the user to find the information he or she wants from all over the world. It provides an opportunity to get not just the information that the government

wants the user to receive, but information that is truly interesting and potentially valuable. The Internet potentially revolutionizes the whole meaning of the word media. It provides an opportunity to connect with all sorts of other individuals and organizations without the need for the approval of the work unit, state, or party.

In China, portals such as Sohu.com, Sina.com, Netease.com, and a significant number of others began to receive millions of hits as they began to offer search engines, chat rooms, and, most importantly, news to the Chinese Internet users. Most of the portals are focused on entertainment and sports. This is content ideally suited for the Web, with its support for color graphics, hyperlinked texts, and rapid updates. The portals were getting some revenue from advertising but were being fueled by foreign investments and by speculation of initial public offerings (IPOs).

ICP News

In China, all newspaper publications are government owned. In the early days of the Chinese Internet, some sites such as Sina.com included dispatches from foreign agencies, including Agence France-Presse and Reuters.⁶⁰ But when the government told its own newspapers that they could not use text directly from foreign organizations, Sina.com stopped doing it as well. Since then, it primarily buys copy from the Chinese press and writes a few of its own dispatches. Even though the Dow Jones Company is a major shareholder in Sohu.com, the site offers only Dow Jones's business and financial news, not its broader news service. In addition, the portals have been advised by the government not to provide links to foreign news sources.

⁶⁰ E. Rosenthal, "Web Sites Bloom in China, and are Weeded," *The New York Times* (December 23, 1999).

According to the *People's Daily*, the Ministry of State Security issued a rule at the end of January 2000 stating that all organizations and individuals are forbidden from releasing, discussing, or transferring secret state information on websites, bulletin boards, chat rooms, and through email. The regulations require companies using the Internet to exchange information and to get a stamp of approval from the government before publishing previously unreleased information on the Web. Websites were also required to undergo a security check. The regulations ask China's Internet service providers and related organizations to teach their users about secrecy and include secrecy clauses in their user contracts.

The portals have also been told to use only news that has been published in government-owned sources and to not use reporters. Although the use of reporters remains somewhat of a gray area, most of the portals and websites have been complying. So far most of the government-owned news sources have been allowing the portals to republish their material without reimbursement.

Many of the major newspapers have developed their own online editions, and *China Daily*, for example, is getting six million "hits" per month.⁶¹ The government has committed to investing millions of RMB in the websites of the leading traditional media including *People's Daily*, Xinhua News Agency, *China Daily*, China Radio International, and the China Internet Information Center. There have even been rumors that foreigners would be allowed to invest in some of these websites.

⁶¹ "China Gives Boost to State Media Web Sites," *ChinaOnline* (March 20, 2000), available at <http://www.chinaonline.com/issues/internet_policy/currentnews/secure/C00031408.asp> (Current March 20, 2000).

Information has always been seen in China as not only something to be controlled, but also as something valuable. Every local and provincial government has an information office that is responsible for the release of government information. These information offices have developed their own portals that are tied together by the national China Economic Information Network (CEInet) of the State Information Office. These information offices not only provide information but broker business relationships. Since the early nineties all sorts of government organs have attempted to sell databases or offer subscription services. Now these organs are developing their own portals. When IPOs were doing well on the stock market, some dreamed about potential IPOs for themselves or for some spin-off. The boundaries between what is government information infrastructure and what is private is very fuzzy in China.

During the year 2000, we saw a plethora of regulations developing as each ministry tried to control and cash in on the parts of the Internet they considered their turf. This includes not only the rules on encryption, the use of reporters, and the release of state secrets, but also rules on advertising and the sale of multimedia. Most regulations require some sort of registration with a branch of a particular ministry. With a new regulation coming out every week as the government puts the Internet in order, it is not clear the degree to which the creation of all these regulations will stifle the development of ICPs and websites.

What is clear is that individuals will not be allowed to develop successful websites in complete autonomy from the state. In fact, personal websites were banned in China as of May 1, 2000. Not all regulations will be enforced equally and an Internet

business in China is required to negotiate many relationships and regulations at the local, provincial, and national levels. The central government in the interest of maintaining order and in setting the stage for WTO accession is developing a regulatory environment to govern the rapidly emerging private sector.

What is unknown is whether the attempt to regulate “media” will have a detrimental effect on initiatives to encourage Internet commerce. China is embracing the Internet in the belief that it will yield significant benefits to the economy. As was witnessed in the loosening of the encryption regulations, China’s leaders must walk a tightrope between allowing individual ministries to overregulate the Internet and being unable to govern it. The fact that so many ministries and government-owned enterprises have a stake in this new form of “mediation” makes this policy-making process all the more complex.

Given the complexity of this process, it is not surprising that many of the new Internet regulations are coming out of the State Council Information Office as opposed to a particular ministry. During the spring of 2000, the Internet Information Management Bureau was created under the State Council Information Office to guard against “false information,” “misleading information,” and “morally destructive” information on the Internet. The bureau has taken the lead in developing a registration process for ICPs.

On October 2, 2000, the government issued State Council Document No. 292, which forces ICPs to re-register with MII. The regulation holds companies liable for any content that appears on their sites, including bulletin boards and individual webpages. The companies must maintain detailed logs of who visited the sites and when. They must

also maintain records of all content for 60 days.

Chat Rooms

Chat rooms have been very popular in China and allow individuals to interact and express their opinions. They are an interesting form of mediation as they allow groups of individuals to communicate in virtual space. It is almost impossible to predict what will happen in them. The government does monitor chat sites, and most of the portals that run chat sites have a monitor on hand who is prepared to delete any comments that stray too far.

In June of 1999 the government and the ICPs were very sensitive around the anniversary of the Tiananmen Square incident. In fact, Sohu temporarily closed its chat section.

The chat rooms can cloak a person's identity, and things may be said that might not be said in other places. However, the Public Security Bureau, with the help of an ISP, can track down the user and the accessing phone number. Of course, users who participate in chat sessions from Internet cafés are much more difficult to catch.

Website Blocking

China continues to block certain foreign websites, including those belonging to *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times*. The sites that are blocked change over time, and there are no explicit regulations on what sites might be filtered. The decision to block is done collectively by the MPS, MII, and the Propaganda Department. Since the blocking takes place on the router of the Interconnecting Network, reports that different networks are blocking different sites are plausible. It is important to recognize that it is

relatively easy to access a blocked site from within China by using a proxy server located outside of China.

Prosecutions

Lin Hai

The Chinese government has begun to enforce its December 1997 regulations that forbid the use of the Internet to “harm national security, disclose state secrets, harm the interests of the State, of society or of a group, the legal rights of citizens, or to take part in criminal activities.”⁶² During the summer of 1998, the MPS arrested Lin Hai, a 30-year-old owner of an Internet job search marketing company. He had been caught providing 30,000 Chinese email addresses to *VIP Reference (Dacankao)*, a U.S.-based Internet democracy magazine.⁶³ Supposedly, the email addresses were collected for advertising purposes but were passed on to the magazine when they did not generate as much interest as expected. Though the prosecutor rejected the case for lack of evidence, the MPS continued to hold Lin Hai.⁶⁴

On January 20, 1999, the Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate Court convicted him for “inciting the subversion of state sovereignty.” The verdict included a two-year jail sentence, a U.S. \$1,200 fine, and the confiscation of “the tool of his crime”—two desktop computers, one laptop, one modem, and a telephone.⁶⁵

There has been speculation that the conviction of Lin Hai is the result of the

frustration that government officials feel at their inability to stop the torrent of antigovernment propaganda that is coming into the country and into their own email boxes. These foreign-based e-magazines are sent from different email addresses each week and are very difficult to filter. The government did, however, filter email sent from China to the email address of *VIP Reference* and caught Lin Hai in the process. The two-year sentence, though stiff for selling email addresses, is somewhat lenient given his conviction on the “subversion” charge, which is one of the most serious crimes in China.

Tunnel

The publishers of *Tunnel*, a weekly online magazine, were also arrested by MPS. *Tunnel* was originally written in China and features dissident writings.⁶⁶ The publishers, based in Jiangxi province, had attempted to hide their tracks by sending the newsletter to a server in California, where it was electronically distributed back into China. They had electronically published more than 20 editions of the magazine before they were caught. Despite the arrests, *Tunnel* is still being published and sent to subscribers in China.

Falun Gong

The Falun Gong religious movement has used email and the Web to organize and disseminate information. When Falun Gong organized a mass demonstration in Beijing to

⁶² U.S. Embassy, Beijing, “New Regulations Codify PRC Internet Practice” (February 6, 1998). The Chinese full text is available at <<http://www.edu.cn/law/glb.html>>.

⁶³ “China To Try Computer Engineer,” *AP Online* (July 29, 1998).

⁶⁴ “China Prosecutor Rejects E-mail Subversion Case,” *Reuters* (September 2, 1998).

⁶⁵ J. Pomfret, “Chinese Sentenced in Internet Case,” *The Washington Post* (January 21, 1999).

⁶⁶ According to U.S.-based Chinese Democratic Party as quoted by Chan Yee Hon, “Subversion Charge Laid over E-mail Address,” *South China Morning Post* (July 30, 1998).

protest mistreatment, email was used to organize the event. When the government cracked down on the movement, some Falun Gong supporters continued to use email to report on the government's activities and to organize a clandestine meeting with the press.

The government, as part of its efforts to curtail Falun Gong's activities, shut down all websites with information on Falun Gong and jammed the email accounts of some followers. At least one Falun Gong adherent was directly charged with using email to subvert the government.

According to the Associated Press and *Wired News*, hackers attacked Falun Gong websites in the United States from Internet addresses that seemed to trace back to Chinese government offices of the MPS's Internet Monitoring Bureau.⁶⁷

There is a long tradition in China of meting out harsh punishment as an example to others. The Lin Hai and Falun Gong cases represent warnings about the dangers of using the Internet to mobilize support against the government.

National Security

There are a number of areas where the Chinese government may be concerned about threats to national security from the Internet. National infrastructure could be at risk from hackers or even hostile governments. The Internet could serve as an incubator for dissent, resulting in political forces that might topple the government or splinter the country. A further concern is the possibility that applications could be developed on the Internet that weaken the PRC's control of its currency.

⁶⁷ D. McGill, "Weekly Press Review," *Virtual China* (August 1, 1999),

It is important to note that encryption has an impact on all three vulnerabilities. Robust encryption is a requirement for protecting national infrastructure, but it can be used to protect those who want to avoid government scrutiny. Finally, encryption is an essential component of any digital currency and can potentially be utilized to circumvent Chinese currency controls.

National security concerns were also involved in discussions over whether China Telecom should operate one physical national backbone or whether there should be competitive service providers. Since one avenue of PRC control of the Internet is through access to the backbone, the Interconnecting Networks, by being gatekeepers, provide both access for customers and protection for the government. Many in the government are distrustful of having China's core telecommunications controlled by foreigners, because it is not clear that foreigners will play a similar role. By keeping China Telecom in a dominant position, the state is assured that it can control and monitor access. Now that JiTong, Unicom, and China Netcom have been given permission to run backbones, they too will be expected to safeguard the national interest.

There is a lot of discussion within China about the potential vulnerabilities of using foreign equipment in their telecommunications infrastructure. There is concern that there may be back doors into equipment that foreign governments, particularly the American government, know about and could potentially exploit to monitor and even disable China's telecommunications infrastructure. Despite these national security concerns, China's network operators prefer the reliability and flexibility of Cisco

equipment to any homegrown alternative.

One respected observer notes that there is greater concern about viruses and who controls the money spigot than about national security. "National security" is mostly an argument made by the people with power in MII and China Telecom in order to scare their somewhat unsophisticated bosses into issuing tough edicts.⁶⁸ According to this line of reasoning, few of them care seriously about national security, assuming that it is either a red herring or someone else's problem. The concern about national security has probably heightened over the past couple years, but those who voice security concerns often also have an economic or bureaucratic motive.

It is difficult to say whether the closing of the CCF loophole for foreign funding was due to national security concerns, an effort by China Telecom to protect its monopoly, or a requirement by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) that had to be met before Unicom could have an IPO. The answer is, of course, that all three are true.

National and organizational interests are also behind efforts to develop Red Flag Unix in competition with Microsoft's Windows 2000. National security concerns are interwoven with attempts to cut costs, develop domestic industry, and build organizational power and influence.

Cultural Security and Preservation

There is wariness among some leaders about integrating the Internet into China. It is feared that massive exposure to Western culture and language will undermine China's

⁶⁸ J. Lewis, Stanford University, comments on an unpublished paper (October 1998).

culture and language, particularly among its youth. Certain individuals and organizations have espoused building a China Intranet of Chinese content. The “169” Multimedia Network is an outgrowth of this idea and provides low-cost access to websites only in China. Some factions advocate that a China-only Internet service should not only be an option but that it should be the only Internet service available to those outside of government and academia. So far these conservatives have had to be satisfied with the “169” service, which in most provinces even now has an international option.

It can be assumed that one of the reasons that the government has supported the development of the ICP industry is because it is a major producer of Chinese language content.

Computer Crime

Since the beginning of the nineties, the number of computer crimes has risen dramatically. According to the *People's Daily*, the CCP's official voice, hacker crime in China is increasing at an annual rate of 30 percent.⁶⁹ There were a total of 180 cases of computer crime handled by the police as of 1999.⁷⁰ However, according to an official with the Ministry of Public Security, only 15 percent of all hacker attempts are accounted for, either because little actual physical harm was done or the victims wanted to minimize damage to their image.⁷¹

China has a severe shortage of computer security specialists and computer

⁶⁹ *People's Daily* (October 12, 1998).

⁷⁰ See “Roundup—Digital Crime Needed To Be Addressed,” *FT Asia Intelligence Wire* (February 15, 1999).

⁷¹ “Computer-Related Crimes Surging in China,” *Xinhua News Agency* (January 6, 1999).

security products.⁷² Zhao Zhangsheng, a computer security expert with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, has stated that China's information technology is still at "a nascent stage," and that even when firewalls are used, there are many holes left for hackers to enter.⁷³

The MPS has engaged in tiger attacks against a variety of banking, government, and public networks and found most systems vulnerable to attack. Foreign hackers have repeatedly attacked China's systems. After assaulting two of China's official websites, Bronc Buster, an international hacktivist, sent a public email saying, "Your security is a total joke, it would be extremely easy for anyone with the needed resources to totally take down the entire Internet in China. These sites had some of the poorest security I've ever seen for a system run by a powerful world government. . . . The hacking part took less than two minutes, we spent more time laughing than we did hacking."⁷⁴

As in other parts of the world, there has been a substantial amount of theft involving the Internet. Some of the reports of computer crime in the press include:

- The first computer crime reportedly happened in July 1986 in South China's Shenzhen, where a computer thief at a local bank embezzled more than 50,500 RMB (U.S. \$6,020) by modifying software programs.⁷⁵
- In 1987, an accountant at a local branch of the China Agriculture Bank in Southwest China's Chengdu was found to have embezzled about one million RMB (U.S.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ "China Website Runs Afoul of Human Right Hackers," *San Francisco Chronicle* (December 30, 1998).

⁷⁵ "China: Cyberspace Crimes on the Rise," *China Daily* (October 20, 1998).

\$120,000) by forging invoices in the computerized account system.⁷⁶

- In April 1998, a postsecondary graduate hacker stole insider stock information from a Shanghai brokerage house's system to help his friend who had lost money in stocks.⁷⁷
- In late July 1998, the Intranet of a paging service center in Balian in northeastern China was paralyzed for an hour. Later, police found that the system had been modified by a "time bomb" that was planted in the network.⁷⁸
- In January 1999, 51 people were arrested on charges of hacking into a Chinese railway's computer system. The scheme involved buying cheap tickets and reselling them after breaking into the reservation computer, upgrading them to more expensive express trains. The scheme involved over 8,000 tickets worth U.S. \$54,000.⁷⁹
- The banking sector has had over 21 million RMB (U.S. \$2.5 million) embezzled.⁸⁰

Outlook Weekly, an official journal in the PRC, at the beginning of 1999 published an article warning that "cybercrime in China has reached such a serious level that it has damaged the normal economic order and threatens national security."⁸¹ In calling for legislation to address information security, Zhang Lansheng, a Shanghai deputy to the National People's Congress (NPC), stated that insecurity of information has

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Xiao Yu, "Computer Hacking Rampant," *China Daily* (December 21, 1998).

⁷⁸ "China: Cyberspace Crimes in the Rise," *China Daily* (October 20, 1998).

⁷⁹ "China Nabs 51 in Computer Break in," *AP Online* (January 29, 1999).

⁸⁰ "Computer Network Poses New Threat to Security," *Xinhua News Agency* (January 11, 1999).

⁸¹ Ibid.

become the leading problem plaguing e-business in China.⁸² Speaking to state and military security departments in 1998, China's president, Jiang Zemin, stated explicitly that China's current security methods have been too backward to cope with the technology. He also demanded that state and military security departments set up a task force to look at the management of computer information networks.⁸³

Legislation and Regulations

In March 1997, the NPC amended the country's criminal code with three articles that included computer hacking and fraud as serious crimes.⁸⁴

Article 285: Whomever violates state regulations and intrudes into computer systems with information concerning state affairs, construction of defense facilities, and sophisticated science and technology is to be sentenced to not more than three years of fixed-term imprisonment.

Article 286: Whomever violates state regulations and deletes, alters, adds, and interferes in computer information systems, causing abnormal operations of the systems and grave consequences, is to be sentenced to not more than five years of fixed-term imprisonment or criminal detention; when the consequences are particularly serious, the sentence is to be not less than five years of fixed-term imprisonment.

Whomever violates state regulations and deletes, alters, or adds [to] the data or application programs installed in or processed and transmitted by computer systems, and causes grave consequences, is to be punished according to the preceding paragraph.

Whomever deliberately creates and propagates computer virus and other programs which sabotage the normal operation of the computer system and cause grave consequences is to be punished according to the first paragraph.

Article 287: Whomever uses a computer for financial fraud, theft,

⁸² "NPC Deputies Call for Legislation for Information Security," *Xinhua News Agency* (March 3, 1999).

⁸³ "Jiang Zemin Reportedly Concerned over Leaks via Internet, *Ming Pao* (September 24, 1998).

⁸⁴ Articles 285, 286, and 287, adopted July 1, 1997, Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, available from <<http://www.qis.net/chinalaw/prclaw60.htm>> (English version) (Current October 31, 1999).

corruption, misappropriation of public funds, stealing state secrets, or other crimes is to be convicted and punished according to relevant regulations of this law.

On December 30, 1997, the Ministry of Public Security promulgated the “Regulations on the Security and Management of Computer Information Networks and the Internet.” It is quite evident that the Steering Committee on National Information Infrastructure was actively involved in drafting regulations, approved by the State Council on December 11, 1997.⁸⁵ The new regulations are a codification of existing practices.⁸⁶ They build on “The Regulations of Safety Protection for Computer Information Systems” and “Notice on Strengthening the Management of Computer Information Network and Internet Registration Information,” both of February 1996, and the “Temporary Regulations on Electronic Publishing” of March 1996.

The regulations state that the Internet can not be used to “harm national security, disclose state secrets, harm the interests of the State, of society or of a group, the legal rights of citizens, or to take part in criminal activities.”⁸⁷ No unit or individual may use the Internet to create, replicate, retrieve, or transmit the following kinds of information:

- Inciting to resist or break the Constitution, or laws, or the implementations of administrative regulations;
- Inciting division of the country, harming national unification;
- Inciting hatred or discrimination among nationalities or harming the unity

⁸⁵ U.S. Embassy, *op. cit.*

⁸⁶ Ministry of Public Security, “Regulations on the Security and Management of Computer Information Networks and the Internet,” Chapter 1, Section Four. Order No. 147 requires users to register with the MPS. Users do this by filling out a form at their ISP. According to a number of users the process is pretty much *pro forma* and they have not been required to show proof of identity. This only proves that it is the ISPs’ records that are of value to the MPS.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, Chapter 1, Section Four.

- of the nationalities;
- Making falsehoods or distorting the truth, spreading rumors, destroying the order of society;
- Promoting feudal superstitions, sexually suggestive material, gambling, violence, murder;
- Inciting terrorism or inciting others to criminal activity, openly insulting other people, or distorting the truth to slander people; or
- Injuring the reputation of state organs.

By making it illegal to “transmit” any of the above, the ISPs and the Interconnecting Networks are responsible for the activities of their users. How actively they will be forced to monitor their users for illegal activities in order to protect themselves is not clear. On the other hand, Section Seven states that the freedom and privacy of network users is protected by law. Further, it states that “. . . no unit or individual may, in violation of these regulations, use the Internet to violate the freedom and privacy of network users.”⁸⁸

What is clear is that ISPs and corporations connected to the Internet are expected to work as agents for the MPS. “Units and individuals engaged in Internet business must accept the security supervision, inspection, and guidance of the Public Security organizations. This includes providing to the Public Security organization information required to discover and properly handle incidents involving law violations and criminal activities involving computer information networks.”⁸⁹ They are also responsible for providing information about violations of the criminal code.

For violations of these regulations, the Public Security organization has the option

of providing a warning, confiscating illegal earnings, or assessing a fine of U.S. \$625 against individuals and U.S. \$1,875 to work units. For more serious offenses computer network access can be closed down for six months, and if necessary Public Security can suggest that the business operating license of the concerned unit be canceled along with its network registration.

The Interconnecting Networks are responsible for the ISPs they support; ISPs are responsible for their customers; and work units are responsible for their workers. The Chinese government has extended its social control mechanisms to the business and connectivity infrastructure of the Internet in a manner that does not threaten the economic benefits it may provide. In fact, the clause requiring the MPS to “protect the legal rights of Internet service providing units and individuals” may be an effort to ensure that an ISP cannot lose its license and connectivity solely for competitive reasons.

The regulations do not specifically mention information service providers but do use the catch-all term “Internet business.” This provides MPS the authority to supervise all parts of the Internet without explicitly trampling on the domain of other ministries.

The regulations of December 30, 1997, require connecting units and corporations to “assume responsibility for network security, protection, and management and establish a thoroughly secure, protected, and well-managed network.” They are also required to carry out technical measures for network and information security.⁹⁰

Institutions

⁸⁸ Ibid., Chapter 1, Section Seven.

⁸⁹ Ibid., Chapter 2, Section Eight.

⁹⁰ Ibid., Chapter 2, Section Ten.

The MPS set up the Computer Management and Supervision Office specifically to deal with crimes involving computers. The staff includes people skilled in computer and network administration and investigation. In Shanghai alone, 150 computer engineers were hired. More than 2,000 people have been hired nationwide.

Ultimately, a situation has been set up where the Interconnecting Networks authorize and have responsibility for the networks and businesses that connect to them. Webmasters are required to get permission before they offer a new service or business on the Internet. In addition, Internet service providers are responsible for their customers and are required to make backup tapes of all SMTP (email) traffic that passes through their networks. The ISP is required by the regulation to act as an agent of the MPS and must provide the MPS with any information that the MPS requests, including the backup tapes. Needless to say, these backup tapes can become a management headache in their own right, and some ISPs are known to not be maintaining them.

It is rumored that the MPS has made arrests only rarely because of information found through monitoring email. Rather, the MPS has often discovered illegal activities through other sources and made public claims that they located the guilty party through email. It is also important to note that people who choose to use Web-based mail services hosted outside of China, such as Hotmail and Yahoo, circumvent the SMTP mail capture procedures and make it difficult for the MPS to access their email accounts. So far, there have been no regulations against the use of Hotmail or Yahoo, and many, particularly students, are using these services.

On July 25, 1998, the Chinese government established the China National

Information Security Testing, Evaluation, and Certification Center (CNISTEC) to conduct testing and evaluation on the quality and performance of security products. CNISTEC maintains close connections with MPS, MII, CAS, and more than 30 other governmental organizations.⁹¹ In February 1999, the China National Accreditation Council for Product Certification Bodies and the China Quality and Technical Supervision Board certified that CNISTEC had met the criteria in ISO/IEC Guideline 65 as an accredited certification body. The CNISTEC currently certifies 11 categories of products:

- Access control products (firewalls, routers, proxy servers/gateways)
- Authentication products
- Security auditing products
- Security management products
- Digital signature products
- Non-repudiation products
- Commercial encryption products
- TEMPEST products (technology that suppresses signal emanations from electronic equipment)
- Information system security products
- Information security services

In February of 1999, China established the State Information Security Appraisal and Identification Management Committee to coordinate the country's anti-cyber crime campaign. The committee is under the direct control of the State Council. It is responsible for protecting confidential government and commercial information on the Internet, identifying any illegal Net users, and defining the rights and responsibilities of ISPs and

⁹¹ "China-Info Security Product Certification," *FT Asia Intelligence Wire* (August 17, 1998).

Internet users⁹² Both the MII and the MPS are cooperating on this, though it is unclear whether the actual equipment testing takes place at MII facilities in Beijing or MPS facilities in Tianjin. Though the MSS is believed to be involved in the Management Committee, it also sponsors the National Commission on Encryption Code Regulation (NCECR), which was discussed earlier. This commission claims to be the certification authority for regulation of research and development, production, distribution, sale, use, and import/export of encryption products and technologies.

⁹² "China Forms Information Security Oversight Committee," *FT Asia Intelligence Wire* (February 15, 1999).

CHAPTER V: COMMERCIAL USE OF THE INTERNET

It is not clear how rapidly e-commerce will transform China, but it is clear that the major area of growth is business-to-business (B2B) e-commerce. Business users are using the Internet in bottom-up efforts to communicate with customers and potential customers through email and web pages. At the same time there are top-down government initiatives to interconnect organizations and to provide the legal and financial infrastructure to support e-commerce. There is also the influence of globalization and culture on the e-commerce adoption process. A survey of 18 electronics firms shows that it is the larger firms that are taking the lead in terms of e-commerce adoption and that the companies have more interaction with the West in general than do the smaller firms.

The Chinese Communist Party has undoubtedly taken significant risks in allowing the Internet. But it is not clear how big China's payback has been. Chinese policy-makers often point to research, such as the Cisco–University of Texas study of the information economy, to show how America is reaping substantial economic gains from the Internet.⁹³ No such similar studies have been done in China. However, MII reported in March 2001, that China had e-commerce revenues of US\$9.32 billion of which B2B (business to business) trade brought in US\$9.27 billion and B2C (business to consumer) brought in US\$47.1 million.⁹⁴

There was a great deal of interest in B2C at the beginning of 2000. China had 667 B2C companies though following mergers, acquisitions and bankruptcies, only 205 had

⁹³ S. Chen, *The Social Impact of the Internet and E-Commerce and China's Development Policy* (Stanford, CA: Center for International Security and Cooperation, August 1999).

⁹⁴ China Daily, February 27, 20001

survived by the end of 2000.⁹⁵

If we take the University of Texas methodology, the Chinese e-economy should be measured as a combination of the revenues from telecommunications infrastructure; software, hardware, and integration revenues; and B2B and B2C revenues. Given the urgency of creating new jobs, it is essential to Chinese policy-makers that the Internet not only increase the efficiency of buying but increase demand as well. Though B2C got a great deal of attention in 2000, it is B2B electronic commerce that is expected to finance the Internet infrastructure and the national economy. It is the key to a vibrant Internet in China. However, it is important to point out the barriers to e-commerce. Chinese are used to doing business on the basis of personal relationships and this has resulted in legacies that thwart change and automation. In addition, neither the legal nor the physical infrastructures have existed nationwide to support settlements, delivery, and materials acquisition. Many of the “trusted” systems that businesses in the West have come to depend on are only now being developed. Information technology definitely has a role in the development of settlement systems between banks, but there is also the need for a legal and contract infrastructure.

It is helpful to see adoption of e-commerce in China at the organizational level as being mediated by the interaction of culture, globalization and top-down forces and bottom-up forces.

Culture

Chinese are highly conscious of the social relationships and networks in which

⁹⁵ Ibid.

they participate. It remains to be seen whether Internet technologies will strengthen and extend these social networks or whether the social networks will be a barrier to the absorption of information technology. Information has traditionally been shared within the context of social networks, hierarchical or otherwise. The information sharing and organizing made possible by distributed information technology creates a certain degree of discomfort on the part of those at the top and even more so at the middle of hierarchies. In the words of Thomas Lam, the general manager for enterprise operations at Cisco China, "In China, the tendency is to protect information—everything is confidential—but with the Internet it's just the opposite, you've got to share information to do your job."⁹⁶

Needless to say, culture has the potential of having a significant impact on what forms of e-commerce are adopted and how rapidly. It is important to note that there may be significant differences among generations of Chinese in their comfort in operating in a virtual environment and using information technology to transform inter-organizational processes. Those young adults who were exposed to computers in college to a certain extent share a different culture than those adults who have only been exposed to information technology in the middle of their life.

Globalization

E-commerce in China can not be separated from the process of globalization. The West is becoming more and more present in China. Chinese engineers are exposed through the Internet to the state of the art in technology in the West. Western customers,

⁹⁶ P. Eckert, "Cisco Sees China Beating Internet Business Hurdles," *Reuters* (September 20, 1999).

investors, and suppliers impact Chinese organizations. Most observers agree that the globalization of supply networks will drive the adoption of e-commerce as Chinese companies compete in the global economy. The question is how long will this process take.

Bottom-up

It is important to point out that rudimentary forms of e-commerce have diffused very rapidly in China. Many businesses are using email to conduct business. Even if the organizations do not have a dedicated connection to the Internet, they are able to place “brochureware” on a Web intermediary site and participate in Web brokerages. Many Chinese manufacturers are finding customers on the newly emerging B2B exchanges. *Virtual China* reported that 200 to 400 of the participants on Chemconnect.com are from China.⁹⁷

Many of the forces driving e-commerce could be characterized as bottom-up as individuals and companies respond to the forces and opportunities placed on them by the market and to some extent by technology. From this perspective, firms increase their sophistication of use in response to perceived benefits.

The relative low cost of labor in China creates less incentive to automate than in the West, especially when the automation tools, such as enterprise resource planning (ERP), are inordinately expensive. One of the reasons that electronic document interchange (EDI) has been so slow to diffuse in China is that many organizations were not sufficiently automated to gain efficiency from it.

⁹⁷ J. Landreth, “Interested in a Ton of Ethylene from China?” *Virtual China* (January 12, 2000). Available

It is possible that many Chinese manufacturers will be able to participate in e-commerce with a PC, a Web browser, and a modem. Once they receive the order they may be able to work it manually. This combination of automation and manual methods is known in the West as a “Betty” switch and may serve many Chinese manufacturers quite well.

Top Down

Though e-commerce is being driven by bottom-up forces, the government is driving e-commerce from the top down in an effort to transform the country into a knowledge economy as discussed in Chapter 3. These efforts range from such projects as the Golden Gate project that is transforming the customs process to efforts such as the Corporate IT Adoption Project. In addition, the government is involved in a wide variety of activities to build a banking and security infrastructure that is supportive of e-commerce. There are efforts underway through the quasi public China Electronic Commerce Association to offer 40 hour e-commerce certifications to millions of workers throughout the country. How these top down forces interact with bottom up forces will have a significant impact on the process of adoption.

It is helpful to visualize as in Figure 2 the interaction of top down, bottom up, globalization, and cultural forces that will impact the rate and kind of e-commerce in China at an organizational level.




Figure 2. Factors Affecting Adoption of E-commerce in China

Survey of E-commerce Adoption

There is little research on factors associated with E-commerce adoption in China. We have thus supplemented our national case study with an exploratory study of 18 electronics companies in an attempt to understand the sophistication of use of the Internet by individual firms and the factors affecting e-commerce adoption. In doing so, I have attempted to begin to explore the impact of globalization, culture, and government on e-commerce adoption.

There are a considerable number of different technologies that can be implemented as part of e-commerce strategies. Some require the standardization and automation of internal business processes and some do not. I have developed an index of e-commerce sophistication which allows me to organize the many different practices associated with e-commerce. E-commerce spans a wide continuum from the use of e-mail for conducting business transactions to the implementation of inter-organizational applications. The index recognizes the various levels of e-commerce sophistication and the relationships between them.

The Institute for the Future has made a convincing case that the electronics industry is characterized by a global flow of information, money, and people in what they have called the Global Silicon Network (GSN).⁹⁸ I postulate that firms that have implemented the most sophisticated electronic commerce strategies will be those which

⁹⁸ Institute for the Future, *The Rise of the Global Silicon Network and the Growing Importance of Asia*, (Menlo Park, CA: Institute for the Future, The Outlook Project Year 1997-1998).

are led by engineers who have trained and worked in the West. They will have Western customers. They will have innovatively merged Western management practices with traditional Chinese business practices.

Adoption of Information Technology

Sultan and Chan made some considerable headway on a strategy for evaluating technology adoption.⁹⁹ They found a number of factors to be strong indicators for the success of technology adoption of object-oriented technology. They noted that the firm's values, teamwork, opinion leadership, communication, response to risk, company culture (centralization, formulization, integration), technology policy, competitive strategies, management risk perception, and top management support explained the adoption of object oriented technology.

It is important to note that the studies by Sultan and Chan (Sultan, 2000) have been done with *nonradical* types of technology. The use of object-oriented technology has been successful in many software development firms. The adoption of sophisticated e-commerce technologies in the Chinese electronics industry represents an introduction of a radically new business process and technology. It has been suggested that there are two types of innovative technologies: exploitative technology and exploratory technology.¹⁰⁰ In the case of e-commerce adoption, I am dealing with somewhat of a cross between the two. The automated supply chain technology has been proven effective in the US and other countries. However, the compatibility of this technology in

⁹⁹ F. Sultan and L. Chan, "The adoption of new technology: the case of object-oriented computing in software companies", *IEEE Trans. Eng. Manag.*, Vol. 47. No. 1, pp.106-126, 2000.

¹⁰⁰ Starling D. Hunter, III, "Which Investments in Information Technology Increase the Market Value of

China is somewhat exploratory in nature since it could potentially involve a drastic effect on the overall business processes.

E-Commerce Adoption in China

It is not clear whether leading edge Chinese electronics companies are going with Web-based interfaces or computer-to-computer interactions for customer and supply chain management if they are doing so at all. It is assumed that companies that can electronically integrate with their Western customers will have a significant advantage over their competitors who can not. The question is which Chinese companies are willing to bear the costs and risks of sophisticated e-commerce implementations and can overcome the cultural barriers to automation and change.

In China, many companies are government owned (SOEs) or have ties to the government. The government has driven the growth of e-commerce through a wide variety of initiatives such as the Golden Bridge, Golden Card, Golden Gate, and Golden Tax and through the reform of the banking system. E-Commerce in China is being driven from both the top-down (government initiatives) and the bottom-up (individual responses to market forces). How these two drivers interact depends on whether the company is an SOE, a private business, a foreign owned business, a joint stock company, or a joint venture. Quite possibly, SOEs have moved faster in terms of electronic integration with other government entities such as customs, but are not as far along in electronic supply chain management as some private companies. Private enterprises can also be expected to be the most advanced in terms of participating in emerging vertical B2B exchanges.

Therefore, I predict the following:

H1a: Private ownership is negatively correlated with e-commerce sophistication.

H1b: State ownership is negatively correlated with e-commerce sophistication.

H1c: Joint stock ownership is positively correlated with e-commerce sophistication.

H1d: Joint venture ownership is positively correlated with e-commerce sophistication.

It is important to test for the importance of size with respect to e-commerce.

Large firms have been primarily responsible for driving EDI and other forms of interorganizational computing in the West and it would not be surprising to find the same for China.¹⁰¹ Larger firms have the MIS staffs and the resources to carry out MIS projects. In addition, they have a volume of transactions with customers that justifies automating those transactions.

H2: The size of a company is positively correlated with e-commerce sophistication.

It is expected that the growth of e-commerce in China will occur most rapidly where companies are integrated into the fast moving web of interconnected people, places, and organizations that make up the global computer industry or what the Institute for the Future calls the global silicon network (GSN). Companies which have managers or MIS managers who have studied, worked, or traveled to the West are more likely to have connections to people, places, and companies in other countries. In addition,

managers who have traveled abroad probably have a good grasp of English and are able to become familiar with the latest developments in e-commerce. This may be true particularly of the MIS managers because much of the technical literature for actually implementing e-commerce is in English. But there are cultural issues as well. The drive to automate and computerize transactions has been particularly strong in Western corporations. Managers and MIS Managers who have been to, worked, or been educated in the West are more likely to be exposed to this “culture” and are more willing to transform how things are done. More importantly, if they had been worked in management or have been educated in the West, they may have learned skills for actually transforming the status quo. Firms with a higher percentage of company managers educated in the West would be more likely to implement sophisticated e-commerce strategies.

H3a: A general manager’s command of English is correlated with e-commerce sophistication.

H3b: The English language ability of the MIS director of a company is correlated with that company’s e-commerce sophistication.

H3c: A general manager’s exposure to travel to the West is correlated with e-commerce sophistication.

H3d: A MIS Director’s exposure to travel to the West is correlated with e-commerce sophistication.

H3e: The percentage of managers of a company educated in the West is correlated

¹⁰¹ P. Ashton, “Impact of Electronic Data Interchange on Small Firms,” Small Business Administration

with e-commerce sophistication.

Another element of the GSN is the relationships between investors, suppliers, and customers. Chinese companies that have a relationship with Western customers or suppliers that are already using e-commerce would be more likely to invest in e-commerce. This would be particularly true of Chinese firms that have Western customers. Western companies might encourage the Chinese firm to implement e-commerce in order to do business or might influence them through example (e.g., Chinese firms see cost reduction techniques.) In addition, it is possible that firms that have Western investors would be encouraged by those investors to move into e-commerce.

H4a: Western investment is correlated with e-commerce sophistication.

H4b: Having Western suppliers is correlated with e-commerce sophistication.

H4c: Having Western customers is correlated with e-commerce sophistication.

A company's overall culture, structure, and management support system technology adoption. The structure of decision-making and whether it is centralized or decentralized is important. In addition, it often takes cross-departmental coordination for technologies like e-commerce to be successful. Firms that have yet to standardize their business processes face a major challenge in implementing office automation. It has been shown in the West that technology adoption depends on whether or not a company has a technology policy and a process in place for choosing and implementing new

technologies.¹⁰² Finally, a company's adoption of technology is also influenced by a commitment to being first in their industry.

H5: The degree to which a firm has a decentralized decision-making structure is correlated with e-commerce sophistication.

H6: The degree to which a firm encourages cross-departmental activities (sales, MIS, engineering, marketing) is correlated with higher levels of e-commerce sophistication.

H7: The extent to which firms have standardized their business processes is correlated with their level of e-commerce sophistication.

H8: Having a technology policy is correlated with having a higher level of e-commerce sophistication.

H9: Commitment to being first in their industry is correlated with a firm's e-commerce sophistication.

There are definite risks associated with various forms of e-commerce as there are in anything that involves organizational and interorganizational change. Ultimately, much depends on willingness of management to embrace and successfully manage change.

H10: The degree of approval and enthusiasm of top management for technology adoption is positively correlated with e-commerce sophistication.

Finally, there is much discussion of the role of the golden projects and other Chinese government initiatives to drive e-commerce. Firms that have been involved in these initiatives should be ahead of other firms.

¹⁰² Ibid.

H11: Active participation in government e-commerce initiatives is positively correlated with e-commerce sophistication.

Method

A survey was developed to test these hypotheses and was translated into Chinese. A Chinese colleague circulated the survey to companies in China. Of the 32 responses, 18 are used in the analysis as they met the general criteria of being “electronics companies.”

On the question of company ownership, users were asked whether their company was a SOE, a Joint Venture, Private, or other. Those choosing “other” were given a space to define their form of ownership. On the English ability of the general manager and the MIS Director, users were given five options ordered from “he doesn’t know English” to “proficient”. Visits to the West for the general manager and MIS director were measured by answers of yes and no. Percentage of company managers educated in the West was measured on a five part scale ordered from none to all.

The percentage of Western investors, suppliers, and customers were measured by answers ranging on a five part scale ordered from none to all. Whether a company allows employees to participate in decision making was measured on a five part scale ordered from “not allowed” to “employees participate actively in decision making.” The degree to which a company allows employees to participate in decision making was measured with a five part scale ordered from “opposed very much” to “encouraged very

much.” The degree of standardization of business processes was measured by answers measured with a five part scale from “not standardized” to “fully automated our internal and external business practices.” The presence of technology policy was evaluated based on responses to answers measured on a five part scale from “no” to “our technology policy guides our adoption of technology”. Competitive position was evaluated by responses to answers measured on a five part scale from “behind most of our competitors” to “number one in the industry.”

The willingness of top management to accept technological change was measured by responses measured on a five part scale from “no they aren’t” to “they are willing to accept rapid technological change.”

The participation in government e-commerce initiatives was measured on a five part scale from “I have not heard of the initiatives” to “government e-commerce projects have changed our company.”

Because the Internet and e-commerce involves a cluster of technologies, it is worthwhile to explore e-commerce sophistication using an index based on the respondent’s answers to all of the technology questions. On questions about technology, participants were asked if they used the technology, would use it within two years, would use it within two to five years, would never use it, or had never heard of it. In evaluating e-commerce sophistication, I have assigned points in a manner that accounts for the fact that certain technologies build on others and that some technologies are more central to sophisticated forms of e-commerce than others. Thus, a dedicated connection to the Internet receives twice as many points (10) as a dial-up connection to the Internet (5).

There is a difference between having a web listing (5 points), having your own webserver (an additional 5 points), and having an interactive website (10-15 points based on the percentage of orders received through the website). The utilization of inter-organizational computing based on protocols such as EDI, XML, and Java apps are given significantly more weight than just having a web site. Table represents the coding system for e-commerce sophistication. Although the assignment of points is to some degree arbitrary, I believe such a tool is helpful in analyzing this survey and could be of use in future e-commerce studies.

Table 12: Index of E-Commerce Sophistication	
Technology Implemented	Points
PC	5
Dial-up Internet Access (do not count if they have dedicated access)	5
Dedicated Connection to Internet	10
LAN or Intranet	5
Listing on Websites	5
Placing or receiving orders through e-mail	5
Placing orders at B2B website	5
Participating at Industry Exchange or Auction	5
Enterprise Data System or ERP (one point for each function supported or a total of 5 for ERP)	5
Webserver on own premise or hosted	5
Interactive Website	
Some orders through website	10

Half orders through website	12
Many orders through website	13
All orders through website	15
Interorganizational Information System (deduct 5 points if they also have an interactive Website; add points for highest scoring protocol used.)	20
EDI	5
Java Applets	10
XML	15

This index does not imply that companies move through the index serially, but does reflect their willingness and ability to integrate information technology into business practices. Though some may question the inclusion of e-mail as an e-commerce practice, particularly in countries like China it represents an important and significant first step into electronically mediated commerce relationships. E-mail and listings on Web intermediaries are generally inexpensive and do not require any significant business process re-engineering. As a result, we have seen tens of thousands of Chinese businesses adopt both e-mail and websites. On the other hand, very few Chinese companies are operating Web pages where customers can place and check on the status of orders. Such systems are not only expensive, but require credit system infrastructures that are only now being built. In addition, interactive web sites require integration into enterprise information systems. Since many Chinese businesses have neither standardized nor automated their supply chain and customer management processes, they are not in the position yet to integrate interactive Web technology.

Results

Of the 18 electronics manufacturers surveyed, 94.4% were using personal computers in their business and most of the companies (72.2%) had implemented local area networks (LANs). Some form of enterprise database system had been implemented by 83% of the companies. Only 16.7% of the companies had implemented an enterprise resource planning (ERP) system, although 38.9% planned on doing so within the next two years.

Though 77.8% of the companies claimed to have a dial-up connection to the Internet, 46.7% responded that they had a dedicated connection to the Internet. Many companies were planning on adding a dedicated connection to the Internet; 20% expected to have a dedicated connection in the next two years and an additional 13.3% in two to five years. But 13.3% of respondents did not think they would implement a dedicated line and 6.7% had never heard of the technology.

E-mail has become an established way of doing business. Most respondents (72.2%) claimed that their company was using e-mail to communicate with customers. Many of the companies have some web presence: 41.2% of the companies claimed that information on their company could be found on a web site. Another 35.3% anticipated having a presence within 2 years and another 23.5% in two to five years. However, only 26.3% actually had a web site and 16.7% (3 companies) claimed that they could take orders via their web site. One company that said it received 50% of its orders through the web made components and parts for computers. Thirty-three percent of respondents said they plan to be able to offer interactive ordering within two years.

None of the companies had implemented Electronic Document Interchange (EDI)

to communicate with customers but 33.3% saw themselves doing so within 2 years.

Another 38.9% had never heard of the technology. Eleven percent of companies were involved in interorganizational computing using Java applications and 5.6% using XML.

Of the companies surveyed, five identified themselves as joint stock companies, three as joint ventures, four as private, and five as state owned enterprises. The number of employees for companies ranged from 2 to 30,000 with a mean of 3,986 employees per company.

Hypothesis Testing

The Spearman Correlation coefficient values for testing the hypothesis follows in Table 13.

Table 13: Correlations with E-commerce sophistication.¹⁰³			
Hypothesis: Correlation with E-commerce sophistication	Spearman Correlation	Observations	Spearman Significance P <
H1a: Private Enterprises	-.42126	18	.05
H1b: State Owned Enterprises	.11966	18	NS
H1c: Joint Stock Companies	-.01197	18	NS
H1d: Joint Venture Companies	.18696	18	NS
H2: Size	.81522	17	.001
H3a: English ability of general manager	.27731	16	NS
H3b: English ability of MIS Director	.80686	9	.01
H3c: General managers who have been to the West	.68217	18	.005
H3d: MIS Director visited West	.86800	11	.001
H3e: Management educated in the West	.49102	18	.025
H4a: Western investor	.60510	18	.01
H4b: Western supplier	.38242	17	.1
H4c: Western customers	.86181	18	.001
H5: Decentralized decision-making	.63345	18	.005
H6: Cross department activities encouraged	.36472	18	.10

¹⁰³ The Spearman correlation of rank order is used because one variable is clearly an ordinal variable. We believe that it is acceptable to use the Spearman correlation by making the assumption that our E-commerce Sophistication Index is also an ordinal variable.

H7: Standardized business process	.16459	16	NS
H8: Technology policy	.48767	17	.025
H9: Commitment to being first	.49135	18	.025
H10: Top Management Support	.49031	18	.025
H11: Participation in government e-commerce initiatives	.36437	16	NS

Ownership Structure

Although the three firms with the most sophisticated e-commerce implementations were joint ventures, I did not find a strong positive correlation between any form of ownership structure and e-commerce sophistication. The strongest positive correlation was between state ownership and e-commerce sophistication (Spearman .12, $p < .10$). Private enterprises had a negative correlation (Spearman $-.42126$, $p < .05$). Therefore hypothesis 1a through 1d were not supported. Although a couple of the companies participating in the survey were from the municipality of Shanghai and the province of Guangdong, most of the participants were from the northeastern part of China. The private companies do not represent the private Guangdong companies that are at the leading edge of automation. On the other hand, the sample may show important trends in terms of what is going in industrialized China. The fact that some joint venture firms had embraced e-commerce while other had not is worth noting. Just because a company is a joint venture does not mean that it will be sophisticated in terms of e-commerce.

Size

Size was highly correlated with e-commerce sophistication. The correlation between employee size and e-commerce sophistication was a Spearman coefficient of .81522 with a significance of less than .001. For the 9 companies in the survey with less

than 1000 employees the average level of e-commerce sophistication was 16. For the 8 companies with more than 1000 employees the average level of e-commerce sophistication is 39.25. The most sophisticated company had the highest number of employees.

Influence of the West

There is strong evidence of a correlation between the extent to which management can and does interact with the West and the firm's e-commerce sophistication. The ability of the MIS director to speak English (Spearman .80686, $p < .001$) is correlated with a firm's embrace of e-commerce. Whether a firm has an MIS director who has traveled to the West is also correlated with the firm's e-commerce ability (Spearman .86800, $p < .001$). At this time, I do not have either the evidence or the theory to postulate the causal connection that MIS managers traveling to the West results in a company taking the steps to become more advanced in terms of e-commerce. It is likely, however, that people who have traveled to the West are more aware of the opportunities and thus are first to jump on the bandwagon. It is clear that identifying companies whose MIS director has traveled to the West is an indicator that the company is relatively e-commerce sophisticated.

It is important to note that the English proficiency of the general manager is not as important as the English proficiency of the MIS director to the firm's level of e-commerce. There is still a correlation between whether a general manager traveled to the West and the company's e-commerce sophistication (Spearman .68217 $p < .005$). There is also a correlation between the percentage of a firm's management that was

educated in the West and the commitment to e-commerce (Spearman .49102, $p < .025$), probably again because they are more likely to be exposed to opportunities.

There is a strong correlation (Spearman .86181, $p < .001$) between whether firms have Western customers and their level of e-commerce sophistication. The correlation is not so strong for firms with Western investors (Spearman .60510, $p < .01$) and even less for firms with Western suppliers (Spearman .38242, $p < .1$). Though we did not ask whether customers had requested companies to upgrade their inter-organizational capabilities, we did ask whether customers required the company to do business electronically. Seventy-six percent of respondents indicated that they had been asked to do business electronically by their customers and 47.1% said that they had complied. Of course, firms can also be exposed to new forms of automation just in the process of doing business with their more automated customers.

Company Structure and Management

Sultan and Chan identified decentralized decision-making as an important factor in technology adoption in the United States. This correlation holds true in China as well. The data showed a significant correlation (.63345, $p < .005$) between the role that employees had in decision-making and the level of e-commerce sophistication in the company. It is not clear why certain firms were including employees in decisions. Not surprisingly, these were the same firms that had foreign customers.

Management commitment to being first was also correlated with e-commerce sophistication (Spearman .49135, $p < .025$) as was the use of a technology policy (Spearman .48767, $p < .025$). Top management support for technology adoption was also

important (Spearman .49031, $p < .025$). Clearly, management makes a difference in e-commerce adoption and many of the factors observed by Sultan and Chan for the adoption of object oriented programming in the US are also relevant for e-commerce adoption in China.¹⁰⁴ It becomes clear that E-commerce adoption is more than just the adoption of technology, but requires the adoption of certain management practices.

Government E-Commerce Initiatives

The survey found little support for participation in government e-commerce programs. This is not cause to throw out the concept that top down initiatives have a role in e-commerce adoption in China. In fact 4 of 16 companies said they were starting to get involved in government e-commerce initiatives and one said the initiatives had made a difference in his company. Many of the government's e-commerce programs are only being rolled out in 2001. Subsequent studies are needed to test the effect of these programs.

Size of Firm and its Correlation with other Factors

The size of the firm is correlated with many other of the significant factors. These correlations between firm size and the other significant factors is described in Table 14.

¹⁰⁴ F. Sultan op. cit.

Table 14: Correlation of Significant Factors with Size		
Factor	Spearman Coefficient	Significance P<
English of MIS Director	.73539	.05
General Manager been to West	.62853	.005
MIS Director Visited West	.86800	.001
Management Educated in the West	.60970	.01
Western Investor	.67722	.005
Western Supplier	.61900	.025
Western Customer	.80895	.001
Decentralized Decision Making	.60209	.025
Cross Department Collaboration	.09492	NS
Technology Policy	.50541	.05
Commitment to being first	.52290	.05
Top Management Support	.26422	NS

Clearly, more research is needed to tease out the differences between the effects of size and Western interaction and management strategy on e-commerce sophistication. It is logical that the firms that are largest also have the highest degree of Western interaction. The question is whether it is Western interaction or some other factor associated with the size of the firm that is responsible for more sophisticated uses of e-commerce in Chinese firms. It is important to recognize that this study measured e-commerce adoption as of May 2000. Firms' sophistication of use and the reasons for it will change during 2001 and 2002.

Conclusion

This is an exploratory study of the factors that have influenced e-commerce adoption in China. The study is limited by its sample size of 18 companies and the fact that it uses only correlational data. Our e-commerce sophistication index allowed us to evaluate a "cluster" of technologies associated with e-commerce. It proved helpful in this

instance and I will continue to refine it in future studies. Significantly more firms need to be evaluated in order to develop a model of e-commerce adoption in China.

This study provides us with some insights for evaluating the Sophistication of Use dimension in our evaluation of China as a whole. Most companies have not yet implemented forms of e-commerce that require a change in business process. E-Mail is being used for commerce. Almost half the organizations surveyed had a web presence and most of the rest planned to. However, only a few companies, mainly the larger ones, were involved in interorganizational computing or could take interactive web orders. Though this is a very small sample of all organizations in China, this study lends credence to still evaluating China's Internet Sophistication of Use on the "Conventional" rather than the "Transformative" level.

CHAPTER VI: GOVERNMENT USE OF THE INTERNET

Most government agencies at the national, provincial and city level now have a website. The amount of information a website offers varies as does its transparency and interactivity. The central ministries and the cities and provinces on the East coast lead the country in terms of their ability to integrate the web into their organizational processes.

China has embarked on the ambitious Government On-line Project to establish a major presence on the World Wide Web. As of May 17, 1999, more than 720 Chinese government agencies had registered a domain name and were offering web sites. This includes more than 50 principal central government agencies. Using domain name statistics, Fravel speculates that there are now more than 3,300 government web sites in China.¹⁰⁵

The Government On-line Project was initiated on January 22, 1999. It was sponsored by the State Economic and Trade Committee and the information departments of more than 40 state ministries and commissions. The Chinese government sees this initiative as a key strategy for promoting the use of information technology not only in government but throughout society as well.

What is the impact of the Government On-line Project? Is it making new information available to the public in new ways? Does it represent a change in the process of governance? What does a government web site with Chinese characteristics

¹⁰⁵ M.T. Fravel, "Online and on China: Research Sources in the Information Age," *The China Quarterly*, 163, September 2000, pp. 821-842.

look like?

In order to give us a perspective on the on-line project it is useful to evaluate Chinese government web sites using the Website Attribute Evaluation System (WAES) developed by the CyPRG project¹⁰⁶. This evaluation system has been applied to all first tier government web sites from around the world. Using the CyPRG database it is possible to compare the websites of Chinese ministries with those of similar ministries in other countries.

Openness: Transparency and Interactivity

Demchak argues that openness exists to the extent that an organization freely and universally provides comprehensive information about all its attributes and maintains timely communications directly with all key public audiences.¹⁰⁷ The World Wide Web is an excellent medium for allowing organizations to increase their openness. But the Web can be used in many different ways and some increase openness more than others. A web site with no organizational or contact information is not particularly open. Demchak defines organizational openness in the context of the World Wide Web according to two components, transparency and interactivity.¹⁰⁸ Transparency is defined by the way an agency provides information about itself and how to work with it. Interactivity is the convenience in accessing this information. On the Web, the two

components are not completely independent. For example, a hot link to a webmaster cannot be provided without having some address embedded in the link. However, addresses can be given without the ease of a hot link.

Transparency

Transparency refers to the availability of information for navigating a large-scale social system.¹⁰⁹ This information creates a layman's basic map of the organization. The five elements of web-based transparency are outlined below, and are listed in order of increasing difficulty for an organization to provide. These five sub-elements of WAES reveal something about the web activities of the organization, the depth of access it allows, the depth of knowledge about processes it is willing to reveal, and the level of attention to citizen response it provides.¹¹⁰ Each sub-element has a series of tests associated with it. These tests are detailed in Table 15.

Table 15: Coding Criteria: Transparency

Ownership	
T1a: agency involvement with site	Tests to see if agency helped in making of website and how different it is from websites of other agencies in same government. Marked by 0 or 1.
T1b: provides different webmaster from main government page	Tests to see if agency, or sub-agency, has some measure of control or direct contact in regard to their website. Marked by 0 or 1.

¹⁰⁶ CyPRG Website is available at <http://www.cyprg.arizona.edu/> (January 26, 20001).

¹⁰⁷ C. C. Demchak, C. Fries, and T.M. LaPort, "Webbing Governance: National Differences in Constructing the Public Face", in Handbook of Public Information Systems, New York: Marcel Dekker, 1999.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

T1c: provides obvious tailoring indicating agency itself has ownership of site content	Tests to see how much agency is involved with content of its website. Marked by 0 or 1.
Contacts	
T2a: provides central agency non-email addresses	Tests to see if agency can be contacted by regular, non-electronic mail. Marked by 0 or 1.
T2b: provides email address to webmaster	Tests to see whether agency has a webmaster or not. Marked by 0 or 1.
T2c: provides email address to someone inside agency in addition to webmaster	Tests to see if agency lists email addresses of employees and/or managers within agency. Marked by 0 or 1.
T2d: provides some kind of addresses for employees within agency beyond top guys (e.g. shows a phonebook with position)	Tests to see if agency provides phone numbers and/or addresses for employees within agency, excluding their managers or any other top level officials. Marked by 0 or 1.
T2e: provides addresses for subelements within agency (can you write them a snailmail letter with this address?)	Tests to see if agency provides a non-electronic address for subelements (such as smaller divisions) within agency. Marked by 0 or 1.
T2f: provides email address to someone responsible for both content of the site and technical support for the site?	Marked by 0 or 1
T2g: provides email address only to someone responsible for technical support for the site?	Marked by 0 or 1
T2h: provides email address only to someone responsible for content of the site?	Marked by 0 or 1
T2i: does the person responsible for technical support for the site appear to be a commercial firm?	Marked by 0 or 1
Issue/Organizational Information	
T3a: provides details on senior official's experiences or vision of future for organization	Tests to see if agency provides any information about/by/for head official of agency. Marked by 0 or 1.
T3b: provides mission statement and various activities of agency	Tests to see if agency provides any data as to what function it serves, what its goals and values are, and how it accomplishes these goals. Marked by 0 or 1.
T3c: provides other issue-related government addresses	Tests to see if agency provides addresses (URL or regular mail) of other government agencies (or within agency itself) whose function is related to this agency. Marked by 0 or 1.
T3d: provides non-issue-related other agency addresses	Tests to see if agency provides addresses (URL or regular mail addresses) of any other government agencies (or within agency itself) that are not related to agency at all. Marked by 0 or 1.
T3e: provides issue-related other non-governmental information source	Tests for same as T3c, but address must be for a non-government source.

	Marked by 0 or 1.
T3f: provides organizational structure in graphic form (add 0.1 for every level above or below shown in graphic)	Tests to see if agency provides an organizational graphic (such as a flow chart): Marked by 0.1 for each element shown in graphic.
T3g: provides reports, research, laws, and regulations in easily readable format on screen.	Tests to see if agency has taken time to provides an easily readable, organized, format for reports, research, laws and regulations. Marked by 0 or 1.
Citizen Consequences/Responses	
T4a: provides text of regulations/laws/agency research or in depth explanations of requirements imposed on citizens resulting from agency activities	Tests to see if agency provides any data on regulations, laws, or research which agency carries out or is related to agency. Marked by 0 or 1.
T4b: provides instructions on how to complete these actions	An extension of previous attribute, Tests to see if agency provides citizens with instructions, help, tips on how meet requirements/regulations/laws imposed by agency (such as providing instructions on how to file a tax form): Marked by 0 or 1.
T4c: provides form in graphics for screen capture or copy	Tests to see if agency provides any necessary forms in graphic form so that citizens may copy them to fill them out. Marked by 0 or 1.
T4d: provides appeal process for decisions or address of an ombudsman	Tests to see if agency provides--online--instructions and/or a way for citizens to appeal agency decisions. Marked by 0 or 1.
Freshness/Timeliness of Data	
T5a: Latest published "last updated" date (yyyymmdd) on main page or, if none, a key subordinate page, or 0 if no date listed on any of these pages.	
T5b: Latest last updated date of page for noted in T20by going into View, Doc Info and noting last update date (yyyymmdd): If no published date, uses latest from either main page or a key subordinate page.	

Interactivity

Interactivity is a measure of the level of convenience or degree of immediate feedback, which is the second component of openness.¹¹¹ The more interactive the site is across the first four transparency attributes, the greater is the demonstrated level of

agency concern for the convenience of the citizen and the speed of communications between the agency and its clients. The sub-elements and the tests associated with them are listed in Table 16.

Table 16: Coding Criteria: Interactivity or Accessibility

Ownership	
I1a: presents clickable email link to webmaster	Tests to see if email link to webmaster is clickable (a mailto link). Marked by 0 or 1.
I1b: presents clickable email link to senior agency official	Tests to see if the email link to any senior officials is clickable. Marked by 0 or 1.
I1c: presents dialog box or online form for communication to the webmaster within the agency.	Marked by 0 or 1.
Contacts/Reachability	
I2a: presents clickable email link to someone inside agency in addition to webmaster	Tests to see if any other email addresses provided by agency are clickable (mailto) links. Marked by 0 or 1.
I2b: presents clickable email link to a number of agency employees	Tests to see if agency provides clickable email links to a large portion of its employees. Marked by 0 or 1.
I2c: Provides an online issue-related forum for outsider participation such as chat lines, and listserves.	Tests to see if agency provides a chat line or listserv for citizens, agency employees and other interested individuals to discuss topics related to agency. Marked by 0 or 1.
Issue/Organizational Information	
I3a: presents clickable easy download of mission statement and various activities of agency	Tests to see if user is able to easily download a list of goals/functions of agency. Marked by 0 or 1.
I3b: presents clickable hot link to other issue-related government addresses	Test to see if addresses provided are clickable. Marked by 0 or 1.
I3c: presents clickable hot link to non-issue-related other agency addresses	Tests to see if addresses provided are clickable. Marked by 0 or 1.
I3d: presents clickable hot link to issue-related other non-governmental information sources	Tests to see if addresses provided are clickable. Marked by 0 or 1.
I3e: Provides an agency newsletter which can be obtained automatically online via a subscription (more than a pamphlet offering a list of reports – this has content itself).	Tests to see if agency has a newsletter, either hard copy or email, which user can subscribe to which provides up to date information about agency and its activities. If agency does not have this but has a service offering to notify user when website is updated or changed, give a .5. Marked by 0 or 1.
I3f: Provides a searchable index for archived newsletters, laws, regulations, and requirements.	Tests to see if agency allows user to search to site for old newsletter, laws, regulations, or anything relating to content agency provides online. Marked by 0 or 1.
Citizen Consequences/Responses	
I4a: presents clickable hot link to listed subelements within agency (add 0.1 for every	Tests to see if subdivisions within agency have a clickable link made to them from main page. Marked

¹¹¹ Ibid.

subelement hotlinked)	by adding 0.1 for each link provided.
I4b: presents clickable hot link to sublevels noted in agency's organizational structure graphic (add 0.1 for every level above or below hotlinked)	Tests to see if elements within agency's organizational graphic (such as area for president, vice president, etc) are clickable. Marked by 0.1 for each element available to be clicked.
I4c: presents clickable hot link to download text of regulations/laws/agency research or in depth explanations of requirements imposed on citizens resulting from agency activities	Tests to see if user can easily click and download regulations/laws/research of agency. Marked by 0 or 1.
I4d: presents any required submission forms onscreen for clickable download (add 0.1 for every form accessible for download)	Tests to see if user can easily download any forms needed/required by agency for compliance with certain laws/regulations. Marked by adding 0.1 for each form available for download.
I4e: presents online form completion and submission (add 0.1 for every form accessible for online completion and submission). This includes ordering publications online.	Tests if user can complete and submit a form online to agency. Marked by adding 0.1 for every form available for online completion and submission.
I4f: presents an automatic response limit for response to online submissions	This attribute notes if agency tells user how long it will take until he/she receives a response from agency. Marked by 0 or 1.
I4g: presents clickable link to appeal process for decisions and/or an ombudsman	Tests to see if appeals process provided is clickable and easy to use. Marked by 0 or 1.
I4h: provides other language access to site for visitors unable to speak or read the language of the host country.	Marked by 0 or 1
I4i: provides iconographic access to site for visitors unable to speak or read the language of the host country.	Marked by 0 or 1
I4j: provides audio access to site for visitors unable to see the site.	Marked by 0 or 1

Chinese Government Websites

There is a fair degree of variability in the characteristics on how Chinese government web pages are designed. As Hartford points out, though the government web sites are full of information, the communication from most Chinese government web sites is still largely one-way.¹¹² Very few sites are designed to allow the public to interact with Agency information systems. Even weaker forms of interaction are not supported. By and large, citizens are not able to obtain email or regular addresses of executive

¹¹² K. Hartford, "Cyberspace with Chinese Characteristics," *Current History*, September 2000 available at

officials, material instruction or help of how to correspond to the related agency, or related forms.

Yang focuses on those websites that lead the rest of China in terms of interactivity and transparency. He points to the Customs Administration, State Administration of Industry and Commerce, State Tourism Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, the State Administration of Taxation as sites that have setup online systems for interacting with the public. He also points to the development of online procurement systems by the State Administration of Internal Trade as well as by local governments, including Shanghai, Henan, Jilin, Sichuan and some smaller cities.¹¹³ Even the Beijing Military Region has set up the Military Government Procurement Management System.

As an example of an interactive site, Yang also points to the Guangzhou municipality police department which has a website where users can check on the status of cases filed with police and the results of applications for household registration and traffic violations.¹¹⁴

However, the transparency and interactivity of Chinese government websites though it is noteworthy is not necessarily uniform. It is helpful to look at a number of government web pages to understand what is and isn't being provided and some of the variability between different central agencies and between central agencies and the provinces. The websites that we have selected are meant to be representative of those from similar ministries or from similar levels of government. Given the limited scope of

<http://www.pollycyber.com/pubs/ch/> (Current January 1, 20001).

¹¹³ D.L. Yang, "The Great Net of China," *Harvard International Review*, Winter 2001.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

this investigation, we can not attempt to evaluate every web site or even a fraction of them. However, there are lessons to learned from even a sample of a few websites.

Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation PRC

(<http://www.moftec.gov.cn>)

Table 17: Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation						
	Owner-ship	Con-tacts	Org. Info	Citizen Conse-quences	Fresh-ness	Trans-parency Total
Transparency	2	7	6	1	1	18
Interactivity	1	2	2	2	-	7

The MOFTEC website is recognized both within China and outside as one of the best developed websites in China. Its purpose is to facilitate foreign trade. The site has been optimized to provide foreign viewers with access to information that would allow them to trade more with China. Unlike most government agencies, the MOFTEC website offers regular address, phone number, and clickable email addresses of every division.

MOFTEC provides biographies of the minister, the Chief Negotiation Representative, six vice ministers and five minister assistants. It provides information on its functions and those of its departments. Although the agency doesn't provide an organizational graphic, every division has its own page.

MOFTEC provides both clickable links of related government agencies, such as overseas mercantile counselor offices, local special offices, for import & export

organizations, and provincial MOFTEC administrations, and links of more than twenty related non-governmental information sources.

MOFTEC has released five documents on its web site. They are:

- Introduction of China's Policy of Foreign Economic and Trade,
- China's Laws and Regulations of Foreign Economic and Trade,
- Report of Multilateral and Bilateral Relationship of Economic and Trade,
- Report of Relationship of Economic and Trade with Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, and
- The Statistics of China's Foreign Economic and Trade.

The web site does not go so far as to present a dialog box or online form for communication to the webmaster within the agency, nor does it provide a chat line or listserv for citizens, agency employees and other interested individuals to discuss topics related to the agency. Though MOFTEC oversees all S.O.E.s and private companies involved in foreign trade, the web site does not provide much guidance on how these organizations should interact with MOFTEC nor provide a mechanism for doing so. MOFTEC does not publish a "last updated" date on its main, it publishes updates as "Rolling News" and "International Economic & Trade Express Message." Both have dates of publication.

The International Electronic Commercial Center of China, an affiliate of MOFTEC, is indicated as its technology support on the main page.

In keeping with its focus on international trade, MOFTEC provides an English version of its web site, though the content does not match the Chinese version.

Ministry of Finance PRC (<http://www.mof.gov.cn>)

Table 18: Ministry of Finance						
	Owner-ship	Con-tacts	Org. Info	Citizen Conse-quences	Fresh-ness	Trans-parency Total
Transparency	2	4	4	2	2	14
Interactivity	1	0	0	3	-	4

A more characteristic central government site would be the Web site of the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Finance provides biographies of the minister and other ranking officials. It also provides introductions to all previous ministers. The Ministry of Finance introduces its main functions and those of its departments along with an organizational graphic. The senior officials and the sub-elements within the organizational graphic are clickable to the biographies and the functions.

The Ministry of Finance provides two important reports on its web site. One is “The Financial System of China”, the other is “The Financial Economic Index”. Within the reports, the agency shows a graphic form of the central and local budgeteering process. It also publishes important economic indicators.

This web site provides only contact information for the webmaster, but offers both a clickable email address and a regular postal address. It does not provide email addresses for individual departments but does provide office phone and fax numbers for each subdivision. The Ministry of Finance does not provide any links or regular mail addresses for its local branches, other interrelated or non-related government agencies, or non-governmental information sources.

As is common with most Chinese government web sites, an online form for communication is not provided.

The webmaster, housed within the agency, is responsible for both the content of the site and technical support for the site. No commercial firm is indicated on the main page as its technology support.

Ministry of Health PRC (<http://www.moh.gov.cn>)

Table 19: Ministry of Health						
	Owner-ship	Con-tacts	Org. Info	Citizen Conse-quences	Fresh-ness	Trans-parency Total
Transparency	2	3	6	1	1	14
Interactivity	1	0	3	1	-	5

Similar to the Ministry of Finance site, the Ministry of Health (MOH) web site provides the biographies of the minister and five vice ministers. The agency presents the structure of its divisions and their functions. The MOH's website publishes health statistics, and reports of sanitation policy, sanitation science and medical education. This site also provides clickable links of State Administration of Traditional Chinese Medicine, medical research institutions, medical colleges, hospitals and public medical information sources. The MOH offers a regular mail address on its main page. However, it contacts the webmaster, rather than ministerial departments. There is also a clickable email address for the webmaster on the main page.

The MOH does not have a special section devoted to updates. There is little instruction on the web site as to how the medical sector should interact with the MOH

and there are no mechanisms for doing so.

National Environment Protection Administration PRC (<http://www.nepa.unep.net>)

Table 20: National Environmental Protection Administration						
	Owner-ship	Con-tacts	Org. Info	Citizen Conse-quences	Fresh-ness	Total
Transparency	2	5	3	1	2	18
Interactivity	0	0	0	2	-	2

The General Office of National Environment Protection Administration runs a web site that has been in existence longer than most government web sites and it is quite special in that it does not use the uniform “gov.cn” domain name, but rather “unep.net” of United Nations Environment Program.

NEPA’s web site provides biographies of the director general and six vice directors. The agency discusses the main functions it and its departments perform. The agency presents the names of senior officials for every department and a clickable link to sub-elements within the agency.

NEPA provides regulations, policies, and extensive issue-related reports on its web site, such as “Communiqué of China’s Environment”, “Trade Standard of National Environment Protection”, “Ecology Protection of China”, and “National Report for Nuclear Safety Convention.”

NEPA offers a regular mail address on its main page, but the address is only used for contacting with the webmaster, not for its practical departments. There is an email address for the webmaster, but it is unusual that the email address is not hyperlinked.

NEPA doesn't provide any links to its local branches, other interrelated government agencies, or non-governmental information source.

As with other Chinese governmental web sites, the web site of NEPA doesn't list email addresses of employees or senior officials within the agency. However, it provides phone numbers for every subdivision.

NEPA publishes updates under the headings "Information of Environment Protection", "Developments of Environment Protection" and "Memorabilia of Environment Protection".

Guangdong Provincial Government (<http://www.gd.gov.cn>)

Table 21: Guangdong Provincial Government						
	Owner-ship	Con-tacts	Org. Info	Citizen Conse-quences	Fresh-ness	Total
Transparency	2	3	6	1	1	14
Interactivity	1	0	4	1	-	6

Guangdong Province on China's east coast has been at the forefront of the implementation of China's Open Door policy and leads the country in the adoption of information technology. "The Public Information Network of Guangdong Government" is the official name of the Website run by the secretariat of the General Office of Guangdong Government. The Information Center of Guangdong Province is responsible for technical support.

The web site provides information on each of the provincial government's departments and provides a clickable link to each. Interestingly, the web site declares

that all mission statements are not allowed to be downloaded for commercial purposes.

The Guangdong web site provides various hot links, such as the links to the official newspapers and the official television station of Guangdong Province, the links to the direct subordinations and local administrations of Guangdong Government, and the links to central institutions and other provincial governments. The web site also provides hot links to five important public information sources: Guangdong Information Net, Guangdong Scientific Net, Guangdong Education Net, Guangdong Cable Television Net, and Guangdong Internet Service Net.

The web site provides complete governmental documentations and searchable index online. It also provides clickable links to “Laws and Regulations of Guangdong Legislature” and “Database of National Laws and Regulations”.

The web site provides the general information of Guangdong Province, such as the administrative map of Guangdong province, and 1999 National Economy of Guangdong province.

Again, like most other Chinese government web sites there are no forms for submissions of queries and requests.

Like many other Chinese government websites it does provide a periodically published online “Governmental Journal”.

The web site has been visited more than four hundred thousand times between August 1999 and January of 2001.

Shaanxi Provincial Government (<http://www.shaanxi.gov.cn>)

Table 22: Shaanxi Provincial Government						
	Owner-ship	Con-tacts	Org. Info	Citizen Conse-quences	Fresh-ness	Total
Transparency	2	2	5	1	0	18
Interactivity	1	0	4	1	-	6

“The Public Information Network of Shaanxi Government” is the web site run by the General Office of Shaanxi Province Government. The Economic Information Center of Shaanxi Province is responsible for technical support.

The web site is different from most other government sites in that it does not provide biographies of the governor or other senior officials. It only lists their names. The web site provides clickable links to most of its departments where it describes their functions.

The web site provides extensive hot links, so it looks more like a portal site. It provides the links to the direct subordinations and local administrations of Shaanxi Government. It also includes links to central institutions. “Special Links” connects one to the “China Economic Information Net”, “Shaanxi Economic Information Net” and “China West Net.” The “Typical Links” to the national official newspaper and other commercial web sites. There is even a “Friendly Links” section.

The web site provides updated governmental documentation online. It also provides a clickable link to the page of “Laws and Regulations”. Within this page, there are excellent searchable indexes. Furthermore, it provides “full text retrieval” for those

with the requisite ID and password.

The web site provides a clickable link to a page listed as “Public Service”. It publishes public service information including the customer service telephone numbers of most public sectors.

The web site, like the Guangdong web sites, provides periodic updates through its “Governmental Journal”.

Provincial Bureaus and Administrations of Central Government Ministries

The Provincial Bureaus and Administrations of Central Government Ministries have their own sites as well. For example, although there is the National Environmental Protection Administration web site discussed earlier, there is a website for each of the Environmental Protection Bureaus in each province and municipality. Probably the most developed is the website of the Shanghai Environmental Protection Bureau (<http://www.envir.gov.cn/shepb>).

Table 23: Shanghai Environmental Protection Bureau						
	Owner-ship	Con-tacts	Org. Info	Citizen Conse-quences	Fresh-ness	Total
Transparency	2	2	5	1	2	12
Interactivity	1	0	4	1	-	6

Like many other provincial bureau sites, the Shanghai site does not provide names or biographies for the leaders of the bureau and in that respect is different from the sites of the provincial government.

The Shanghai Environmental Protection web site provides a “Governmental Affairs and Industry Standards” section. This section not only provides extensive environmental laws, regulations, policies, bylaws and industry standards, but explains how it operates its functions and adjudicates various issue-related petitions.

The bureau provides two important reports on its web site: “Scientific Achievements” and “Environmental Bulletin.” Within the “Environmental Bulletin”, it publishes a “Global Environment Outlook” section and a “Shanghai Environment Outlook” section. It also presents a searchable index for the archived documentation.

The Guangdong Environmental Protection Bureau offers a web site

(<http://www.gdepb.gov.cn>) that is not quite as rich in information as the Shanghai site but is actually slightly more transparent according to the CyPRG WAES system.

Table 24: Guangdong Environmental Protection Bureau						
	Owner-ship	Con-tacts	Org. Info	Citizen Conse-quences	Fresh-ness	Total
Transparency	2	3	5	1	2	14
Interactivity	1	0	3	0	-	4

The site does not provide information on the leaders of the organization or contact information. It does provide a daily report of atmosphere quality of big cities within Guangdong Province, and multiple environmental data, laws and regulations, industry standards, and knowledge.

The web site provides a very extensive page of “Recommended Links”. Within this page there are searchable hot links to:

- international, national, foreign, provincial, municipal and district environmental protection institutions;

- non-governmental environmental protection web sites at home and abroad;
- famous search engines;
- sites for software downloading.

The Bureau publishes updated environmental news which note the publishing date. In addition, the web site publishes “Environment Outlook”; and “Environmental Impact Assessment Gateway”, a journal which is a collaboration of Guangdong and Hong Kong.

As a point of contrast it is worth looking at the Shaanxi Environmental Protection Bureau’s web site at <http://203.93.40.252/tjxx/sxhb/sxhb.htm>. Shaanxi is west of Shanghai in and is often taken as illustrative of development in central China.

Table 25: Shaanxi Environmental Protection Bureau						
	Owner-ship	Con-tacts	Org. Info	Citizen Conse-quences	Fresh-ness	Total
Transparency	2	2	1	1	1	8
Interactivity	1	1	0	0	-	2

This web site provides regular mail addresses and phone numbers of its local branches, but no links to other interrelated or non-related government agencies, or non-governmental information source. The web site does provide clickable pages of “National Policies of Environment Protection”, “Shaanxi Environment Outlook” and other issue-related reports.

Of the sites surveyed the Shaanxi site was evaluated least in terms of both transparency and interactivity. The Shaanxi Environmental Protection Bureau provided far less information on the agency nor did it provide mechanisms for communicating with the agency.

Conclusion

Table 26: Transparency Points of Selected Chinese Government Agencies

	Owner-ship	Con-tacts	Org. Info	Citizen Conse-quences	Fresh-ness	Trans-parency Total
Ministry of Finance	2	4	4	2	2	14
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation	2	7	6	1	1	18
Ministry of Health	2	3	6	1	1	14
National Environment Protection Administration	2	5	3	1	2	13
Guangdong Province	2	3	6	1	1	14
Shaanxi Province	2	2	5	1	0	11
Shanghai Environment Protection Bureau	2	2	5	1	2	12
Guangdong Environment Protection Bureau	2	3	5	1	2	14
Shaanxi Environment Protection Bureau	2	2	1	1	1	8

Table 27: Interactivity Points of Selected Chinese Government Agencies

	Own-ership	Con-tacts	Org. Info	Citizen Conse-quence	Interactiv-ity Total
Ministry of Finance	1	0	0	3	4
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation	1	2	2	2	7
Ministry of Health	1	0	3	1	5
National Environment Protection Administration	0	0	0	2	2
Guangdong Province	1	0	4	1	6
Shanxi Province	1	0	4	1	6
Shanghai Environment Protection Bureau	1	0	4	1	6
Guangdong Environment Protection Bureau	1	0	3	0	4
Shaanxi Environment Protection Bureau	1	1	0	0	2

Of the organizations we surveyed MOFTEC has the most transparent and interactive site based on the CyPRG WAIS categorization (see Table 25 and Table 26). This is not surprising given the fact that the mission of the ministry focuses on trade. The

MOFTEC web site designers provide significant contact and organizational information for navigating their organization. The other national ministries do almost as well. The ministries have begun to utilize some of the capability of the web to create mechanisms for interacting with the agency, though these mechanisms are limited at best. Information is designed to flow out of the organization through the web and not the other way round.

Of the central government ministries surveyed, the National Environmental Protection agency was the least interactive, although it was evaluated as relatively transparent. The agencies with an economic focus definitely lead in terms of adoption and absorption of web technology.

The provincial government sites were structured in much the same way as the national web sites. This isomorphism is a sign that web designers are keeping an eye on each other and perhaps indicates either formal or informal guidelines on how websites should be structured. Hartford points out that as you get further west in China government sites become sparser and have less useful information.¹¹⁵ The Shaanxi Government site definitely has less information and features than the Shanghai and Guangdong websites. It does, however, have features such as searchable indexes that represent a significant attempt to utilize the technology to make the sites more useable.

The Shaanxi Environmental Protection Bureau is not as interactive in particular as the Shanghai and Guangdong bureaus. This could reflect the fact the organization is more comfortable with brochure ware. It could also be the case that the organization or

¹¹⁵ Hartford, *op. cite*.

the webmaster are less ambitious or less conscious of how the web is being used in the commercial world as well as throughout government organizations both within China and outside.

As seen from Tables 27-30, China's central ministries have integrated web technology to create a level of transparency and interactivity that is comparable to the level achieved by India, but significantly less than seen in Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. This is just a very limited sample of government web sites in China. We have demonstrated that significant amounts of information are available and that ministries have made rather remarkable strides in terms of putting their organizations on the Web. This is quite remarkable given the fact that 20 years ago phone numbers of government agencies were not made public. Chinese government agencies have not gone as far as agencies in some of the more advanced Asian economies.

The Government On-line Project reflects the Chinese commitment to becoming an "information society" and to the process of informatization. Becoming an information society requires significant changes in how government and business function. Certain organizations especially at the local level in Shanghai and Guangdong recognize the potential of the Internet and have implemented systems that involve transforming the way they do business. The question remains as to how rapidly the government as a whole will be willing and able to integrate transparency and interactivity into their information systems with the public.

Table 27: Comparisons of Web Pages of Environmental Agencies

Country	Ministry/Agency	Transparency	Inter-activity
China	National Environmental Protection Administration http://www.nepa.unep.net	13	2
India	Ministry of Environment and Forests http://envfor.nic.in/	15	8
Japan	Environmental Agency http://www.erc.or.jp/eanet/index.html	21.5	10.9
Korea	Ministry of Environment http://www.me.go.kr	21.1	15
Taiwan	Environmental Protection Agency http://www.epa.gov.tw	18.3	11.6

Table 28: Comparisons of Web Pages of Ministries of Finance

Country	Ministry/Agency	Transparency	Inter-activity
China	Ministry of Finance http://www.mof.gov.cn	14	4
India	Ministry of Finance http://finmin.nic.in/finmin	13.5	5
Japan	Ministry of Finance http://www.mof.go.jp	21.2	10.9
Korea	Ministry of Finance and Economy http://www.mohw.go.kr	27.7	17.6
Taiwan	Ministry of Finance http://www.mof.gov.tw	22.3	8.6

Table 29: Comparisons of Web Pages of Ministries of Health

Country	Ministry/Agency	Transparency	Inter-activity
China	Ministry of Health http://www.moh.gov.cn	14	4
India	Ministry of Health and Family Planning http://www.nic.in/mohfur	14	5.3
Japan	Ministry of Health http://www.mhw.go.jp	16.6	10.8
Korea	Ministry of Health and Welfare http://www.mohw.go.kr	13	11.9
Taiwan	Department of Health http://www.doh.gov.tw	17	11.4

Table 30: Comparisons of Web Pages of Ministries of Foreign Trade

Country	Ministry/Agency	Transparency	Inter-activity
China	Ministry of Foreign Trade http://www.moftec.gov.cn	18	7
India	Ministry of Commerce http://www.nic.in/commin/	15	5.4
Japan	Ministry of International Trade http://www.miti.go.jp	22.5	15.9
Korea	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade http://www.mofat.go.kr	19	10.4
Taiwan	Board of Foreign Trade http://www.moeaboft.gov.tw	15	9

CHAPTER VII: DIMENSIONS OF INTERNET DIFFUSION IN CHINA

By 1996 the Internet in China was definitely moving beyond the introductory stages of Internet diffusion. The educational sector was leading the way. By 1999, the public sector had begun rapidly integrating the Internet through the government online project. Businesses have access to Internet connectivity, but most have yet to transform their business processes to take advantage of it.

In order to analyze China's Internet diffusion, this study takes advantage of the framework developed by the Global Diffusion of the Internet Project.¹¹⁷ This framework allows us to organize the wealth of data about Internet diffusion in a way that makes it possible to conduct cross-country and longitudinal comparisons. Under this framework, the Internet in any particular country can be analyzed according to the six dimensions introduced in Chapter 2:

1. Pervasiveness
2. Geographic Dispersion
3. Sectoral Absorption
4. Connectivity Infrastructure
5. Organizational Infrastructure
6. Sophistication of Use

Pervasiveness

By December of 2000, there were 22 million Internet users according to China Network Information Center (CNNIC) (see Figure 3).¹¹⁸ The number of Internet users has

¹¹⁷ Goodman et. al. The Global Diffusion of the Internet Project, op. cit.

¹¹⁸ CNNIC (January 2001), op cit.

been more than doubling every year.




Figure 3: Internet Users in China

With China's population at 1.27 billion, 14 people per 1,000 have Internet access.

In the year 2000 China moves to a Level 3 (**Established**) for pervasiveness (see Table 31).

Table 31: Internet Pervasiveness in China

Level 0	Nonexistent: The Internet does not exist in a viable form in this country. No computers with international IP connections are located within the country. There may be some Internet users in the country; however, they obtain a connection via an international telephone call to a foreign ISP.
Level 1	Embryonic: The ratio of users per capita is on the order of magnitude of less than 1 in 1,000 (less than 0.1%).
Level 2	Nascent: The ratio of Internet users per capita is on the order of magnitude of at least 1 in 1,000 (0.1% or greater).
Level 3	Established: The ratio of Internet users per capita is on the order of magnitude of at least 1 in 100 (1% or greater).
Level 4	Common: The Internet is pervasive. The ratio of Internet users per capita is on the order of magnitude of at least 1 in 10 (10% or greater).

CNNIC estimates that 2.58 million Internet users are connected through leased lines, and the remainder connect using dial-in accounts.¹¹⁹ There is a significant amount of account sharing among users. It is estimated that every account is shared by an average of eight people.

CNNIC estimates that 76 percent of users are between 18 and 30. Most have a bachelor's or associate degree.¹²⁰

Geographic Dispersion

Table 32 summarizes the characteristics of the Interconnecting Networks. By early 1996, ChinaNet had established access nodes in all of the provincial capitals. During 1997 and 1998, the provincial Post and Telecommunications Administrations

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

(PTA) extended the Internet to other cities in the provinces. More than 360 cities have access to ChinaNet.

Table 32: Interconnecting Networks

Interconnecting Networks	Routers	Networks/Cities Supported	Backbones
ChinaNet	Cisco	230 cities	E-1 DDN, Frame Relay, higher speed circuits between network operation centers
ChinaGBN	Cisco	100 networks/30 provincial nodes	E-1 VSAT from PanAmSat moving to ATM
Uninet	Cisco	149 nodes/129 cities; 250 cities by end of 2000	622 Mbps ATM, OC-3 to provinces
China Netcom	Cisco	Mainly eastern provinces; 17 cities	IP/DWDM OC-48
China Mobile	?	100,000 dial-up users around the country; 200,000 card users; 100 special-line customers; 450,000 email users	IP
CERNET	Nortel/ Cisco	700 universities; all universities by 2000	OC-3/OC-48
CSTNet	Cisco	200 research networks	E-1 DDN, Frame Relay, VSAT from Asia II

The Golden Bridge Network (ChinaGBN), which relies on the JiTong's national VSAT (very small aperture terminal) satellite communications backbone, provides Internet access in 24 cities at rates between 64 Kbps and E-1 (2.048 Mbps) using a PanAmSat space segment. ChinaGBN is also building a fiber network in the eastern

portion of the country. The China Netcom backbone also connects primarily major cities in the eastern provinces. Unicom's Uninet is providing Voice Over IP in more than 129 cities.

The Ministry of Education's academic network, CERNET, currently provides access to about 1,000 universities around the country. Based primarily on Cisco technology, CERNET upgraded its Cisco equipment in the fall of 1998 to support Layer 3 switching and Voice Over IP.¹²¹ CAS's CSTNet has also interconnected several hundred research institutes, which are distributed around China, using 10 VSAT connections to the Asia II satellite as well as leased lines from China Telecom.

China has been at a Level 3 (**Highly Dispersed**) for geographic dispersion under the Global Diffusion of the Internet framework since 1997 (see Table 33). As the provincial arms of China Telecom build out their networks, and if they choose to provide access to the "163" and "169" Networks at distance insensitive costs, China will deserve to be considered for a Level 4 ranking. However, in many rural areas, access to a dedicated connection to the Internet is still an impossibility, given the limitations in DDN deployment.

¹²¹ "China's CERNET Upgrades National Backbone," *Newsbytes* (September 3, 1998).

Table 33: Ranking Geographic Dispersion for China's Internet

Level 0	Nonexistent. The Internet does not exist in a viable form in this country. No computers with international IP connections are located within the country.
Level 1	Single Location: Internet points of presence are confined to one major population center.
Level 2	Moderately Dispersed: Internet points of presence are located in multiple first-tier political subdivisions of the country.
Level 3	Highly Dispersed: Internet points of presence are located in at least 50% of the first-tier political subdivisions of the country.
Level 4	Nationwide: Internet points of presence are located in essentially all first-tier political subdivisions of the country. Rural access is publicly and commonly available.

Sectoral Absorption

There are currently 180,000 enterprises registered under the *.com.cn* domain that is set aside for businesses. Although the majority of registered domains are in the *.com* sector (see Figure 4), it is not yet true that the majority of businesses in China have domain names. The State Economic and Trade Commission estimates that half of China's 1,500 medium to large state-owned businesses are utilizing the Internet for business. Many, however, are still using dial-in accounts and having others host their webpages. The percentage of smaller firms that have leased lines or servers is even smaller.¹²² Even so, by 2000 we estimate that at least 10 percent of all businesses with over 100 people have a server or a server hosted remotely. As a result we upgrade the commercial sectoral ranking from **Minimal** to **Medium** (see Table 34).




Figure 4: Second-Level Domains Under the .cn TLD (2000)¹²³

Table 34: Ranking Sectoral Absorption for the Internet in China

Sector	Minimal	Medium	Great Majority
Academic	<10% have leased-line Internet connectivity	10-90% have leased-line Internet connectivity	>90% have leased-line Internet connectivity
Commercial	<10% have Internet servers	10-90% have Internet servers	>90% have Internet servers
Health	<10% have leased-line Internet connectivity	10-90% have leased-line Internet connectivity	>90% have leased-line Internet connectivity
Public	<10% have Internet servers	10-90% have Internet servers	>90% have Internet servers

¹²² "Chinese Firms Conduct Business via Internet," *Xinhua English Newswire* (August 14, 1998).

¹²³ CNNIC (July 2000), op. cit.

The academic sector, where 700 of a total of 1,000 universities have leased-line connectivity, has the highest penetration of all of China's sectors. Only a few primary and secondary schools have leased-line connectivity, though some have dial-in accounts. Given the incredible strength of CERNET, under our framework, we rate the academic sector at the **Medium** level.

Government agencies were initially slow to develop a Web presence. MII had a website that explains its restructuring, and CNNIC had an informative website. In addition, various government ministries and a few provincial and local governments have been involved in the development of sites oriented toward tourism and economic development. In 1999, the government embarked on a massive "government online" project. Through this project many ministries developed webpages, and the government can now be ranked at the **Medium** level for sectoral absorption.

Though there have been implementations of telemedicine, and some hospitals have leased-line connectivity, the health sector is still at the **Minimal** level.

Under the Global Diffusion of the Internet framework, we assign sectors with a **Minimal** rating one point, sectors with a **Medium** rating two points, and a **Great Majority** rating three points. Under this system, China has a total of seven points, which moves it up to a Level 3 (**Common**) for Sectoral Absorption (see Table 35).

Table 35: Ranking Sectoral Absorption

Sectoral Point Total	Level	Absorption Dimension Rating
0	0	Nonexistent
1-3	1	Rare
4-6	2	Moderate
7-9	3	Common
10-12	4	Widely Used

Connectivity Infrastructure

Backbone Infrastructure

China's data communication infrastructure is built using over 820,000 kilometers of fiber-optic cable, of which 150,000 kilometers is used in nationwide trunk cables. All the trunk lines now use either 622 Mbps or 2.4 Gbps synchronous digital hierarchy (SDH) technology, with potential capacity expansion available by adding wavelength-division multiplexing (WDM) technology. Eight 2.5 Gbps interprovincial trunks run north-south, and eight run east-west. Provincial backbones are being installed. The fiber-optic cable is supplemented with microwave and satellite. This infrastructure is primarily controlled by China Telecom, though some other ministries, such as Railways, and the People's Liberation Army have substantial fiber in the ground.

On this fiber, China Telecom has developed its digital data network (DDN) service using time-division multiplexing (TDM). The DDN network is capable of supporting E-1 (2 Mbps) speeds. There is also the X.25 network ChinaPAC that is still used to access the Internet in certain provinces, and China Frame Relay provides 45 Mbps service to 21 provincial capitals. An ISDN network has also been deployed but has not

met with much success. These networks are being replaced with an asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) network that is being deployed at the national level and in some of the more prosperous provinces. Though the ChinaNet service was originally built with E-1 lines, China Telecom is upgrading the lines to 155 Mbps as part of the migration to ATM.

ISPs and Interconnecting Networks primarily use the China DDN and China Frame Relay to provide direct circuits to their customers, to connect with upstream providers, and to build their own internal backbones. China Telecom has not provided dark fiber to any other organization.

China Netcom is building its own high speed IP over DWDM (dense-wave division multiplexing) infrastructure that can potentially offer gigabytes of backbone IP connectivity to major cities in the eastern provinces. Unicom is building an ATM network linking 129 cities that can potentially offer 155 Mbps of backbone speed. The backbone of the Unicom network runs at 622 Mbps.

Thus, even though the core China Telecom network supports 155 Mbps and only to major provincial capitals, the aggregate bandwidth of the country is or will soon exceed 200 Mbps. China's backbone infrastructure is thus at the **Broad** level.

Exchanges

By June of 1997, the four Interconnecting Networks in China had interconnected using bilateral peering and upgraded their interconnections to E-1 speeds. In 1997, the Steering Committee on National Information Infrastructure announced its plan to set up three Internet exchanges in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou to facilitate

interconnection between the four national Interconnecting Networks. The plan stalled due not only to technical, financial, and coordination difficulties, but also due to the restructuring of MII.

In March of 2000, it was announced that China Telecom, ChinaGBN, CERNET, CSTNet, Uninet, China Mobile, China Great Wall Network (CGWNet), and China Netcom would exchange traffic over a broadband network. Another network affiliated with MOFTEC, the China International Electronic Transaction Network (CIETNET), has also been authorized to connect.

Because most of the sought-after webserver in China are on China Telecom's network, any competing Interconnecting Networks that want to provide customers and ISPs with an alternative to China Telecom must find a cheap way of routing traffic to China Telecom without sacrificing quality. More importantly, networks such as China Netcom that are offering customers gigabyte speeds are now able to route their traffic to websites on China Telecom at at least OC-3 speeds. The development of a Chinese network access point (NAP) is a significant step in the development of a competitive market for backbone services.

Although CERNET had proposed running the NAP itself, it was ultimately decided that China Telecom would physically run it at its facilities. The NAP, however, is governed by a committee made up of representatives from each of the networks. The committee reports to MII.

ChinaNet has given each network a dark fiber connection to the NAP from each network's operation center. Each network operates a router at the NAP. The routers

connect to the dual homed gigabyte switches at OC-3, but the NAP is designed to be upgraded to much higher speeds if necessary. Currently, each of the networks exchanges traffic on a bilateral peering basis.

MII has intentions of opening up eight NAPs around the country starting with Shanghai and Guangzhou. How these two NAPs will interface with the existing exchanges being run by local authorities is not clear.

Access Methods

Most users (6,660,000 according to CNNIC) access the network through dial-in modems at speeds up to 56 Kbps. There are trials of fiber to the building, DSL, cable access, and other high-speed access methods, but none of these have been fully implemented. Most leased lines support 64 Kbps data rates, though some ISPs and large businesses have implemented speeds up to E-1 (2 Mbps).

International Circuits

Only the nine authorized Interconnecting Networks can presently connect to the global Internet and then only through approved gateways. In 1997, the Chinese prices for the higher end international half-circuits were more than double the cost of the United States-to-China half-circuits (see Table 36). China Telecom's expensive rates for international half-circuits discourage competitors such as ChinaGBN and slow Internet expansion.

Table 36: Monthly International Circuit Prices (in U.S. \$) (1997)¹²⁴

Bandwidth	64 Kbps	128 Kbps	256 Kbps	1 Mbps	2 Mbps
China Half-circuit	\$6,585	\$10,600	\$18,000	\$49,000	\$73,000
Foreign Half-circuit	\$6,585	\$8,300	\$9,900	\$18,000	\$22,000

As of January 2000, ChinaNet had the most international IP connectivity (see Table 37) relative to other networks.

Table 37 International IP Bandwidth (January 2000)

Interconnecting Network	Bandwidth
ChinaNet	487 Mbps
ChinaGBN	67 Mbps
CSTNet	22 Mbps
Uninet	20 Mbps
CERNET	8 Mbps

Table 38 International Bandwidth (1998–2000)¹²⁵

Year	1998	1999	June 2000	December 2000
Capacity of International Connection	241 Mbps	351 Mbps	700 Mbps	1.5 Gbps

China Netcom is establishing two OC-3 international links during the summer of

2000. Though each of the Interconnecting Networks has significantly increased its bandwidth, ChinaNet has increased its overall share of the bandwidth.

China has the backbone and international connectivity profile of a Level 3 (Broad) country, but the exchange and access infrastructures are still immature. We use a rating of Level 2.5 to connote this in-between status (see Table 39).

Table 39: Ranking Connectivity Infrastructure

Level	Domestic Backbone	International Links	Internet Exchanges	Access Methods
0: Nonexistent	None	None	None	None
1: Thin	<3 Mbps	<129 Kbps	None	Modem
2: Expanded	3-200 Mbps	129 Kbps-45 Mbps	1-2	Modem 64 Kbps DDN lines
3: Broad	201 Mbps-100 Gbps	46 Mbps-10 Gbps	More than 1; bilateral or open	Modem >64 Kbps leased lines
4: Extensive	>100 Gbps	>10 Gbps	Many; both bilateral and open	<90% modem >64 Kbps leased lines

Organizational Infrastructure

China's Internet networks are divided into two categories: Interconnecting Networks and Access Networks. The term "Interconnecting Networks" comes from a literal translation of the Chinese characters *hulian*, which stand for "interconnecting."

¹²⁴ Internet Forum at <<http://sunsite.net.edu.cn/IFM/97/5/lnw.htm>> (March 1997).

¹²⁵ BII International Consulting, *China Internet*, Monthly Report (July 2000).

These computer networks are directly linked to the global Internet through international leased lines. As discussed earlier, only eight licenses have been granted by the State Council: one each to the academic and research networks—CERNET and CSTNet—and six to the commercial networks—ChinaNet, ChinaGBN, Uninet, China Netcom, China Mobile, and CIETNET.¹²⁶ In the fall of 2000, licenses have also reportedly been given to Railcom which was created from the telecommunications infrastructure of the railways and Satcom the network based on China's satellite infrastructure.

Interconnecting Networks are required to lease the Chinese leg of their international lines from either China Telecom or Unicom. Lines on the foreign leg are often leased from multinational carriers, including AT&T, Global One, and Teleglobe.

ChinaNet and the Multimedia Network

China Telecom is the dominant provider of Internet service in China. In many provinces, more than 90 percent of all commercial users access the Internet through it. Most ISPs in China also route traffic over ChinaNet. China Telecom has also deployed the Public Multimedia Network, known by its access code as "169." This network offers a less expensive service that limits access to only Chinese websites. The Multimedia Network has been very successful and rivals ChinaNet in terms of the number of subscribers. China Telecom is building a national ATM network to support it. In fact, many predict that the Multimedia Network and ChinaNet will merge, and there have been

¹²⁶ There are nine networks that connect at the exchange. The ninth network (Great Wall) belongs to the People's Liberation Army, which is in a class by itself and is different from the other Interconnecting

signs of this in certain provinces.

ChinaNet is managed and operated by the Data Communication Bureau of China Telecom. China Telecom has been technically separated from the Ministry of Information Industry (MII), but the two are connected through both formal and informal ties. At the city and provincial levels, the Post and Telecommunications Administrations (PTA) are part of the local government, as well as arms of China Telecom.

China Golden Bridge Network

With its roots in the conflict between the old Ministry of Electronic Industries (MEI) and the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (MPT), JiTong's Golden Bridge Network has continued to compete with China Telecom in terms of providing connectivity to government, SOEs, business organizations, and ISPs. By 1999, it had over 100,000 dial-up users. During the early days, ChinaGBN gained a reputation for reliability. In 1999, though it had less international bandwidth than China Telecom, ChinaGBN claimed to provide better international response times due to a lower number of subscribers per bandwidth.

Local Internet Service Providers

There were more than 500 ISPs in China by the end of 1999. Approximately 100 of the ISPs, including the Beijing Telecommunications Administration, are part of China Telecom. Many of these ISPs have already invested millions of dollars in their networks. China Telecom has been able to recoup some of its costs through the telecom access

Networks.

charges that dial-up users must pay in addition to their Internet access fees.

Many other ISPs are either wholly or partially owned by the PTAs, including Capital Online in Beijing, Guangzhou Vision, and Shanghai Online. Many ISPs depend on personal relationships with the PTA to establish connectivity and to minimize charges. There are over 200 ISPs that have varying degrees of independence from China Telecom. Many of them, like ISPs elsewhere, are diversifying into developing and hosting content as well as providing system integration services. Any Chinese corporation, after meeting certain safety, legal, technological, and financial requirements, can be licensed as an ISP. Any ISP has to be licensed by MII and gain global access through one of the Interconnecting Networks. They are not permitted to directly connect with a foreign ISP.

ISPs have had to pay traffic sensitive charges to China Telecom for their connections to the Internet and yet are forced by the market to compete with China Telecom ISPs in terms of price. In addition, they do not receive the local access charges that China Telecom recoups. Most ISPs have had significant financial difficulties, and many have come and gone since 1995.

It is important to note that in some major cities China Telecom is evolving into more of a wholesaler.

CERNET and CSTNet

Started in 1993, the China Education and Research Network (CERNET) developed a massive network connecting more than 1,000 universities throughout the country to the global Internet. Hundreds of thousands of people use the network each day, and there are more than three million subscribers, primarily students. The plan is for

CERNET to connect not only all universities in China, but high schools, middle schools, and primary schools as well. CERNET operates under the authority of the Ministry of Education. The CERNET National Network Center is headquartered in Beijing Tsinghua University.

On a smaller scale, China Science and Technology Network (CSTNet) has connected research institutes that are associated with the Chinese Academy of Sciences. CSTNet merged a number of networks that had arisen in the research community between 1987 and 1996.

Both CERNET and CSTNet are considered Interconnecting Networks under State Council Order #195, and both have a regulatory role of monitoring the networks they connect. Both must go through the China Telecom gateway to interconnect with global Internet providers. Neither is allowed to offer commercial service. CERNET has developed a policy that charges for all international traffic and claims that this policy has been successful in recouping revenue and reducing demand on its international circuits.

Organizational Infrastructure Ranking

Prior to 1999, China was ranked at a Level 2 (**Controlled**) in terms of organizational infrastructure under the Global Diffusion of the Internet framework (see Table 40). This is because of the immense power of China Telecom in terms of the power of its ISPs, the strength of its national backbone, and its control of the international gateways. However, in 1999, it could be argued that the new competition from Unicom and China Netcom introduced a degree of competition that might justify evaluating organizational infrastructure at the Level 3 (**Competitive**) ranking. There has also been a

significant amount of competition in the Internet content provider (ICP) industry as companies have jostled to become the major portal in the country in the hope of attracting both advertising revenue and foreign investment. Once again, a Level 2.5 is appropriate for organizational infrastructure given the extent of what Lovelock calls state coordinated competition. There is competition, but that competition is managed by the government.

Table 40: Ranking Organizational Infrastructure of the Chinese Internet

Level 0	None: The Internet is not present in this country.
Level 1	Single: A single ISP has a monopoly in the Internet service provision market. This ISP is generally owned or significantly controlled by the government.
Level 2	Controlled: There are only a few ISPs and the market is closely controlled through high barriers to entry. All ISPs connect to the international Internet through a monopoly telecommunications service provider. The provision of domestic infrastructure is also a monopoly.
Level 3	Competitive: The Internet market is competitive; there are many ISPs and low barriers to market entry. The provision of international links is a monopoly, but the provision of domestic infrastructure is open to competition, or vice versa.
Level 4	Robust: There is a rich service provision infrastructure. There are many ISPs and low barriers to market entry. International links and domestic infrastructure are open to competition. There are collaborative organizations and arrangements such as public exchanges, industry associations, and emergency response teams.

Sophistication of Use

Applications such as email and Web access are being utilized to substitute for telephone calls and mail. The Chinese are behind many Western countries in terms of implementing electronic commerce. Chinese organizations often lag behind the West in terms of business process standardization, and this has limited the automation of those business processes.

Chinese businesses have been quick to be listed on Web intermediaries such as Chinamarket.com, MeetChina.com, and Alibaba. Some firms have become active on global B2B exchanges such as Chemconnect.com. These activities, however, do not require significant re-engineering of business processes. It can be assumed that within five years, many Chinese firms will participate in interorganizational information systems. Not only will these firms be able to bid and take orders electronically, but they will be able to integrate into supply management chains and automatically provide data on production and logistics. It is not clear what factors will determine if and when Chinese firms invest in the business standardization and automation required for them to truly leverage the power of the Internet.

There has been much public discussion about the merits of transforming China into a knowledge-based economy. The government has embarked on a number of “Golden” projects aimed at transforming parts of the economy. The Golden Card project, for example, involves the deployment of smart cards for electronic currency. At the same time, a few China Telecom–affiliated ISPs are starting pilots providing stock market purchasing, electronic banking, and other services over the Web. It is unclear how and whether the “Golden” projects and the innovations associated with the Internet are going to come together.

ICPs, fueled by foreign capital and a heavily competitive atmosphere, have been rapidly innovating in the attempt to create value. As a result, Chinese individuals are being exposed to a wide variety of services including free email, matchmaking, chat rooms, auctions, and e-commerce services. As a result, even though most organizations

are still at a Level 2 (Conventional), there are many individuals who are moving into Level 3 (Transforming) (see Table 41).

Table 41: Ranking China's Sophistication of Use of the Internet

Individual Use	Organizational Use
Level 0: None	
No use of the Internet.	No use of the Internet.
Level 1: Minimal	
Email communication or Web browsing is an infrequent and novel experience.	Email is available but is not used as an alternative to traditional interpersonal communications (memos, telephone, and meetings). Websites consist of a very small number of static pages reflecting a "minimalist brochure."
Level 2: Conventional	
Email may be a preferred means of communicating with people in an individual's circle of acquaintances. Web surfing is a regular activity. Some individuals maintain websites to post personal interest information. Individuals may listen to broadcast programming on the Web rather than on the radio or television. Online chat is an advanced form of Level 2 or possibly a Level 3, depending on whether it is primarily entertainment or results in changes in the individual's social network.	Email is widely used for both official and unofficial communication. Listservs or their equivalent are used to disseminate information or solicit feedback. Websites are largely static but are extensive and provide customers with in-depth information about products and services, utilization of those services, comparative information, etc. The content is more than just advertisement.
Level 3: Transforming	
Online communities proliferate around shared interests. These communities bring together people who otherwise would not have come in contact with each other. Interaction between members of such communities is substantive and often interactive. Examples include online bridge clubs, use of ICQ to create communities, individuals' e-groups.	One strong indicator of business process re-engineering is that a significant number (more than 5%) of websites, both government and business, are interactive. Websites are dynamic, becoming an alternative distribution channel. Online ordering is possible. Customer service functions expand to permit customers to conduct transactions that formerly involved employees. International.

	companies use the Internet as a substitute for business trips, enabling round-the-clock collaborative product development. E-commerce has taken hold.
Highly sophisticated forms of technology supporting interpersonal interaction and access to content are not only used by, but developed for, a demanding customer base.	Level 4: Innovating The fundamental structure of organizations and their external relations with other organizations is altered. Companies pioneer new uses of the Internet, such as IP telephony, data mining of Web customers' "click histories."

Under the belief that there will not be enough IPv4 addresses to meet China's projected needs, CERNET has taken a leadership role in implementing IPv6. Not only has CERNET implemented IPv6 in its backbone, but it has also developed IPv6 network management tools, implemented video applications on IPv6, and created its own search engine for webpages on IPv6. CERNET has also recently signed an agreement with Nokia to jointly conduct IPv6 research. CERNET has taken a world leadership role in developing the next generation Internet, and the argument could be made that it is at the **Innovating** stage for sophistication of use.

China thus shows signs of being at the **Conventional**, **Transforming**, and **Innovating** stages. Because most organizations are only entering the Transforming stage and often through third party intermediaries, we believe it is appropriate to rank China at a Level 2.5 for sophistication of use.

Summary

The six dimension ratings for China are summarized in Table 42 and depicted in Figure 5.

Table 42: Dimensions of Internet Diffusion

Dimension	Level	Explanation
Pervasiveness	3: Established	Having reached 1 user per 100 inhabitants, the user community has expanded from networking technicians to students, government (including the military), large businesses, and the broader public.
Geographic Dispersion	3: Highly Dispersed	Internet access is available in all first-tier administrative subdivisions.
Sectoral Absorption	3: Common	The Internet has taken root in the academic and government sectors.
Connectivity Infrastructure	2.5: Expanded-Broad	China, by increasing ChinaNet's backbone capacity and international links, is still approaching Level 3. There are limits on availability of service greater than E-1, and access is still primarily by modems.
Organizational Infrastructure	2.5: Controlled-Competitive	There is healthy competition among ISPs in major cities, but only six commercial networks can interconnect with the global Internet. The WTO accession agreements promise more competition.
Sophistication of Use	2.5: Conventional-Transforming	The Internet is used to enhance current processes, such as messaging, without fundamentally changing those processes. Individuals led by ICPs are transforming. IBPs are transforming business processes.




Figure 5: Dimensions of Internet Diffusion in China

CHAPTER VIII: DETERMINANTS OF INTERNET DIFFUSION IN CHINA

Internet diffusion has been driven by the desire of the Chinese to connect with each other and the outside world. The prices of PCs and Internet access have kept a damper on diffusion but have not stifled it. Competing and state-owned enterprises are continuing to deploy national infrastructure. The education community has played a leading role in getting students and their associates on the Internet.

While the Global Diffusion of the Internet framework gives us a representation of the status of the Internet at any given time or over a time series, a profile of the contributing factors is useful. The Global Diffusion of the Internet project has developed a set of factors that seem to be important in most of the countries the project has studied. Of course, there are important differences as well as commonalities between countries in terms of how a particular factor shows up in a particular country and thus how it influences Internet diffusion. "Understanding these factors not only has explanatory utility, but also can indicate the principal mechanisms, factors, and policies that may be applied to promote (or hinder) the Internet's development."¹²⁷ It can be assumed that the Internet and e-commerce are instantiating in different cultures and countries differently. By understanding some of the determining factors, policy-makers may be able to influence not only the rate of Internet and e-commerce diffusion, but also how the Internet is absorbed into the culture and the economy.

For a foreign businessman involved in either investing in the Chinese Internet or using it to trade, it is important to have an idea of how rapidly individuals and

¹²⁷ P. Wolcott, *The Diffusion of the Internet in the Republic of Turkey* (University of Nebraska at Omaha, 1999), available at <http://mosaic.unomaha.edu/TURK_PUB.pdf> (May 19, 2000).

organizations will have access to the Internet. Of equal importance are factors that will determine both the rate of Internet and e-commerce diffusion and the form they take.

In this section, we will examine a number of key factors that have emerged as particularly strong determinants of the extent and nature of growth of the Internet within China. In the following section, we apply the determinants to each of the dimensions of Internet diffusion in China, predicting the potential for each dimension.

Perceived Value of the Internet

One of the greatest values of having Internet service was that it allowed young people to access universities outside of China and correspond with the universities they are interested in via email. In addition, email popularity as a way of communicating has grown as the number of friends, colleagues, and family with email connectivity expands. Many university students had grown familiar with “chat” applications on their university bulletin boards. As national chat rooms developed, both at ISPs and at ICPs such as Sina.com and Sohu.com, they have proved immensely popular.

News is a major interest to many Chinese. ICPs have carved out niches by offering news and sports information in a flashy form. Major newspapers now also support online editions and chat rooms. There is very little information on the Chinese Web that is not available through print media. While there is a real hunger for “valuable” news, news that provides insights into the functioning of state organizations is often guarded as state secrets. At the same time, private organizations tend not to disclose too much information publicly. As the government regulates ICPs and allows them to engage in reporting, ICPs will have the challenge of coming up with valuable information for

their viewers that does not threaten the government.

Clearly, for people who can read English and know how to navigate the Web, there is a wealth of information available through the Internet. As noted earlier, only a few websites have been blocked.

Since 1996, Internet use itself has become highly fashionable, particularly among young people. Having an ISP account or even an email account is a symbol of status. What people get from the Internet may be less important than participating in this latest “craze” that has such global scope. Internet adoption is a group phenomenon in addition to being an individual choice. Like cell phones and pagers, the Internet is becoming a “must-have” tool.

ICPs are continually trying to offer new services in their efforts to carve out market share. These services include online banking, stock trading, job listings, auctions, and electronic retail. Many of these services are copied from successes in the West. It is still an open question as to how successful many of these services will be and whether they are drawing new people to the Internet. As mentioned earlier, there are some significant cultural and logistical barriers to using the Internet to purchase goods and services. It remains to be seen how long it will take for a significant B2C infrastructure to develop in China and whether the presence of it will drive Internet diffusion by increasing the perceived value of Internet access.

It is also unclear how valuable Internet access would be to those outside the intelligentsia. There have been some stories of rose farmers in Guangdong profiting from getting pricing on flower markets over the Internet. However, most intellectuals seem to

doubt that villagers or even workers will ever have any use for the Internet. This is strikingly different from India, where there are many “tales” of PCs that have been made available to peasants along with an interpreter and have made a significant impact.¹²⁸ Given that a majority of Chinese are peasants, Western dreams of 1.2 billion Chinese on the Internet will have to wait for the Internet to develop value as a tool for peasants.

Perceived Value by Organizational Users

Chinese companies are abuzz with the hype surrounding the Internet and e-commerce although few have significantly redesigned their business processes to take advantage of the Internet. Many in management are using dial-up Internet accounts to access email. Many companies have listed themselves on websites such as the government-run ChinaMarket.com or the privately run MeetChina. Some have developed webpages, often hosted by someone else. More than a few Chinese companies are active players on the new B2B sites, such as ChemConnect, that have developed in the past few years. Far fewer companies have a dedicated IP connection to the Internet or their own webserver.

Management is willing to use the Internet to exploit business opportunities but avoids making long-term commitments that require either restructuring or significant recurrent costs. It is not clear how the Chinese business world, where business and information flow through personal relationships, is going to meld with the automated global economy. It can be imagined that in 10 years most Chinese manufacturers still in

¹²⁸ P. Chatterjee, “Village Cyber Cafes Save Time, Money and Red Tape,” *MSNBC*, DHAR, India (February 2000).

business will be so integrated into the Internet that software agents will be able to get quotes, submit orders, and get detailed production and logistics information automatically over the Web. What is not clear is the path between today and the future.

Most Chinese businessmen know that the Internet is the future. But many have yet to standardize their business practices. There is a significant difference with regard to automation between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private companies, which are primarily family based. The SOEs often have invested in software, due in part to top-down government initiatives including the need for information to manage these large corporations. On the other hand, the SOEs often have multiple software packages—inventory, accounting, tax, and customer management—that do not necessarily talk together. Very few have implemented enterprise resource planning (ERP) applications. Even fewer are ready to implement the next generation inter-enterprise resource planning applications (IERP) that will allow multiple organizations to coordinate production. On the other hand, the far more nimble private companies are more cautious of their capital investments, and many have yet to standardize their business practices, which is a precursor to any automation.

Certain SOEs will attempt to integrate into the supply chains of their global customers. Based on the results of my preliminary study, it is also expected that some of the most dynamic private companies, especially those led by management that has either gone to school in or worked in the West, will take the risk of integrating their enterprises into inter-organizational systems over the Internet. It is these companies that will become true “Internet” companies, and they will gain significant value because of that integration.

The real question is, How quickly will the leading companies in China catch up with state-of-the-art Western and Japanese supply chain management implementations? Once one Chinese company has demonstrated a competitive advantage through electronic integration, many companies will follow.

Which companies are going to take the lead and how rapidly will they do so? It may very well take two to four years for significant progress to be made in e-commerce in China and then only at a few companies. However, at a certain point most successful firms will have jumped on the bandwagon. Integration and software firms at the leading edge of e-commerce in China may have to wait a couple of years before they can reap the dividends of the seeds that they sowed. Integration and software firms face a risk that when e-commerce catches on in China it will be implemented with shareware, open standards such as XML, and skills that are basic commodities. In order to capture margin, integration firms will have to convince Chinese manufacturers to make significant investments in state-of-the-art implementations today. What is not clear is what these implementations will look like in the Chinese context. These implementations need to be integrated into the global economy while minimizing the political and cultural obstacles to electronic integration.

Perceived Value by Government Entities

The government perceives the Internet as critical for economic progress. Leaders at MII point to studies of the impact of the Internet on the U.S. economy as proof that the Internet will yield such dividends for China. There has been little public acknowledgment of the challenges that China faces in reaping the same dividends as the United States has

from the Internet. Millions of Internet users may represent significant revenue to China Telecom and may allow Chinese ICPs to attract millions of dollars in investment capital, but it is not clear that this will have an appreciable impact in terms of transforming the economy. Even if e-commerce develops in China, it is hard to know if it will actually increase GNP or simply mean that people buy over the Internet instead of through stores.

President Jiang Zemin in his March 2000 speech on the Internet economy affirmed the economic possibility of the Internet and the need for safeguards. In addition to allowing the deployment of an Internet infrastructure, the government is taking steps to put in place the security, delivery, and settlement infrastructure needed for e-commerce.

The government is also driving the interconnection of 520 key state-owned large- and medium-sized enterprises with the Ministry of Finance, the State Administration of Taxation, the State Economic and Trade Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, and the State Bureau of Internal Trade. It is not clear that the government fully understands the challenges of electronically integrating organizations and whether they are planning on just implementing TCP/IP connectivity or whether they are committed to investing in interorganizational information systems. As is all too often the case, they may be dreaming of the latter while budgeting for the former.

The government has made a major commitment to the “government online” project and is busy putting up websites for many government agencies. My survey points to the fact that websites vary in terms of interactiveness and transparency though the information flow is unidirectional. There is a potential that these sites will develop

beyond brochureware, but that is not clear. The governing process in China is immensely complex. The government online project is a first step in the long process of re-engineering government to take advantage of information technology. It is likely that the most significant things will take place beyond the public eye through technologies such as email. Nevertheless, the government online project is one of the most visible efforts at informatization in China. As such it should be closely watched.

Ease of Use

The development of a Chinese Internet means that millions of Chinese are able to visit websites in the Chinese language. Although at first English was predominantly used in email, but now most email traffic in China is in Chinese characters. There are different systems for entering Chinese characters through a keyboard. Some involve the use of the romanized script pinyin. Others depend on the use of the numeric keyboard to select strokes. A number of systems allow the user to select the Chinese character. Companies such as IBM and Intel have invested millions of dollars in the development of voice input systems. The development of touch screens allows the user to draw the character directly on them. No one method has come to predominate.

For individuals with no English training, the use of romanized characters in uniform resource locators (URLs) for accessing webpages can be a difficulty. The IETF is currently considering an extension of the domain name system that will allow the development of Chinese character-based URLs.

Millions of Chinese are now learning English in elementary school. As a result, the number of Chinese who can take advantage of English websites and Internet

applications is growing dramatically. No matter how much Chinese content there is, the Internet, for the foreseeable future, will have more value to those comfortable with English.

Cost of Internet Access

The cost of ISP access for individuals has been steadily dropping. However, the telephone access charges—where China Telecom makes its profit—have not been dropping (see Figure 6).




Figure 6: Monthly Online Costs in China for 40 Hours per Month (U.S. \$)¹²⁹

¹²⁹ BDA China, *The Internet in China* (Beijing, June 1999).

Chinese almost universally complain that the price of Internet connectivity is too high. There was a lot of public pressure on China Telecom to lower the Internet access rates in 1998 and again in 1999. Because of the telephone access charges, Chinese users still pay approximately U.S. \$15 per month more for full Internet access than do Americans. In addition, their average wages are significantly less than U.S. workers.

As a result of these price pressures, many Chinese end up mostly using applications such as email, which do not require them to stay online for long. In addition, by choosing such lower cost options as the “169” Multimedia Network, which provides access to websites in China only plus global email connectivity, they can also reduce their online charges.

For people without a PC, buying one remains a major financial commitment, not taken lightly given the average wage in China, even in industrialized cities. Many of the early adopters of the Internet were in fact families who purchased both a PC and Internet access so that their son or daughter could learn and correspond with U.S. colleges. Families have often been willing to pool their incomes in the interests of the next generation.

ISP Costs for Accessing the Backbone

When China Telecom reduced its prices for online access, it did not at first reduce the charges that ISPs have to pay for backbone access. Most ISPs have agreed to contracts where they are forced to pay for traffic in addition to the charge for bandwidth. As a result, between 1996 and 1999 non-China Telecom ISPs have struggled under the pressures of competing with China Telecom while having to buy backbone services from

them. With the maturation of China Telecom and the advent of Unicom and China Netcom, it is expected that a whole new generation of ISPs will develop.

It is important to realize that these ISPs are still dependent on China Telecom for their digital data network (DDN) circuits both to their backbone provider and to their customers if they offer dedicated circuits. Although the rates for DDN circuits are not exorbitant, they are often difficult to procure without the right connections with China Telecom. Further, ISPs cannot use satellite connections to get global connectivity; they must get it through an Interconnecting Network.

It is also important to restate that the Interconnecting Networks must pay China Telecom for the Chinese leg (also known as the gateway) of any international circuit. Although prices have come down, China Telecom is still charging twice what U.S. carriers charge for their leg of an international circuit. These gateway charges are reflected in what the new Interconnecting Networks must charge for access.

Access to Constituent Technologies

Access to the Internet requires hardware and software and a way of connecting with an Internet point of presence, usually an ISP.

Individual Access to the Internet

Though China has rapidly increased its telephone density, particularly in the cities, there are still many rural areas where most families do not have access to a phone line. While it is a government priority to establish at least one phone in every village, a commitment has not been made to make Internet access available in every village.

Most Chinese use a PC to access the Internet. The number of PCs in the country

has often been hypothesized as a limiting factor on the number of Internet subscribers. In 1997, International Data Corporation estimated that there were under 10 million PCs in China. In 2000, this number has doubled to 20 million PCs.¹³⁰

There are multiple efforts underway to develop the TV as the access device to the Internet as well as to build Internet functionality into DVD recorders. There are also efforts to build an under-U.S. \$500 PC for low-cost Internet access. Most of these efforts require the use of a telephone line to access the Internet. Many realize the potential of the widely deployed cable network to support Internet access.

There is also speculation about the popularity of mobile phones with wireless access protocol (WAP) as an access method to the Internet. Even though most mobile phones in use today do not support the protocol, many ICPs have made commitments to supporting it.

Internet cafés have been very popular in China. They provide a relatively painless and low-cost method of accessing the Internet as they provide both the PC and the access line. The recent CNNIC study indicated that 11 percent of users surveyed accessed the Internet from these cafés; 37 percent of users accessed the Internet from either work or school, with 50 percent accessing the Internet from home.¹³¹

ISP Access to the Internet Backbone

ISPs not associated with China Telecom have often had a difficult time getting connectivity from it under terms where they could compete directly with its own

subsidiaries. Often in the provinces, ISPs and even Internet cafés needed to have a personal relationship with someone in the PTA to get connectivity. With the development of first JiTong, then Uninet, and now China Netcom as backbone providers, ISPs' options for international connectivity have increased. It is not clear whether ISPs who use non-China Telecom backbone connectivity can provide good access to China Telecom routes for their customers. The development of an exchange point with broadband capabilities should make it much easier for customers of the new Interconnecting Networks to get to websites on China Telecom.

Demand for Capacity and Connectivity

A major determinant of the Internet is the demand for capacity and connectivity. The rapid expansion of international bandwidth from a few megabytes in 1997 to over 559 Mbps by January 2000 has been driven by demand. Many of the provincial ATM backbones are probably being built in anticipation of future traffic.

It is very important to note that the experience of accessing websites in China has traditionally been very different from what users in the United States expect. Response times for a webpage download for certain users, even on LANs, could range upwards of five minutes. During 1998, certain ISPs such as Sparkice were able to provide download times that were comparable to what Western users expect. Other ISPs have continued to have long delays. Some of this delay can be attributed to poorly designed and overloaded infrastructure, but some of it is most likely due to scarce international bandwidth.

¹³⁰ International Data Corporation, IDC Asia/Pacific, see <<http://www.idc.com.sg>> (Current December 6, 1999).

¹³¹ CNNIC (January 2000), op. cit.

It is very difficult to calculate how much international IP bandwidth China should have given its population because such calculations depend on how much traffic stays within the country, what applications are used, and how often they are used.

Chinese users on networks such as CERNET and the “169” Network face financial incentives to not spend much time surfing the international World Wide Web, if they do at all. By creating financial incentives not to surf international sites, China Telecom and the other Interconnecting Networks have limited the demand for scarce and expensive international bandwidth.

China has more than several hundred ISPs. The exact number depends on how you count them. Historically most of the independent ISPs have not been able to compete with China Telecom and its affiliated ISPs. Efforts to build national information infrastructure have failed, in part, because the competitors to China Telecom are dependent on it for global connectivity, local loops, and long-haul circuits. It remains to be seen whether Uninet and China Netcom will be able to build viable businesses and whether they will support the growth of viable ISPs. Cable networks, by solving the last mile problem, are probably the most potent potential competitors to China Telecom’s affiliated ISPs.

In addition to the traditional services associated with IP connectivity, including Web browsing and email, a rich assortment of services has developed primarily around ICPs in their attempt to become portal sites. During 1999 there was an explosion of Internet business providers (IBPs) who offered matchmaking, electronic auctions, and a wide variety of business services, many of them copied from successful sites in the West.

The availability and the promise of foreign capital have spurred the proliferation of both ICPs and IBPs and have attracted a significant number of foreign-educated Chinese to return to China to make their fortunes.

Though it is not easy to assess how the ICP and IBP infrastructure in China compares with other developing countries, it is safe to state that the infrastructure created by China's competing ICPs is richer than in many other countries with comparable per capita GDPs. These ICPs have certainly contributed to the "buzz" about the Internet in China and have most definitely attracted users to the Internet.

One of the more interesting questions is whether the IBPs will find ways of adding value by circumventing some of the barriers to commerce in China, including settlements, logistics, taxes, and lack of trust. The government, through banking reform, development of a certificate authority, and the simplifying of the tax regime, can help to put in place a whole new service infrastructure. It is also possible that new services will be created by ICPs that will make B2B and B2C commerce easier.

The deployment of Voice Over IP has helped drive the deployment of three more national IP backbones (Uninet, China Mobile, and China Netcom). Now that the price of circuit-switched international calls has been lowered to that of international Voice Over IP calls, it is not clear whether Voice Over IP is going to drive the connectivity infrastructure forward.

Geography

China has most of the factors that would limit geographic dispersion: large

landmass, widely distributed population centers, and rough or hostile terrain. The fact that the Internet had been rolled out to all of the provinces and autonomous regions including Tibet by 1996–1997 is a testament to the commitment of the Chinese government to ensuring that all provinces have access to this revolutionary technology.

Adequacy and Fluidity of Resources

As the BDA study of the Internet in China notes, few organizations that were granted interprovincial ISP licenses have been able to capitalize on them, and many are not even renewing their licenses.¹³² This was due in part because they were prevented from getting foreign investment, and they were also hampered by their dependence on China Telecom, the Data Communication Bureau, and the PTAs for their global interconnectivity, their dial-up lines, and their leased lines. Resources to compete with China Telecom were simply not available.

It could be expected that the lack of competition would result in poor performance by the dominant carrier, China Telecom. However, it has been able to meet a significant amount of demand for Internet service because it was able to mobilize the financial, informational, human, technological, and material resources needed to both build a national backbone and to deploy ISPs.

One of the things that makes China stand out from many other developing countries is the fact that once it made a commitment to deploying the Internet it did so rapidly around the country. CERNET received significant financial support from the State

¹³² BDA China, op. cit.

Education Commission. China Telecom funded the development of a national backbone; provinces funded provincial backbones; and PTAs developed ISP infrastructure. Much of the development of the national and provincial backbones was subcontracted out to Sprint and AsiaInfo. Thus China Telecom used its finances to outsource the human resources it needed to rapidly and widely deploy the Internet. China Telecom's telephone business was throwing off enough money to support the rapid deployment of this new data service. Though the Internet service often did not pay for itself, the telephone access charges that the PTAs received more than made up for the difference.

Vendors such as Cisco, 3Com, Sun, and Nortel were willing and able to provide the latest technology for routing and switching the Internet. It is important to note that except for the field of encryption, there have been few restrictions by the U.S. government regarding the export of Internet technology to China. Because the funds were available, the technology was readily available. China Telecom has often staged technical and price competitions between as many as six vendors in an effort to get the best technology at the best price. In addition, the standards on which the Internet developed are primarily open and readily available, enabling the rapid development of Internet technologies by Chinese manufacturers.

More than U.S. \$1 billion has poured into the ICPs from foreign sources and has helped finance their business development and expansion. This capital has allowed them to attract the human and technical resources they need to implement the services that have been evolving so rapidly in the West.

How quickly the ISPs and software providers will be able to marshal the resources necessary to transform China's business processes and integrate them into the emerging global electronic market is open to question. Clearly a great deal of initiative will come from the state sector. The state has access to tremendous resources for contributing to the re-engineering of China's economy but faces significant obstacles in terms of bureaucratic infighting and resistance. Whether the state will end up cutting off private sector access to critical resources for e-commerce or taking too many "pounds of flesh," as has happened in the ISP business, is also open to question.

Ability to Execute

Once China chose to officially adopt the Internet, both China Telecom and CERNET deployed massive national backbones rapidly. For a developing country, China implemented its national Internet strategy very quickly. Some people attribute this ability to the organizational strength of China Telecom. Distributed networking technology may be a good fit for a decentralized organization like China Telecom that is distributed between the national, provincial, and local levels.

ICPs have also deployed rapidly. It remains to be seen whether the country as a whole as well as its manufacturers, software providers, and ICPs can overcome the barriers to electronic commerce and can integrate China into the electronic global economy. Because this involves changing organizational processes and many different government bodies, it will be difficult. Since it is a priority of the government at the highest levels, China may in fact succeed.

The Chinese government has moved beyond just the ability to implement

infrastructure. The MII is highly aware of the standards that determine the success and failures of electronic manufacturers and is becoming highly sophisticated in attempts to leverage China's purchasing power to build the capability and capacity of domestic industry. This is perhaps best exemplified by the negotiations of MII and the Interconnecting Networks with Voice Over IP vendors. MII aggressively pushed for the integration of competing Voice Over IP products, staged the competition so that each Interconnecting Network chose a different MII-approved vendor, and ensured that Chinese manufacturers would, over time, be the predominant manufacturer of Voice Over IP gateways. The success of China's Voice Over IP implementation should not be judged solely on the size of the infrastructure that has been so rapidly deployed, but to what extent the deployment has spurred the growth of China's electronic industry.

It remains to be seen whether government-driven efforts such as Red Flag Linux fail or whether China will be able to execute at a level that makes it a powerhouse in the information technology world.

Culture of Entrepreneurship

Chinese culture, as evidenced by the explosion of commerce in Hong Kong and Taiwan, has a strong element of entrepreneurship in it. It could be more adequately described as family entrepreneurship, not individual, and it has begun to thrive in China. The question is, How do family entrepreneurships get started in a communist culture? Many of the founders of family-owned corporations have political or even family ties to the ruling elite. Many in the Communist Party have chosen to "jump into the sea," an

expression in China that means letting go of the lifeline of support of the work unit to join a joint venture or even start one's own company. But many who have "jumped into the sea" have done this with their connections to the government intact.

Many of the SOEs and even ministries have engaged in a form of entrepreneurship of their own where they spin off or support companies that fall under their influence. The presence of these companies makes policy-making all the more complex. There have been many efforts to start ISPs and ICPs by government bodies.

There is clearly a strong culture of entrepreneurship emerging. It has been led by returning Western-educated Chinese such as Edward Zeng of Sparkice, Edward Tian of AsiaInfo, and Charles Zhang of Sohu.com. The ability of these leaders to attract foreign capital, build substantial businesses, and, in the case of Edward Tian, go public on the NASDAQ exchange, has thousands of others returning from the West. It has also prompted many ambitious Chinese to forgo careers in government and academia, in favor of starting Internet cafés, ISPs, ICPs, and IBPs. It is not clear whether these young entrepreneurs will have the backing from their families, the government bureaucracy, or Western corporations and venture capitalists that is needed to survive in the fast-paced world of the Internet. Since March of 2000, there has been significant belt-tightening on the part of both foreign and domestic sources of capital. Venture capitalists are no longer interested in the number of page views a dot.com has, but in its path to profitability.

Legal and Regulatory Framework

As detailed earlier in our section on the history of government policy regarding the Internet, governmental decision-making has been evolving over the past five years.

Many orders have been promulgated by many different government bodies. Private companies have often operated in a gray area where their survival depended on cultivating good relationships with various ministries as well as the provincial and local government. ISPs have generally had a difficult time competing with the ISPs aligned with China Telecom. Private ICPs, which have had even less formal regulation, flourished thanks to foreign and domestic investment and are now languishing as the investment mood has soured.

MII has promised a new Telecommunications Law for a number of years. If this law in fact is enacted it may open up the telecommunication sector to more competition and pave the way for the convergence of voice, data, and TV. It is possible that this new law will enshrine the Interconnecting Network hierarchy and preserve it in the face of the opening represented by the WTO accession agreement.

New regulations in China do not necessarily mean that there will be more competition. Often the rules represent an attempt by a ministry to assert itself in the constant bargaining going on between ministries to gain financial benefit and bureaucratic power from the fabled Internet.

As is the case with the 1999 encryption regulations, businesses often choose whether or not to selectively respond to a new regulation. Thus even as regulations proliferate, the gray area only expands.

Forces for Change

The biggest driver of the Internet is the desire of the Chinese community to connect—to connect with their friends, family, potential mates, chat buddies, and

Western universities. There is also a desire to not only connect with Western culture, but to be part of a global phenomenon. Because the standard of living even in Chinese cities is so low compared to the United States, the Chinese will often spend significantly more of their income on Internet connectivity (PC, ISP connection, Internet café fees) than do Westerners. It is not clear whether the elasticity of their demand curve is significantly different than Westerners. If one assumes that the cost of email and Web access in China drops to zero, driven by the demand to get viewers, as has practically happened in Europe, what will the effect be on diffusion rates in China? Network benefits associated with the Internet, when combined with the “hype” around being connected to it, will ensure that the number of users connected to the Internet will continue to double each year. The question is, When will the rate of expansion start to slow as it has in the United States?

Enablers of Change

The Chinese government is by far the greatest enabler of change, primarily through its investments in the educational community, CERNET, and its management of China Telecom.

CERNET, by giving more than three million students and professors access to the Internet, has made a significant contribution far beyond the educational community. These students have convinced their parents and friends to use the Internet—if only convincing them to go to an Internet café—so that they can communicate more cheaply with them. In addition, the universities have trained students on how to use information technology and the Internet to transform organizations. Clearly, as the students enter the

job market they are going to make a difference in the companies they work for, differences that are essential if China is to take advantage of e-commerce.

China Telecom in many provinces directly supports up to 95 percent of the commercial users and often provides Internet connectivity to most of the other ISPs. It is not clear how quickly China Unicom, China Netcom, and the cable networks are going to provide real competition to China Telecom in terms of national backbone services. Even more important, it is not clear when ISPs will be able to use satellites to bypass China Telecom's gateway and buy their global Internet connectivity on the global market. The threat of competition, both real and imagined, is driving China Telecom's deployment and is probably partially responsible for the drop in the cost of Internet access over the past couple of years.

CHAPTER IX: PROVINCIAL CASE STUDY OF THE INTERNET IN GUANGDONG

Guangdong province rivals the cities of Beijing and Shanghai and is more than three to five years ahead of the rest of the country in terms of Internet diffusion. The province's proximity to Hong Kong, the central government's Open Door policy, and the resulting economic boom have all contributed to the rapid rate of Internet diffusion.

In studying the Internet in China, it is essential to remember that much of the deployment of Internet infrastructure is driven by decisions at the provincial and local levels. Thus, the instantiation of the Internet in each province takes on different characteristics depending on political, economic, and cultural factors at the provincial and local levels. In the coming years, we expect to see substantial differences in how individual provinces and cities integrate themselves into the global electronic economy. Though a study of Internet diffusion in each province is certainly warranted, it is beyond the scope of this report.

Instead, we explore the dimensions of Internet diffusion in Guangdong, China's most economically advanced province. For anyone interested in the Internet in China, it is important to get a handle on the relationship between organizations at the national, provincial, and local levels that are involved in the Internet.

Guangdong province, with Fujian to the east and Hong Kong to the south, is the largest province in southern China (see Figure 7). It occupies 170,760 square kilometers and has 20 cities, 77 counties, and 41 city districts. It was set up in A.D. 1370 with Guangzhou as its capital. Its population is about 71.4 million, the fifth most populous

province in China. It has the highest number of Internet users of all the provinces.¹³² (See Table 43)



Figure 7: Map of Guangdong

¹³² CNNIC (July 1999), op. cit. According to the CNNIC survey, Beijing, a municipality, has the highest percentage of users in China.

Table 43: Statistical Data on Guangdong in 1997¹³⁴

Population	71.43 million
Internet users	800,000
Internet users per 100	1.12
Telephones per 100	21.11
Micro-computer production	748,200
GDP	793.7 billion RMB, U.S. \$96.79 billion
Export	U.S. \$75.724 billion
Import	U.S. \$54.279 billion
College students	185,000 regular, 146,400 adult ed.
Graduate students	8,043
Literacy (age 6 and over)	82%

The central government, through its Open Door policy, has given Guangdong a significant degree of economic autonomy. As a result, three cities from Guangdong—Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou—were designated as special economic zones. In 1988, the central government allowed Guangdong to experiment with economic reforms throughout the province, allowing it to develop into an export-oriented economy. Many Hong Kong businesses have shifted manufacturing to Guangdong cities like Shenzhen.

The gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 30 percent from 609.7 billion RMB (U.S. \$74.35 billion) in 1996 to 793.7 billion RMB (U.S. \$96.79 billion) in 1997. The

¹³⁴ “1998 Guangdong Statistical Report from the Guangdong Statistical Bureau,” Guangdong Statistical Bureau (1998).

economy was growing very quickly in 1996 and 1997. Exports grew 20 percent from U.S. \$59.346 million in 1996 to U.S. \$75.724 million in 1997. However, with the Asian crisis, exports only increased by 4 percent between 1997 and 1998.¹³⁵ While this slowdown was a source of anxiety among policy-makers and businessmen, the doubling of this rate of increase in exports to 8 percent in 1999 eased many fears.

Since 1994, Guangdong has rapidly embraced the Internet. . The provincial arm of China Telecom built one of the first provincial backbones, and the Guangdong Information Center put up a significant amount of government information on the Web.

Pervasiveness

The Guangdong Steering Committee of NII estimates that there were 800,000 users in Guangdong in 1998.¹³⁶ Using the Steering Committee's numbers means that Guangdong's Internet users-per-capita is 1.11 for every 100 users.

It is important to keep in mind that counting users in China is difficult because many Chinese Internet users share the same subscription. Table 25 shows the rapid growth in subscriptions to China Telecom's ChinaNet "163" Network and "169" Multimedia Network. Under the standard agreement, users who access the "169" Network have access to all websites in China but do not have access to websites outside of China. However, they do have global email access.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Xu Zhi Biao, Director Guangdong Steering Committee of NII, personal communication (May 25, 1999).

Table 44: China Telecom Internet Dial-up Subscribers in Guangdong

Year	"163" Network Subscriptions	"169" Network
1997	46,000	43,000
1998	130,000	160,000
1999 (March)	190,000	210,000

Geographic Dispersion

The Guangdong Internet is highly dispersed. As in other provinces in China, Guangdong's Internet access is connected through the four major networks. They include ChinaNet, CERNET, ChinaGBN, and CSTNet. However, unlike many other provinces in which Internet points of presence (POPs) are confined to only the provincial capital, Guangdong's Internet POPs are now located in most of the major cities in the province.

The nodes of the major networks span the entire the province. ChinaGBN provides Internet access in Guangzhou as GBNet-GZ. CERNET has located its Southern China Regional Network Centers in Guangzhou, provides Internet access to the major universities in Guangdong and nearby provinces, and operates Guangdong Education and Research Network (GDERNET), an organization that serves all the education and research community in Guangdong province.¹³⁷ ChinaNet has expanded its provincial nodes from Guangzhou and Shenzhen to cities throughout the province. Currently the "163" Network and "169" Network are available in 23 cities in Guangdong. However, the phone tariffs are set up so that users accessing the Internet through the "163" Network

and “169” Network do not have to pay distance-sensitive prices. As a result, Internet access costs the same throughout the province.

Connectivity Infrastructure

The connectivity infrastructure of Guangdong is rapidly evolving. The ChinaPAC X.25 network, which can be used to access the Internet, has POPs in more than 21 cities in the province. Guangdong Data Communications Bureau (GDCB) has signed a contract with Newbridge Networks Corp to supply networking equipment for the expansion and upgrade of the province’s digital data network (DDN). This upgrade will provide integrated service management of MainStreetXpress 46020 Network Managers across multiple administrations operating in urban networks in cities throughout Guangdong province.

The DDN supports Frame Relay access from 12 cities in the province. Frame Relay access is currently available at speeds up to E-1 (2 Mbps). The ATM protocol is used in the backbone of the network to support Frame Relay and Internet Protocol (IP) services. The China Public Multimedia Network, “169” Network, has connected to Guangzhou with large-capacity ATM. According to the GDCB, its next generation network will be based on running the IP protocol on top of the ATM protocol.¹³⁷ It is currently testing equipment from six different vendors for this next generation of network. China Telecom is also rolling out a CDPD service that provides wireless data communications. It is currently conducting an IP telephony trial service.

¹³⁷ GDERNET, <<http://www.gznet.edu.cn/gdernet/index.htm>> (Current August 20, 1999).

¹³⁸ GDCB, op. cit.

The Guangdong Wireline TV Corp has significant potential for providing high-speed access to the home. As of 1999, only a few hundred cable modems have been installed as part of this trial.¹³⁹

China Telecom is also planning on being able to install ADSL by the year 2000. Currently, however, there are legal problems engendered by the potential of ADSL to support video on demand—the domain of the TV company.¹⁴⁰

Organizational Infrastructure

The GDCB, part of the Guangdong Telecom Bureau, supports 90 percent of all commercial users in Guangdong. The Guangdong Telecom Bureau is the provincial body of China Telecom. Internet access is sold through the city telecom offices such as Guangzhou Telecom (see Table 44).

Table 44: China Telecom

Scope	Body	Web Address
National	China Telecom	http://chinatelecom.cninfo.net
Provincial	Guangdong Telecom	http://www.gdcb.gd.cn
City	Guangzhou Telecom	http://gztelecom.com.cn

Besides China Telecom, there are many ISPs in Guangdong (see Table 45). Most of the ISPs have built portal sites with links to sites of interest and very powerful Chinese website search engines.

¹³⁹ Xu, op. cit.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

Table 45: Major ISPs and Content Providers in Guangdong

Feihua Telecom	http://www.fhnet.cn.net/feihua
Guangzhou Netease	http://www.nease.net
Karsing Online	http://www.kol.com.cn
Great Trend Internet Services	http://szwd.net.cn
Shenzhen Newsnet	http://newsnet.szppt.net.cn

The city branches of China Telecom have also built portal sites. Guangzhou Telecom, for instance, runs gznet.com. GDCB was a pioneer in developing the 21cn.com portal site of the “169” Multimedia Network. This site is one of many city and provincial sites that can be accessed through the cninfo.net domain.

Sectoral Absorption

The public sector has an extensive Web presence. This presence has been developed by the information offices of the province and each city (see Table 46). GD Information Network, run by the Guangdong Information Center, has extensive statistics on economic indicators at the provincial and national levels.¹⁴¹ It has global news, market prices, commerce regulations, stock quotes from the Shenzhen exchange, and health care statistics. GD Information Network also plays a matchmaker function by providing requests for quotes from around the world. Though the information provided is extensive, it rarely links to separate websites of the various branches of the government that gathered the information. This is probably due to the fact that most of the branches of the provincial government do not yet have their own departmental websites. A separate

¹⁴¹ Guangdong Information Network, <<http://www.gd.cei.gov.cn>> (Current July 28, 1999).

Guangdong government domain provides information on the various provincial decision-making bodies. This site is maintained by the Guangdong Information Center. The city information offices also have their own websites, which provide information on the city and its government. Both the provincial and city sites are part of the China Economic Information Network (CEInet), which is operated by the State Information Office. The city, provincial, and national sites all point to one another, a reflection of the fact that they are all loosely organized branches of CEInet.

Table 46: Information Offices

Network	Body	Web Address
China Economic Information Network	State Information Office	http://www.cei.gov.cn
Guangdong Information Network	GD Information Center	http://www.cei.gov.cn http://www.gdic.gd.gov.cn/xxzx_e.htm
Guangzhou Information Network	Guangzhou Information Office	http://www.203.207.178.12

Guangdong's **Common** sectoral absorption is explained in Table 47.

Table 47: Sectoral Absorption in Guangdong

Academic	Level 2	Most universities in Guangdong have Internet access provided by CERNET.
Commercial	Level 2	10-90% of businesses with more than 100 employees have Internet servers.
Health	Level 1	Less than 10% of hospital and clinics have leased-line Internet connectivity.
Public	Level 2	10-90% of government entities have Internet servers.

It has yet to be seen whether the development and availability of a videoconferencing

network based on a high-speed ATM exchange will have a significant impact on either the commercial or health sectors. The regional communications and network systems integrator, Datacraft Asia, will design and build a high-performance distance videoconferencing network in Guangdong. Hongkong Telecom, China Telecom, and the Guangdong PTA have joined networks to sponsor the first cross-border ATM-based telemedicine trial, linking several hospitals and universities between Guangdong and Hong Kong.¹⁴²

Sophistication of Use

Guangdong has not broken out beyond the **Conventional** level. For the time being, sending email, reading the newspaper, and accessing “169” Multimedia Network are three of the major reasons why Guangdong people are online. Regarding online newspaper readership, the website of *South China Daily* group in Guangdong Province was visited by more than 400,000 people in June of 1998. Business-to-business e-commerce is being talked about, but few companies have implemented it or have redesigned their business processes to take advantage of it. Only a few companies have implemented EDI (electronic document interchange), mainly in conjunction with the Golden Gate project. Many more are using electronic intermediaries. The GDCB is promoting digital signatures to support e-commerce.

¹⁴² 100 M. Scott, “Hong Kong, China in Telemedicine Trial,” *Computerworld Hong Kong* (August 1998).

Summary

The dimensions of Internet diffusion in Guangdong are illustrated in Figure 8 and Table 48.




Figure 8: Internet Dimensions for Guangdong in 1998

Table 48: Internet Dimensions for Guangdong in 1998

Dimension	Level	Explanation
Pervasiveness	3: Established	Guangdong has 1.11 users for every 100 people.
Geographic Dispersion	4: Provincewide	The "163" and "169" Networks are available in 23 cities. There is no distance charge from rural areas.
Sectoral Absorption	3: Common	Internet leased-line connectivity is available in

		most universities but not secondary schools. State Information Office runs website that provides access to information from various sections of the government.
Connectivity Infrastructure	3: Broad	ATM backbone is being constructed. It supports Frame Relay and IP. There is an Internet Exchange and connectivity to Hong Kong and the world.
Organizational Infrastructure	2.5: Controlled-Competitive	China Telecom is the primary provider of Internet access and controls international circuits. There are many Internet content providers, some of which provide access. Golden Bridge Network and CERNET provide commercial and educational access.
Sophistication of Use	2.5: Conventional-Transforming	Internet is primarily being used as a substitute for voice and fax. Email is very popular. There are some top-down efforts to change business processes such as the Golden Projects. Business intermediaries are driving change.

Unique Factors Influencing Guangdong's Internet Diffusion

The dimensions of Internet diffusion in Guangdong are created through the interaction of governmental (top-down) policies with the dynamism that has been created by economic opportunity.

China Telecom

China Telecom is committed to building a nationwide Internet Protocol (IP) backbone and rolling out both the "163" ChinaNet and the "169" Multimedia Network. Although China Telecom continues to lose money on its IP services, it makes it up in the per minute local telephone charges for accessing the networks.¹⁴³ China Telecom, as a matter of both national and organizational interest, is plowing the huge cash flow generated by Internet services back into the network.

China Telecom's provincial arm, the GDCB, is taking the initiative in rolling out a provincial ATM backbone and developing new value-added services such as IP-telephone and electronic commerce. In the interests of providing the tools to support e-commerce, the GDCB developed its own certificate authority for authenticating servers well ahead of the development of national policy. In the case of the certificate authority, the People's Bank has put a hold on its rollout by the GDCB.

¹⁴³ GDCB, op. cit.

Steering Committee on the National Information Infrastructure

The provincial government has a Steering Committee on the National Information Infrastructure that sets policy for the province on information technology and the Internet. The Steering Committee is appointed by local government and is associated with the Guangdong Province Information Center.¹⁴⁴ The center was established in 1997 as a “co-department institution” under the Guangdong government, being controlled by the planning commission. The center’s 108 employees work with more than 700 others from other cities and counties in Guangdong. The center has a broad mandate to be responsible for the organization and direction of the informatization of the economy. It gathers a wide range of macroeconomic indicators and makes them available through the CEInet site GD Information Network that was discussed earlier.

The Steering Committee contracts with the center to implement various projects. The center is responsible for building the networks for the provincial government and the Communist Party, and supporting their office automation. In this role, there has been some tension with China Telecom over the extent of resources China Telecom should provide to the government. The center has also been responsible for the development of databases for a wide range of organizations, including the Shenzhen Union Exchange and the GD Highways Company. The center runs the GDIX, an Internet exchange that connects the research, provincial government, and educational networks with ChinaNet. Presently, the GDIX is testing a connection to HKIX, the Internet exchange in Hong

¹⁴⁴ Guangdong Province Information Center (English), <http://www.gdic.gd.gov.cn/xxzx_e.htm> (Current July 25, 1999).

Kong.

As mentioned earlier, the center's GD Information Network has a great deal of information drawn from many sectors of the government and the economy. It is an open question as to how individuals and businesses in Guangdong are utilizing this rich data environment. Another interesting question is why the GD Information Network is much richer than the information services provided by Fujian and other provinces. The influence of Hong Kong and the sophistication of Internet use in Guangdong can be seen in the quality of the GD Information Network.

According to Xu Zhi Biao, now the director of the office of the Guangdong Steering Committee of NII, the government's strategy for promoting the informatization of the province involves these steps:

- Putting government information online;
- Reforming laws and regulations to support e-commerce; and
- Encouraging vendors to do business with the government electronically.¹⁴⁵

The Steering Committee has embarked on a project promoting enterprises to go online that starts with getting an email account and progresses to getting a webpage. The Steering Committee is also concerned about providing an infrastructure that will support the spread of the Internet and informatization.

¹⁴⁵ Xu, *op. cit.*

Open Door Policy

Though the provincial government has easily adopted information technology, Guangdong's rapid absorption of the Internet relative to the other provinces can be primarily attributed to its economic growth as a result of the Open Door policy. In 1979, the State Council gave Guangdong permission to implement special economic policies. As a result, three cities from Guangdong—Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou—were designated as special economic zones. In 1988, the central government allowed Guangdong to experiment with economic reform province-wide. Guangdong has developed into an export-oriented economy and is regarded as China's frontier to the outside world. The relative prosperity of the province has allowed people to purchase Internet services. In addition, the Internet represents a significant opportunity for time and cost savings for those individuals and companies involved in international trade, and, through the Web, opens up access to highly valuable information.

Migration

Guangdong's Open Door policy and the resulting economic boom have attracted entrepreneurial and technical talent from throughout China. Guangdong and its private companies are often the destination for the cream of China's youth that fail to land positions in Beijing and Shanghai. Many of these migrants have an aptitude for technology and have been early adopters of the Internet. In addition to attracting risk-takers from throughout China, Cantonese culture has traditionally been commerce-friendly and has been a fertile ground for entrepreneurial Internet companies.

More than 20 million people have emigrated out of Guangdong to Hong Kong and other countries. These overseas Chinese still have connections and influence with their family and friends who remained in Guangdong. Email is being extensively used to support those connections.

High-Tech Multinational Companies

Multinational companies have been attracted to Guangdong as a gateway for both manufacturing and selling in China. The Institute for the Future recognizes Shenzhen as a key node in the Global Silicon Network—the global flow of money, ideas, and people that drive the computer industry. As part of doing business with these high-tech multinational firms, Guangdong's businesses are exposed to the latest in information technology and are sometimes required to implement it as part of their trading agreements. Multinational companies also see Guangdong as a major market for their technologies and a gateway into the rest of China. For example:

- Cisco Systems and Lucent Technologies are upgrading Guangdong's telecommunications infrastructure.
- Intel is making special chips that allow Guangdong users to share the same online subscription.
- Compaq is building the E-commerce Technology Center in Guangzhou.
- Microsoft is making Chinese software and implementing Web TV in Guangdong.

Relationship between Hong Kong and Guangdong

Guangdong's attractiveness to Hong Kong as a base for manufacturing operations could create one of the most symbiotic partnerships in Asia. This interconnection is happening across most sectors of Guangdong society.

The main push for connectivity between Guangdong and Hong Kong is to expand research capabilities. Universities can share electronic libraries or expand joint research programs to better understand their objective. For instance, a joint program with the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Chinese University of Hong Kong is conducting a Joint Laboratory for GeoInformation Science. The technology plays a key part in sharing and promoting geographical information. Some of the participating cities include Beijing, Shanghai, Taipei, Kao-Hsiung, Tianjin, Chongqing, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.¹⁴⁶ The Joint Universities Computer Center Limited HARNET connects the eight main universities of Hong Kong to other international institutions, primarily in China.¹⁴⁷

The government is strongly pushing information technology. Plans such as Digital 21 have included goals for connectivity to the mainland from Hong Kong. The first to be implemented is the trial dedicated circuit between the Guangdong Internet Exchange run by the Guangdong Information Office and HKIX.

Guangdong companies must have email if they want to continue doing business with Hong Kong. It is an open question as to how quickly Hong Kong businesses will build inter-enterprise resource planning systems that use information technology to distribute decision-making across the virtual enterprise.

Surprisingly, the health sector is keeping up with technology. Through the help of strong telecom giants like Hong Kong Telecom, China Telecom, and Guangdong Post

¹⁴⁶ Academic Exchange, Joint Laboratory for GeoInformation Science (JLGIS), <http://jlgis.geo.cuhk.edu.hk/Index_e.htm> (Current April 28, 1999).

¹⁴⁷ HARNET, <http://www.jucc.edu.hk/jucc/content_harnet.html> (Current April 28, 1999).

and Telecommunications, the health sector has explored new applications and telemedicine trials across ATM technology.

Conclusion

It is useful to compare Guangdong Province with the rest of China as the province is more than a couple years ahead of the country in terms of Internet diffusion and rivals the metropolitan areas of Beijing and Shanghai. There are two questions. First, will Guangdong province approach the level of Internet diffusion that we have witnessed in Hong Kong?¹⁴⁸ Second, will it be possible for other provinces to approach such levels.

The perceived value of the Internet may be higher in Guangdong than in other provinces, because of the “contagion” effect of being next to Hong Kong. Though the cost of Internet access may be similar, the higher standard of living also drives Internet diffusion in Guangdong relative to other provinces.

There is a culture of entrepreneurship in Guangdong and a number of key Internet businesses in China developed there. The backbone providers are competing in Guangdong as well as other providers many with ties to Hong Kong. This competition will inevitably lower prices, increase the use of high bandwidth services, and lead to the rapid development of value-added services. There will be more competition in Guangdong than in other provinces.

The central government certainly has a lot to gain from the informatization of

¹⁴⁸ W. Foster, S. Goodman, and Z. Tan, *The Internet and E-Commerce in Greater South China*, (Fairfax, VA: The MOSAIC Group, November 1999) available at <http://mosaic.unomaha.edu/shina.pdf> (Current 11 January 2000).

Guangdong if it will result in more oversight of businesses. It remains how to be seen how the bottom-up forces, which are so strong in Guangdong, interact with the top down informatization efforts.

CHAPTER X: PROSPECTS

Assuming that there is no major political crisis, the Internet will continue to diffuse in China at a moderate rate. China's "coordinated competition" and the lack of legal and regulatory transparency will leave its mark on the pattern and rate of diffusion. However, Chinese institutions have demonstrated an ability to execute in terms of deploying Internet infrastructure. If Chinese businesses can take advantage of the Internet to compete in the global economy, the infrastructure will be built.

We can now integrate the discussion of the dimensions and the determinants of the Internet. The results reveal some of the trends for the Internet in China and suggest measures or changes that might be most effective in promoting the growth of the Internet.

Determinants of Pervasiveness

Table 49 illustrates the determinants of pervasiveness. What we can see from Table 49 is that China is still in the process of moving beyond the one Internet user per 100 benchmark. With approximately 22 million users, it has more users than many countries, and by next year it will have many more. However, the reality is that the majority of its population is rural based, and many Chinese have rudimentary reading skills and no access to computers or the Internet. A fair number of the Chinese intellectuals have found a way to access the Internet through family, a friend, or an Internet café.

Table 49: Impact of Determinants on Pervasiveness

Determinant	State of Determinant	Impact
Access to Internet	Internet access is available in all provinces and in most major cities. Availability depends on telephone infrastructure and access charges. The price of PCs is dropping rapidly, although it is still very high for the majority of Chinese families. Internet cafe's abound. Wireless access protocol (WAP) has the potential to enable many new users in the coming years.	Fair and rapidly improving
Perceived Value of the Internet	The Internet has become fashionable in social and economic circles. Companies and governments are talking about the benefit it could bring. The Communist Party and the government have significant concerns about the Internet's impact on their ability to control the society. This has served to strengthen China Telecom's dominance of ISPs.	Fair and improving
Ease of Use of the Internet	Chinese are able to use multiple methods for inputting characters, none of them ideal. Email is often sent using Mandarin. URLs are in English. Mandarin domain names are being deployed.	Good and improving
Cost of Internet Access	There has been a 75% decrease in user fees over the past two years. Telephone access charges have remained steady. Backbone connectivity charges for ISPs are generally usage sensitive and remain high.	Good and improving
Adequacy and Fluidity of Resources	China Telecom has had the financial resources to deploy Internet service. Competitors have had access to capital.	Good but tightening
Regulatory and Legal Framework	Government-coordinated competition has meant rapid geographic availability at dropping prices.	Fair and improving
Forces for Change	China Telecom by its dominance of ISPs has both driven the diffusion of the Internet and squelched effective competition. JiTong, Unicom, and China Netcom will provide a heightened level of competition.	Good and improving
Enablers of Change	Chinese are very social and have embraced technologies that enhance social interaction and knowledge acquisition. It is not clear how quickly Chinese companies will interact electronically with Western organizations and among themselves.	Good and improving

A great deal could be done to increase pervasiveness, including providing low-cost bandwidth to Internet cafés and allowing the active proliferation of them. Internet cafés not only provide access, they provide information on using the Internet and on what sources of information to access. The development of low-cost wireless Web access may, over time, bring millions more to the Internet in China.

Determinants of Geographic Dispersion

Despite limited competition in terms of backbone networks, China has done remarkably well at geographic dispersion and has done so rather rapidly. Even though China did not officially embrace the Internet until 1995–1996, multiple national backbones were in place by 1996. The fact that the provincial Data Communication Bureaus (DCBs) in each province are responsible for building their provincial networks has meant that provinces have had a role in provincial dispersion of the Internet. See Table 50 for the impact of determinants on geographic dispersion.

Table 50: Impact of Determinants on Geographic Dispersion

Determinant	State of Determinant	Impact
Access to Internet	China Telecom's Internet backbone has reached every province. The provincial IP backbones access most major cities or are available via DDN or X.25. Telephone infrastructure is being deployed to every village. Most universities have access to CERNET.	Good and improving
Perceived Value of Geographic Expansion	The Chinese government is unsure on how quickly to distribute Internet access to the county and village level. First is a question of cost, second of benefit, and third of control.	Good and improving
Adequacy and Fluidity of Resources	China Telecom has been willing to invest in an Internet infrastructure by subsidizing it with telecom revenues. Foreign investors have invested heavily in ICPs and, if China accedes to the WTO, will most likely invest in ISPs and backbone providers.	Fair and improving
Regulatory and Legal Framework	The absence of a telecommunications law, the Interconnecting Network restrictions, and the lack of transparency in regulatory activities have stifled the development of competing national backbone providers. The difficulties that private ISPs have faced have also limited geographic dispersion. On the other hand, China Telecom, a government entity, has been responsible for most of the geographic diffusion.	Fair and improving
Ability to Execute	China Telecom has been enormously successful for a bureaucracy in terms of its rollout of the Internet. CERNET has also implemented a highly professional network operation.	Good and improving
Geography	China is a vast country with mountainous terrain. China's deployment of a national fiber-optic backbone is evidence of its commitment to connect the whole country.	Not changing
Forces for Change	China's WTO accession with its potential of opening up the telecommunications services to investment and legitimating foreign investment in ISPs, ICPs, and IBPs could greatly increase competition in the Internet sphere. It could potentially undermine China Telecom, which to this point has been the greatest driver of the Internet.	Good and improving

Determinants of Sectoral Absorption

Sectoral absorption is highest in the university portion of the academic sector. During 1999–2000 under the government online project, government organizations established leased-line connectivity, email systems, and webpages. The business community initially started by using dial-up accounts for email and by placing brochureware on Web-intermediary sites. Starting with the SOEs, organizations are connecting their intranets to the Internet through leased lines, mainly at 64 Kbps. Business organizations are starting to operate their own websites and slowly moving into electronic commerce. In the health field, there have been numerous experiments with telemedicine, particularly in the military arena, but lack of resources and bandwidth has hindered widespread deployment in the civilian medical sector. Table 51 illustrates the impact of determinants on sectoral absorption.

Table 51: Impact of Determinants on Sectoral Absorption

Determinant	State of Determinant	Impact
Access to Internet	Dial-up access can be obtained in most major cities. The availability of leased lines (DDN) is still a limiting factor as is cost of leased lines. CERNET provides access to most universities. Unicom and China Netcom may increase availability of high bandwidth lines.	Good and rapidly improving
Perceived Value of the Internet	The perceived value to universities is high. Businesses are investing in dial-up accounts but are slower to invest in leased-line connectivity.	Fair and improving
Cost of Internet Access	Price of leased line connectivity is dropping and quality improving in response to competition.	Fair and improving
Ease of Use of the Internet	While use of the Internet is relatively simple, integrating an organization into the Internet is not. Many ISPs, IBPs, and ICPs now offer Web host and design services, lowering barriers to entry.	Fair and improving
Adequacy and	ISPs have had difficulty getting the financing to	Fair and

Fluidity of Resources	build national backbones and to compete with China Telecom. Uninet and China Netcom are changing that. Organizations lack human resources to integrate enterprise systems into the Internet.	improving
Regulatory and Legal Framework	The country lacks a legal and regulatory framework that will facilitate competition and lower the cost of organizational connectivity. A good deal of work needs to be done to establish the proper legal framework for electronic commerce: the development of a national settlement system; the development of a digital signature system; and the adoption of tax and accounting laws to properly handle electronic transactions and to not penalize organizations that automate transactions.	Fair and slowly improving
Forces for Change	CERNET has driven adoption in the academic sector and contributed to increasing the human resources available for organizational transformation. The Government On-line Project is bringing many government organizations onto the Web at the national, provincial, and local levels. What impact the government online project will have on absorption in the business sector is not clear.	Good and improving
Enablers of Change	University and public sectors are most open to change and have the financial and human resources necessary to carry it out. Business sector has embraced dial-up access. SOEs are embracing leased-line access and are being followed by the private sector.	Good and improving

Determinants of Connectivity Infrastructure

Much of China's connectivity infrastructure has been driven internally by China Telecom in response to consumer demand and in anticipation of the requirement by business organizations for more value-added services and higher bandwidth. It is assumed that the revitalization of ChinaGBN and the emergence of Uninet and China Netcom will only serve to heighten China Telecom's investment in connectivity infrastructure. At the

same time, each of these competing networks, by building its own infrastructure, is making a significant contribution to overall national connectivity. Though some planners at MII talk about the danger of duplication of resources, the reality is that the market will most likely prove a better allocator of Internet resources than the China Telecom bureaucracy. The question is, How quickly can competition be brought to China's connectivity infrastructure without significant legal and regulatory reform? In the meantime, it seems that MII is committed to having multiple competing Interconnecting Networks and is able to use its power to ensure that this happens.

The emergence of a national network access point or exchange is essential for allowing the other Interconnecting Networks to compete with China Telecom. With broadband connectivity between their networks, the competing ISPs can route traffic directly to China Telecom rather than routing it through expensive international links.

It must be pointed out that there are elements within both MII and the government as a whole that believe that unlimited international connectivity is not necessarily a good thing and that China would be much better off if it could keep most of its users and organizations on the "169" Multimedia Network and build China's Intranet. This nationalistic concern is aligned with China Telecom's desire to limit demand on its expensive international bandwidth. On the other hand, some users on the Internet want access to international sites and are willing to pay more for that access. Thus we see the emergence of schemes where users on the "169" Network have a choice of paying more to view international websites. Again, it is important to note that even the users of the domestic-only Intranet have the option of sending email to anyone in the world. CERNET

has also implemented a policy where users who access international sites are billed for them.

Thus, China has been able to implement and charge for a differentiation in service that reflects the difference in price between global connectivity and China connectivity. Such a differentiation is probably essential if China moves to offering high-bandwidth connectivity such as cable modems and xDSL. ISPs simply can not afford to allow large numbers of users to download high bandwidth applications, such as movies, from the West without charging them a special fee.

Table 52: illustrates the impact of determinants on connectivity infrastructure.

Table 52: Impact of Determinants on Connectivity Infrastructure

Determinant	State of Determinant	Impact
Access to Constituent Technologies	China has a nationwide fiber-optic backbone that is being upgraded to support the latest in optical technology.	Good and improving
Perceived Value of Extensive Connectivity	China Telecom has built an extensive national backbone, and its provincial arms are building major provincial backbones. China Netcom, ChinaGBN, Uninet, and China Mobile Telecommunications are also building major national backbones to compete. MII policy-makers repeatedly warned against resource duplication.	Fair and improving
Cost of Connectivity	The cost of global Internet connectivity has decreased throughout the world. More and more is being offered at lower prices. Many believe that China Telecom's bottlenecks on the gateway and local loop have kept prices higher than they would be in a competitive market.	Fair and improving
Adequacy and Fluidity of Resources	The Chinese government has chosen to invest heavily in CERNET and China Telecom Internet infrastructure. Foreign investors seem eager to invest in both the ICP and ISP markets because of the size of the Chinese market. The ban on foreign investment on telecommunications is being relaxed to support	Fair, could improve rapidly

	substantial competition to China Telecom.	
Regulatory and Legal Framework	"The legal and regulatory framework has not protected builders of national backbones. Those that survived, such as ChinaGBN, had the backing of the powerful MEI. Both Uninet and China Netcom are "sons" of the government and have powerful backers in high places. If they succeed, second-tier ISPs will have a chance. China is not the right place to run a national ISP without the right connections. "	Fair and changing but not clear how rapidly
Ability to Execute	China Telecom demonstrated its ability with the help of Asia Info to execute when it built the national backbone in 1996. CERNET also demonstrated remarkable ability. In Voice Over the Internet, China has also moved rapidly and decisively, and the government has taken advantage of competition to increase its power with foreign companies. The same Ability to Execute is seen in the deployment of state of the art fiber optic backbones.	Good for a former monopoly
Demand for Capacity	International bandwidth has always been a constrained resource for China, but China Telecom has been rapidly expanding international bandwidth. Some of the provinces are building high-capacity backbones in anticipation of demand for video and high bandwidth services.	Good and improving
Multiplicity of ISPs	Though there are many ISPs, those not part of local PTAs have had a distinct competitive disadvantage. This could change if China Netcom, Uninet, and a national cable network become vigorous competitors. It is not clear how many more Interconnecting Networks the government will allow.	Fair, could improve rapidly
Services Provided	Leased lines of 64 Kbps have been available from DDN but are not plentiful in some areas of the country. Provision of high-speed/low-cost Internet access services (e.g., cable modems and xDSL) is in trial stages.	Fair and improving
Forces for Change	China Telecom at the national, provincial, and local levels is pushing the deployment of China's connectivity infrastructure. The potential competition of Uninet, ChinaGBN, and China Netcom is undoubtedly driving it forward, as is its organizational desire to be the telecommunications service provider for the country.	Good

Determinants of Organizational Infrastructure

China is entering a critical stage in its development of a robust organizational infrastructure. The entrances of Uninet and China Netcom, when combined with ChinaGBN, represent a significant potential for competition in the Interconnecting Network business. These companies still face China Telecom's monopoly of the local loop. One potential alternative is cable networks. So far MII has prevented widespread use of the cable networks to provide "last mile" connectivity to homes and businesses that bypasses China Telecom. In preparation for foreign investment into the telecom sector, MII has promised to implement a regulatory infrastructure for ISPs and to govern foreign ownership. It is not clear whether MII will attempt to undermine competition or enhance it. China's organizational infrastructure may get stuck at Level 2.5 between the **Controlled** and **Competitive** levels or it may make a significant breakthrough to the **Competitive** level within the next two or three years (see Table 53).

Table 53: Impact of Determinants on Organizational Infrastructure

Determinant	State of Determinant	Impact
Access to Internet Backbone	The terms and conditions under which ISPs have had to agree to access the Internet have often undermined their competitiveness. The emergence of new Interconnecting Networks may be changing this.	Fair and improving
Perceived Value of Complex Organizational Infrastructure	There are some in MII who have doubted competition, and even today there is concern about duplication of resources. There is also a concern whether China Telecom will prosper if faced with foreign-backed competition. Others believe competition is essential for moving China into a knowledge economy.	Fair and getting better
Cost of Internet Access	Internet access fees are high for ISPs that must compete with China Telecom-linked ISPs for customers. China Telecom fees for	Fair and getting better

	actual traffic make turning a profit difficult.	
Adequacy and Fluidity of Resources	Limits on foreign investment for ISPs have greatly limited competition. This will change under WTO.	Fair and could get better quickly
Culture of Entrepreneurship	With the drying up of easy capital, it remains to be whether China's entrepreneurial spirit will persevere.	Fair and gradually improving
Regulatory and Legal Framework	The legal and regulatory framework has allowed the proliferation of ISPs. The requirement that only Interconnecting Networks can have global Internet access has reduced competition. In response to the WTO accession agreement, MII has come out with new regulations on foreign ownership and Category One and Category Two telecommunications.	Fair and getting better
Forces for Change	The force for change has partly been coming from the United States and Europe, who have pushed for the opening up of the telecommunications sector to foreign investment and competition. There has also been an effort on the part of many both within MII and without to increase competition in IP backbone services.	
Enablers of Change	The environment has been highly conducive for the development of ICPs. How big an effect they will have on the overall industry remains to be seen, especially as investment capital tightens up.	Fair with possibility of change

Determinants of Sophistication of Use

At an individual level, the Chinese are integrating the Internet into their lives in ways that go far beyond being just a substitute for written and telephone communications. The strength of the ICPs has encouraged people to use the Internet to seek partners, participate in auctions, and to extend their social circles. Chinese organizations, on the other hand, have been slower to integrate information technology and the Internet in ways that transform business processes. China does not have as strong a tradition as the West

of standardizing and automating business practices. Depending on personal relationships to facilitate business is not only part of the culture but is essential for negotiating the complexities of operating under a highly heterogeneous and complex country. As more and more functions become routinized, such as logistics, it is possible to automate transactions to a higher and higher degree. One of the dangers of automating transactions is that it makes them more transparent to the myriad state organizations at the national, provincial, and local levels that might have an interest in the enterprise. Thus there is a risk that an enterprise that automates all its transactions may be placed in a more vulnerable position. Having access to all the transactions in an enterprise does not necessarily empower management. Few Chinese manufacturers have invested in comprehensive ERP systems from companies like SAP and People Soft. These solutions are seen as both too expensive and running the risk of not providing the flexibility required to operate in the Chinese environment. For Chinese family-owned enterprises, to invest in inter-enterprise resource planning applications, the cost must go down, the potential gains must go up, and somehow the government must lessen the risks involved in having all transactions transparent to relevant authorities.

Educational institutions such as Tsinghua are taking the lead in terms of developing expertise and experience with ERP systems. Tsinghua is also taking a leadership role in the development of the next generation Internet.

Table 54 shows the impact of determinants on sophistication of use.

Table 54: Impact of Determinants on Sophistication of Use

Determinant	State of Determinant	Impact
Access to Internet Backbone	The Internet is available on a dial-up basis in most major cities. Organizational connectivity is available. Ministries and many SOEs have limited dedicated access to the Internet backbone. Private enterprises are slower to connect.	Fair and improving
Perceived Value	Though there is much hype about the potential of e-commerce, the number of organizations that know how to re-engineer themselves to take advantage of the Internet is small. The value of implementation is still less than the risk.	Fair and improving
Ease of Use	Many Chinese organizations face major challenges in standardizing and automating business processes to take advantage of the Internet.	Fair and improving
Adequacy and Fluidity of Resources	It is not clear whether the resources are there to transform organizational processes within a firm. There is also a shortage of people with the skills at automating organizations.	Fair and improving
Regulatory and Legal Framework	There has been little legal support for automating transactions. A digital signature regime still needs to be developed, as does a legal and regulatory regime. Settlement infrastructure needs to be developed and needs legal and regulatory support.	Poor and will improve, but how quickly?
Culture of Entrepreneurship	Entrepreneurship is alive but struggling in the ICP and now IBP communities. There is also a strong entrepreneurial culture among family-owned manufacturers. It is not clear, though, how quickly and under what circumstances these companies will invest heavily in IT. SOEs have less culture of entrepreneurship but tend to invest more heavily in IT.	Fair but will change dramatically during next five years
Forces for Change	Companies that are the first to integrate electronically into global supply chains will have a major competitive advantage over those that can't. The pursuit of profits will drive certain key firms to take major risks and invest in advanced enterprise and inter-enterprise IT. Once these companies are successful everyone else will jump on the bandwagon. Over the last couple of years, the technical elite in China have begun to take the lead in developing next generation protocols such as IPv6	Fair and will take a couple years to build momentum

	and Voice Over IP. This bodes well for the Chinese electronics industries.	
Enablers of Change	"One of the enabling factors is the ""demonstration effect."" As the number of organizations and individuals demonstrating a particular level of sophistication grows, the amount of ""follow the leader"" grows as well. At present, the demonstration effect primarily causes companies to have Web brochureware on a Web intermediary and to have an email address. In the future, this will involve more sophisticated levels of IT integration. Often firms may imitate what a leader is doing without fully understanding the processes involved."	Good

Government Policy and the Determinants of Internet Diffusion

The most important determinant, government policy, belongs in a category by itself. These policies overlay all other determinants, affecting both their nature and their effectiveness, based upon a government's ability to exercise coercive power and to use it to coordinate society. Table 55 illustrates some of the ways in which the PRC government has influenced the determinants discussed in the previous tables. The table can be used to suggest ways in which the government can impact the development of the Internet in China. Each of these measures can be classified according to whether it is likely to be a high-impact or a low-impact measure. High-impact measures are those that are likely to have a strong and relatively quick impact on one or more of the Internet dimensions. Each measure can also be classified according to whether it is easy or difficult to implement.

Table 55: Selected Internet-Enhancing Options for Government Policy-Makers

Determinant	Measures Taken by Government	Measures That Might Be Taken by Government	Impact	Difficulty
Access	Investment in ChinaNet and CERNET. Approval of ChinaGBN, Uninet, and China Netcom.	Allow significant foreign investment in telecoms. Abolish Interconnecting Network regime. Allow cable companies to offer Internet service.	High	Moderate-Difficult
Perceived Value	"Government online," allowing ICP industry to flourish. Government trying to "control" media and flow of information.	Promoting policies to increase flow of information (including allowing reporting by ICPs). Removing disincentives for transparent transactions. Foreign investment in ICPs.	High	Difficult
Ease of Use of the Internet	Encouraging Chinese content. Promoting ICPs, IBPs, and Internet cafes.	Provide Internet facilitators for villages with low-cost access.	Moderate	Moderate
Cost of Internet Access	Reduction of tariffs.	Further reduction of charges for	High	Easy to lower price of circuits, much

		international circuits. More competition among Interconnecting Networks and for local loops.		more difficult to implement competition for local loop.
Adequacy and Fluidity of Resources	Allocated significant resources for CERNET and ChinaNet. Turned blind eye to foreign investments in ICPs.	Encourage investment in telecoms.	High	Under WTO 50% foreign ownership is proposed; higher percentage ownership is difficult.
Regulatory and Legal Framework	It is legal to operate an ISP or Internet cafe as long as connectivity comes from an Interconnecting Network.	Provisions that ensure more competition between Interconnecting Networks and provide competition at local loop	High	Difficult
Ability to Execute	Government responsible for the success of ChinaNet and CERNET. Much decision-making is decentralized.	Allow enlarged role for private sector.	Moderate	Moderate
Demand for Capacity	Allowed users access to Internet.	Create conditions for expansion of business use.	Moderate	Moderate
Multiplicity of ISPs	Allowed ISPs, but China Telecom had upper hand.	Attract foreign investment; abolish Interconnecting Network regime; open up local loop to	High	Moderate-Difficult

		competition.		
Services Provided	Creation of multiple IP backbones; controlled release of Voice Over the Internet.	Decontrol of Voice Over the Internet and Video over the Internet.	Moderate	Moderate
Culture of Entrepreneurship	Turned blind eye to foreign investment in ICPs. Is gradually allowing integrators and ICPs to go public on foreign exchanges.	Ensure a predictable regulatory environment for enterprises to grow and prosper.	High	Moderate
Forces for Change	Cultivation of champions in business and industry who can lead informatization of society.	Ensure a predictable regulatory environment that does not penalize firms on the cutting edge of Internet implementation.	High	Difficult
Enablers of Change		Continue to fund academic and research community that provides leadership for informatization process and also educates next generation.	High	Moderate

Culture and Globalization

In trying to understand the prospects for the Internet in China, it is important to conceptualize how the forces of globalization will interact with Chinese culture. In terms of the Global Diffusion of the Internet Framework globalization can be seen as a “Force for Change” and Culture can be seen as an “Enabler of Change” or an “Inhibitor of Change”. It is, however, useful to break out Culture and Globalization from the rest of the determinants and to explore how the two, like government, have an impact on many of the determinants.

Culture is of course a notoriously difficult concept to work with. On the other hand, a national analysis of Internet diffusion can not be complete without reference to culture. In cross-country comparisons, we may see that the same government actions have different consequences in terms of Internet diffusion because of differences between national cultures. Table 56 explores the relationship between the determinants and culture for China.

Table 56 : Impact of Culture on the Determinants of Internet Diffusion

Determinant	Possible Influence of Culture
Perceived Value	Chinese collectivist culture has an affinity for networking technology. People are willing to spend a substantial portion of income to be “connected.”
Ease of Use	Culture shapes perceptions of ease of use.
Ability to Execute	The effectiveness of China in building national infrastructure probably has cultural roots.
Culture of Entrepreneurship	The degree of uncertainty avoidance in the national culture impacts willingness to risk being an entrepreneur. Degree of uncertainty avoidance may be generational.
Regulatory and Legal Framework	The Chinese Internet regulatory regime reflects cultural values such as respect for authority.
Forces for Change	The desire to connect has a cultural component.


Enablers for Change	The importance of the university in Chinese culture supports its role as one of the key enablers for the Internet.
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The Internet is both supporting the globalization process and is being supported by it. Globalization ends up interacting with national culture and government to shape many of the determinants. Table 57 explores some of the interrelations.

Table 57: The Determinants of Internet Diffusion and Globalization

Determinant	Globalization
Perceived Value	The Internet not only connects Chinese to the world, but serves as a conduit for the world's values to China.
Adequacy and Fluidity of Resources	The ability to raise funds on stock markets from Hong Kong to New York has provided funds for building China's infrastructure.
Ability to Execute	Best practices for management from all over the world are available to Chinese managers.
Culture of Entrepreneurship	Hi-tech entrepreneurship in West and in Asia has an impact on would be entrepreneurs in China. Travel and education in the West has often encouraged entrepreneurship.
Regulatory and Legal Framework	International negotiation in context of W.T.O. is driving transformation of regulatory and legal framework.
Forces for Change	Globalization may be a major force for change in China by unleashing competitive forces and exposing Chinese to new ideas and technologies.
Enablers of Change	Globalization brings with it many enablers of change including joint ventures and foreign companies.

We do not yet have the data to explore how government, culture, and globalization interact to shape the determinants and through them the dimensions (see Figure 9). It is expected that future work will elaborate on these relationships since it is clear that they eventually be included in any model of Internet diffusion in China.

Figure 9: Culture, Government and Globalization

CHAPTER XI: CONCLUSIONS

Over the next five years, China will be wrestling with the balance between central government control over the Internet and the value of competition and decision-making decentralization. One of the biggest challenges that the central government has faced in making Internet policy is the number of different agencies that have a stake or an interest in the Internet. With more than one decision-maker it is difficult to come to a consistent set of policies that can be externalized as rules or laws.

Because of the opening established through the WTO accession negotiations, China must now come up with a regulatory environment that harnesses the power of foreign investment while ensuring that the government is still in substantial control of its communication infrastructure. Having the state-owned China Telecom in control of most ISPs, the gateway, and the circuits that the other Interconnecting Networks use was one way of maintaining control. The whole Interconnecting Network regime was another way to ensure not only that MII stayed in control of the private ISPs and ICPs but also that it stayed in control of Internet ventures of other government organizations. Too much intergovernmental rivalry could make it difficult to coordinate government Internet policy.

The Internet is quickly becoming too valuable to China and to individual ministries to have international access closed down, but how quickly it will transform Chinese society is still an open question. How well are the top-down government informatization processes going to work? What can be done to get the agile private manufacturers to invest in automating their transactions with the West? Clearly, the more

competitive the ISP, ICP, and IBP markets are, the more likely they are to develop solutions that can both lower the cost and increase the benefit of connectivity.

It must be pointed out that China has done fairly well by China Telecom. For a national bureaucracy, China Telecom has been extremely effective and fast in deploying a national backbone and ISPs in most major cities. As a decentralized organization, it has been able to effectively implement a decentralized technology. How well it is going to do in the ICP and IBP markets is open to question. China has clearly benefited from the significant amount of competition in the ICP market, a market that China Telecom plays in but does not dominate. It could be argued that a strong China Telecom is necessary for China to make the necessary investments in national infrastructure. With China Netcom and Uninet joining ChinaGBN as alternative Interconnecting Networks, China has made a choice for competition, if only for competition between the chosen “sons” of the government. Instead of banning the use of the Internet for voice traffic, China has built the world’s largest Voice Over IP infrastructure. It is unlikely that China Telecom would have embraced this new technology that so threatens its traditional profit margins if it had not had the threat of competition from China Netcom, Unicom, and ChinaGBN. It is very helpful to compare China with India on this point. Whereas India banned Voice Over IP, China has used it to build the infrastructure of both China Telecom’s competitors and China Telecom itself.

A similar phenomena happened with the radical technology of running IP directly on fiber (IP/DWDM). When China Netcom embraced this technology and started developing a 40 gigabyte backbone, China Telecom was pushed to upgrade its backbone

which was running in the megabytes to a new 80 gigabyte backbone. This explosion of bandwidth might not be perceived as a benefit to a monopoly provider who has an interest in maintaining scarce and expensive bandwidth. However, in order to compete against China Netcom, China Telecom has been goaded into building a state of the art infrastructure.

What is unclear is how quickly MII and the State Council will allow other networks such as the cable networks to become Interconnecting Networks. The new regulations state that only “state-owned” can run backbone IP networks. Foreign companies that want to invest in backbone networks must do so through a joint venture with a S.O.E. It can also be assumed that not every state owned enterprise can run a backbone Internet network. In order to do so they will need the approval of MII and perhaps even the State Council.

As long as there is no major organized resistance to the State, conservative elements in the Communist Party will probably allow the expansion of the Internet. The state will find one way or another to ensure conformity on the part of both individuals and organizations. Even in the face of the potential avalanche of foreign investment, the State will find ways to stay in control even if it means using the threat of force. The real challenge the Communist Party faces is how to open up the Internet to competition while ensuring that irresponsible state-owned enterprises do not squander government resources on ill-advised Internet ventures.

The Chinese Communist Party and the state are taking a calculated risk in providing citizens with ready access to the Internet. They are doing so because they

believe it will pay significant economic dividends and will allow China to keep up with the world. Over the course of its five-year history, the Chinese Internet has only begun to produce these dividends. Most observers, including the government, believe that it is B2B electronic commerce that has the potential to make a significant impact on the Chinese economy. There are significant cultural and legal barriers to full-scale integration of Chinese businesses into the global electronic economy. However, the potential for profits and the threat of competition are incredibly powerful forces that will drive transformation of China's manufacturing sector. There are significant opportunities for those firms that can figure out how to lower the risks and costs involved in standardizing and automating business transactions. What is not clear is how long it will take for leaders to emerge and for the general economy to follow. Chinese organizations are a significant ways behind United States firms in terms of the integration of information technology. The Chinese government is seeking to drive e-commerce through extensive top down initiatives. Will the government be as effective at driving e-commerce as it has been at deploying Internet infrastructure. A lot depends on how these top down initiatives interact with bottom up forces.

If e-commerce is going to rapidly transform the Chinese manufacturing sector, the question must be asked whether it will support wise long-term decisions. Globalization and information technology may only exacerbate the problems associated with negative externalities, including cultural and environmental degradation.¹⁴⁹ It remains to be seen whether the Chinese will be able to create a knowledge economy that not only

¹⁴⁹ T. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1999.

supplements its manufacturing sector but which serves as a funnel to channel the industrial economy in a way that is in harmony with the environment. This is the ultimate challenge for the Internet in China.

There are some in the West, including some U.S. politicians, who believe that the ultimate consequence of the Internet will be to undermine the Chinese Communist Party. It is believed that once individuals have the communication power of the Internet they will inevitably use it to resist an authoritarian government. This attitude makes assumptions about what is really important for the Chinese and ignores the weight of cultural tradition. The 22-year-old in a Chinese Internet café today is more interested in learning something new and increasing his social and economic well-being than he is in criticizing the status quo. In this respect, his goals are aligned with the goals of the government.

If we reject technological determinism, it can be assumed that Chinese society will harness the power of distributed computing in ways that are different from the West. With the Interconnecting Network regime we have seen the willingness of Chinese to develop their own institutions for maintaining the delicate balance between control and competition.

APPENDIX A : KEY GOVERNMENT BODIES INVOLVED IN INTERNET

Name	Historical Mission	Interest in Internet
The Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS)	Scientific research policy-maker and host of hundreds of research institutes	Technology transfer; Internet-oriented research and development
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)	Provides government decision-makers with information and analysis	Research regarding social impact of Internet; electronic commerce
Internet Information Management Bureau	New body under State Council Information Office	Ensures that ICPs conform to government content guidelines
Propaganda Department of Communist Party	Makes sure that media are under the control of the party	Especially concerned with the influence of Western information and the role of the Internet as media
State Council	Highest organ of state executive and administrative power	Ensures that Internet and the ministries that are involved with it are serving the interest of the state
State Council Information Office	Close ties to Propaganda Department	Oversees much of Internet content policy
Name	Historical Mission	Interest in Internet
State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC)	Policy decisions regarding infrastructure and relationships with foreign firms	Foreign investment in China's Internet infrastructure
State Planning Commission (SPC)	Controls China's economic resources	Funds for infrastructure; pricing of Internet services. Some of this responsibility is being shifted to MII.
Ministry of Culture	Controls the distribution of cultural products	Music and movies sold on the Internet
Ministry of Education	Policy-maker and administrator for China's education system	Internet support for university and secondary education
Ministry of Information Industry	Combination of Ministry of Post and Telecommunications and Ministry of Electronic Industries	Information technology decision-maker and regulator
Ministry of Public Security	Police of Chinese society	Ensure Internet is not used

(MPS)		to leak state secrets, conduct political subversion, or spread pornography or violence
Ministry of Science and Technology (MST)	Policy-making and financing of China's research and development	R&D for Internet
Ministry of State Security	Protect state security	Encryption; ability to decode traffic on the Web and prevent foreign services from doing so
People's Bank of China	Loans to Chinese firms	Control of electronic currency and certificate authority
People's Liberation Army	State security; also has ties to many manufacturing interests	Security issues; has wanted to expand into Internet provision
Name	Historical Mission	Interest in Internet
State Administration of News and Publication	Formerly part of Propaganda Department. Gives permission for official publication.	Traditional press moving to Internet
State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT)	Manage cable networks	Internet access through cable
State Press and Publishing Bureau	Regulates publishing industry	Regulate the selling of books over the Internet
State Administration of Industry and Commerce	Register businesses	Register B2C e-commerce sites; grants advertising licenses
State (National) Information Office	Disseminate information about government to the public	Internet as a tool for disseminating information
Xinhua News Agency	Monopoly news producer	Leverage and protect monopoly on news
Provincial and municipal bodies	Moving away from central government in pursuit of their own economic development	Develop Internet infrastructure; attract investment through Internet

APPENDIX B: KEY REGULATIONS

1. MPT's decision to open up computer information services and email to non-MPT entities (MPT Order #675) (September 1993).
2. MPT's notification concerning issues pertinent to examination, approval, and management of organizations engaging in telecommunications industry (October 1993).
3. Security regulations for Computer Industry Security (Order #147) that authorize the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) to be in charge (1994).
4. MPT's rules on the management of open market telecommunications (November 1995).
5. MPT's rules on examination, approval, and management of telecommunication terminal equipment (November 1995).
6. MPS's requirement for users to register with the MPS (MPS #7) (January 1996).
7. The State Council's decision to allow interconnection but only through Interconnecting Networks (Order #195) (February 1996).
8. MPT regulation specifying terms and connection methods of international Internet connections (MPT #492/403) (April 1996).
9. Steering Committee on National Information Infrastructure set up on April 16, 1996 (Order #195).
10. MPT's provisional rules on interconnection between special networks and public networks (July 1996).

11. MPT's public notice concerning issues on management of content of telecommunication information service (August 1996).
12. MPT's measures on the management of China public multimedia communication (September 1997).
13. MPT outlines ISP licensing procedures (MPT #36) (December 96).
14. The State Council Order #218—amends #195, designates three categories of computer networks related to the Internet (May 1997).
15. MPT's requirements for ICP licensing for multimedia "operators" and "providers." (MPT #28) (November 1997).
16. MPS releases regulations for use of the Internet (MPS #7) (December 1997).
17. MII attempts to assert MII responsibility over Internet regulation (MII #573) (September 1998).
18. State Council issues regulations on the use of encryption and puts National Commission on Encryption Code Regulations (NCECR) under the Ministry of State Security (MSS) in charge (State Council Directive 273) (October 1999).
19. State Council's State Information Office issues regulations regarding the release of state secrets through the Internet. The Bureau for the Protection of State Secrets in charge (January 2000).
20. State Council issues document No. 292 on measures for managing Internet information services (October 2000).

APPENDIX C: MII MISSION STATEMENT

(August 1998)

1. Research and formulate the development strategy, policy, and overall planning of China's information industry; revitalize the manufacturing industry of electronic information products, the telecommunications industry, and the software industry; promote the informatization of China's economy and social services.
2. Formulate laws, regulations, and directives regarding the manufacturing industry of electronic information products, the telecommunications industry, and the software industry; responsible for the administrative implementation and monitoring of those laws, regulations, and directives.
3. In charge of the overall planning of all networks including China's public telecommunications networks (local and long-distance networks), radio and TV broadcasting networks (wire and wireless TV networks), military networks, and all private networks owned by others; responsible for overall sector administration.
4. Coordinate and publish technology policies, technology architectures, and technology standards for the electronic information products industry, the telecommunications industry, and the software industry; publish technology architectures and standards for the radio and TV transmission networks; be responsible for the approval of telecommunications networking equipment and terminals; provide guidance on quality monitoring and administration for electronic information products.
5. Responsible for the allocation and administration of China's public telecommunications resources, including frequency spectrums, satellite slots, network

IDs, domain names, and IP addresses; in charge of the construction approval, tracking, and monitoring of all the radio stations including coordinating radio administration, signal interference, and signal control.

6. Monitor and administrate, based on laws, the telecom and information service market; implement the necessary operation licensing system; monitor service quality; ensure open competition and universal services; safeguard national interests and consumer interests; formulate the interconnection rules and settlement methods among various networks and monitor the implementation.
7. Formulate policies on rates of telecom and information services; determine pricing standards on basic posts and telecom services and monitor the implementation.
8. Responsible for the planning, construction, and administration of private networks for Communist Party and governments; manage and administrate national telecom network monitoring and controlling center and international gateways; coordinate the operation of special telecom services for Communist Party and governments, disaster emergency telecom services, and other important telecom services; protect the national telecom security and information safety.
9. According to the industry policy and technology development policy, guide and nurture the development of information industry; guide the adjustment of the structure of industry, products, and corporations; guide the re-organization of state-owned enterprises and the formulation of holding groups; reasonably allocate resources and prevent duplication of projects.
10. Advance the R&D of the manufacturing industry of electronic information

products, the telecommunications industry, and the software industry; coordinate and implement the major R&D projects and the digestion, absorption and improvement of imported technologies; promote the commercialization of R&D outcomes; nurture and promote indigenous industry.

11. In charge of the military electronic industry; formulate development strategy, policy, and planning for the military electronic industry; cooperate in planning with the military and the Commission for Defense Science, Technology, and Industry; implement the plan.

12. Formulate development planning for the informatization and national economy; promote China's key informatization projects; guide, coordinate, and organize the development and applications of information resources; guide the broad adoption of electronic information technology and promote the education of informatization.

13. Organize and guide the financial submission, internal redistribution, and settlement of major post and telecom enterprises; coordinate the operation between post and telecom services; implement the subsidization of universal services on post and telecom sectors; implement the human resource authority on its staff in MII and top managers in affiliated organizations.

14. Represent China in international organizations and sign bilateral agreements; coordinate economic and technical cooperation and exchanges with foreign countries; handle all the relevant foreign affairs.

15. Study telecom and information policies regarding the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong, as well as Macao and Taiwan; handle relevant issues.

16. Publish the statistics and other information regarding information industry.
17. Responsible for other authorities assigned by the State Council.

According to the State Council, the National Bureau of Post Services is under the auspices of the MII.

APPENDIX D: GLOSSARY

ADSL	asynchronous digital subscriber loop
ATM	asynchronous transfer mode
B2B	business-to-business e-commerce
B2C	business-to-consumer e-commerce
CAnet	China Academic Network
CAS	Chinese Academy of Science
CASS	Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
CATV	cable television
CCF	Chinese-Chinese-Foreign investment method
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CEInet	China Economic Information Network
CERNET	Chinese Education and Research Network
ChinaGBN	China Golden Bridge Network
CIETNET	China International Electronic Transaction Network
CNC	China Netcom
CNISTEC	China National Information Security Testing, Evaluation, and Certification Center
CNNIC	China Network Information Center
CRnet	China Research Network
CSTNet	China Science and Technology Network

DDN	digital data network
DWDM	dense-wave division multiplexing
EDI	electronic document interchange
ERP	enterprise resource planning
GDCB	Guangdong Data Communications Bureau
GDERNET	Guangdong Education and Research Network
IBP	Internet business provider
ICP	Internet content provider
IHEP	Institute for High-Energy Physics
ISP	Internet service provider
IP	Internet protocol
IPO	initial public offering
IT	information technology
MBMT	Ministry of Broadcasting
MEI	Ministry of Electronic Industries
MII	Ministry of Information Industry
MOFTEC	Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation
MOH	Ministry of Health
MPS	Ministry of Public Security
MPT	Ministry of Post and Telecommunications
MSS	Ministry of State Security
MST	Ministry of Science and Technology

NAP	network access point
NCECR	National Commission on Encryption Code Regulations
NPC	National People's Congress
PLA	People's Liberation Army
POP	point of presence
PRC	People's Republic of China
PTA	Post and Telecommunications Administration
QOS	quality of service
SARFT	State Administration for Radio, Film, and Television
SCPB	Standing Committee of the Politburo
SDH	synchronous digital hierarchy
SEC	State Education Commission
SETC	State Economic and Trade Commission
SPC	State Planning Commission
SOE	state-owned enterprise
TDM	time-division multiplexing
URL	uniform resource locator
VSAT	very small aperture terminal
WDM	wavelength-division multiplexing
WAP	wireless access protocol
WTO	World Trade Organization

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